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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty years, the landscape in which both law practice and legal 
education operate has dramatically changed. Demand for traditional legal services 
experienced tremendous growth from the 1990s through the early 2000s.1 However, since 
the Great Recession of 2008, demand in the legal sector has languished and, by many 
estimates, not yet recovered.2 With firms taking in less revenue, jobs in “big law”—firms 
employing over 1,000 attorneys—are increasingly unavailable to recent law graduates, 
despite turnover rates that have accelerated since 2008.3 At present, there are simply too 
many law graduates and too few jobs to absorb them; ten months after graduation, only 
60 percent of the law school class of 2014 had full-time long-term jobs that required them 
																																																								
1 While there is no uniform definition for traditional legal services, it is generally considered to 
encompass standard domains of law: business and commercial transactions; litigation representation in a 
variety of civil legal proceedings; and tax counsel. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: 
Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995 (2014), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ r/vol82/iss6/15 (describing alternatives to these domains driving the future of 
big law); and Dennis Kennedy, The Productization of Legal Services, 40 LAW PRACTICE (2015) 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2014/july-august/the-productization-of-
legal-services.html. 
2 See, e.g., Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2018), http://legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-Report-on-the-
State-of-the-Legal-Market.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (2017), http://static.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/static/pdf/peer-
monitor/S042201-Final.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (2016), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/upload/2016_PM_GT_Final-
Report.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(2015), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/upload/FINAL-
Report-1-7-15.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2014), https://peermonitor.thomsonreuters.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/2014_PM_GT_Report.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR 
THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2013), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/continuing-legal-
education/executive-education/upload/2013-report.pdf. 
3 MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT'S HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1997) (establishing the definition of “big law”); Theodore P. Seto, Where Do Partners Come 
From? 62 J.L. & EDUC. 242 (2012) (discussing the lack of big law jobs available to recent graduates of law 
schools in the years immediately following the 2008 recession compared to previous decades); Shannon 
Achimalbe, Solos and Small Law Firms Plow Through Associates Too, But They’re Tired of It, ABOVE THE 
LAW, April 13, 2016, http://abovethelaw.com/2016/04/solos-and-small-law-firms-plow-through-associates-
too-but-theyre-tired-of-it/ (noting the continuation of this trend in 2016). 
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to pass the bar. In 2017, only 68 percent did—its highest rate since 2008 but almost 10 
percent lower than bar-passage-required employment figures in at the turn of the 21st 
Century.4  
Law school outcomes—in terms of bar-passage rates—have significantly declined 
over the same period.5 Simultaneously, the average indebtedness of law school graduates, 
as well as the disparity of salaries between private- and public-sector attorneys, continues 
to increase,6 concurrent with the diminished investment and rising costs in higher 
education, generally.7 The effects of broader economic shifts that have yielded reductions 
in the demand for legal services jobs seem to have stretched much deeper into the legal 																																																								
4  See, e.g., 2015-2018 Granular Employment Data, AM. BAR ASS’N (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
statistics/2015_2018_bar_passage_law_school_funded_granular_employment_data.xlsx; Steven J. Harper, 
Too Many Law Students, Too Few Legal Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015); STEVEN HARPER, THE 
LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS (2013). See, also, Paul F. Teich, The Near-Term Employment 
Prospects of American Law School Graduates, Boston Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 16-03 
(2015); Law School Tuition 1985-2012, AM. BAR ASS’N,, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf; Margaret Lofuts, Drop in Applications Spurs Changes at Law 
Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 11, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/articles/2015/03/11/drop-in-applications-spurs-changes-at-law-schools (2015); Ry 
Rivard, Lowering the Bar: More Law Schools Are Admitting Less Qualified Students, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED., Jan. 16, 2015 from https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-compete-
students-many-may-not-have-admitted-past (2015); Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New 
Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541–607 
(2013); George Critchlow, Kim Kardashian and Honey Boo Boo: Models for Law School Success (or Not), 
45 CONN. L. REV. 1319-53 (2013); Class of 2001 Employment Summary Findings: Employment of New 
Law Graduates Stands at 90%, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (2002), available at 
https://www.nalp.org/uploads/43_erss01sum.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Multistate Bar Exam Scores Drop to Lowest Point Ever; Is 
There a Link to Low-End LSAT Scores?, ABA JOURNAL, April 12, 2017, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/multistate_bar_exam_scores_drop_to_lowest_point_ever_are_low
_end_lsat_score/; Mark Hansen, What Do Falling Bar-passage Rates Mean for Legal Education—and the 
Future of the Profession. ABA JOURNAL, September 2016, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/legal_education_bar_exam_passage. 
6 Jerome M. Organ, Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal Education, 41 WASH. U. 
J. L. POL’Y, 33-56 (2013); William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: Federal 
Loans Inflate College Budgets, But How Long Will That Last If Law Grads Can't Pay Their Bills?, 98 AM. 
BAR ASS’N J. 30 (2012); John A. Sebert, The Cost and Financing of Legal Education, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
516-27 (2002); Marilyn Yarbrough, Financing Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457-92 (2001). 
7 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. BECKER, JR., AND DARRELL R. LEWIS, THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2012) (noting a diminishing public investment in higher education amidst rising 
costs); Gordon C. Winston, Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher 
Education, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 13-36 (1999) (noting the same). 
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education pipeline than the last economic recession in 2001.8 Resultantly, the demand for 
legal education, which peaked during the Great Recession of 2008, is in the midst of an 
historic decline.9 
Figure 1.1: Law School Enrollment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2010, for example, a total of 145,575 law students were enrolled in J.D. degree 																																																								
8 See Figure 1, supra. See also Margaret Lofuts, Drop in Applications Spurs Changes at Law 
Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (March 11, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-
graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2015/03/11/drop-in-applications-spurs-changes-at-law-schools. 
9 See Figure 1, supra. See also Total LSATs Administered: Counts & Percent Increases by Year, 
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL (2015), http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-administered; 
End-of-year Summary: ABA (Applicants, Applications & Admissions), LSATs, and Credential Assembly, 
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL (2015), http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsac-volume-summary. 
It is rather apparent that higher education and in fact graduate education increasingly resembles a consumer 
good. See, e.g., Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Nurturing the Law Student’s Soul: Why Law Schools Are Still 
Struggling to Teach Professionalism and How to Do Better in an Age of Consumerism, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 
1021 (2016) (indicating that, like all of higher education, for better or worse, legal education now operates 
in a marketplace where “consumers purchas[e] a product, and law schools increasingly see themselves as 
purveyors of a product”). For further discussion on the rise of consumerism in higher education, see, e.g., 
JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
(2005); SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW ECONOMY: 
MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION (2004); DONALD G. STEIN, BUYING IN OR SELLING OUT?: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY (2004); ROGER L. GEIGER, KNOWLEDGE 
AND MONEY: RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES AND THE PARADOX OF THE MARKETPLACE (2004); ERIC GOULD, 
THE UNIVERSITY AND THE PARADOX OF THE MARKETPLACE (2004); ERIC GOULD, THE UNIVERSITY IN A 
CORPORATE CULTURE (2003); DAVID L. KIRP, SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE 
MARKETING OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003); DEREK BOK UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003). 
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programs, but by 2017, this number had fallen to 110,156—by far, the lowest enrollment 
since 1974, when there were 47 fewer accredited law schools.10 Even elite law schools 
have attracted significantly fewer and less qualified applicants each year since 2010.11 In 
fact, the number of Law School Admission Tests (LSATs) administered in the 2017 
admissions cycle declined approximately 25 percent from the number administered in the 
2009 admissions cycle, with the lack of LSAT test-takers registering as high as a 40 
percent reduction from the 2009 figures in the 2014 admissions cycle.12 Although the 
number of examinees for the LSAT climbed somewhat in 2018, the total number of 
LSATs administered in any year between 2013 and 2018 is lower than any other single 
year since 1987.13 While it is too early to tell if the 2018 increase in the number of test 																																																								
10 See Figure 1, infra. See also, Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, 1963-2012 Academic Years, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR (2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf; 2016 Standard 509 Information Report Data 
Overview, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/2016_standard_509_data_overview.authcheckdam.pdf. This is not the first recession to impact 
enrollments in higher education, and though similarities exist between institutions in terms of the 
manifestations of these impacts, the effects can vary by institution type and even within institution type. 
See EARL F. CHEIT, THE NEW DEPRESSION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A STUDY OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS AT 
41 COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1971). 
11 See Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 312-384 
(2015); Laira Martin, Law Schools Admitting More Minorities to Combat Enrollment Drop, NAT’L JURIST, 
Feb. 17. 2015, http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/law-schools-admitting-more-minorities-combat-
enrollment-drop (describing the decline in law student academic credentials including median GPA and 
LSAT scores). See also Natalie Kitroeff, The Best Law Schools Are Attracting Fewer Law Students, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 17, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-26/the-best-law-
schools-are-attracting-fewer-students (noting that among the very top law schools, only three law schools 
posted gains in applicants, while most saw their application pool shrink by an average 20 percent between 
2011 and 2015). 
12 Total LSATs Administered—Counts & Percent Increases by Admin & Year, LAW SCHOOL 
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL (2018), http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-administered (reporting that 
171,514 LSAT exams were administered in 2009-2010, while only 101,689 were administered in 2014–
2015). However, it should be noted that a recent bump in the number of LSATs administered in the 2017 
admissions cycle suggests a greater number of law school matriculants in Fall 2018, but even with this 
increase, 2017 admissions cycle figures still lag 2009 admissions cycle LSAT-takers by almost 25 percent. 
See, id. (reporting that 129,165 prospective law students sat for the LSAT in the 2017 admissions cycle, an 
increase of nearly 20,000 test-takers, exhibiting what some observers have called the “Trump Bump,” but 
still falling over 40,000 test-takers short of 2009 admissions cycle figures). 
13  Derek T. Muller, LSAT Trends Show Increase in Test-takers and Project Modest 2018 JD 
Enrollment Increase, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY, December 15, 2017, 
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takers reflects in the number of the law school admission applications received in Fall 
2017, recent enrollment patterns have been dismal since 2010. Reaching a thirty-year low 
in Fall 2014 at 55,700—nearly half of the reported 100,600 applicants to national law 
schools in Fall 2004—law school applications have steadily declined from the historic 
zenith in 2010, reaching just 26,737 in 2017, nearly one quarter of Fall 2004 applicants.14  
These trends highlight how precipitous the decline in demand for legal education 
has been. As such, the modern realities of the legal education market have precipitated an 
even more competitive legal education market, focused on competition for law students.15 
The impetus for this competition among law schools is simple: all law schools to a lesser 
or greater extent are tuition dependent and thus rely on enrollment to generate revenue.16 
But the response of many prospective consumers of legal education, particularly 
the 60,000-plus 2016 admissions cycle LSAT-test-takers who decided not to enroll in law 
school in Fall 2017, has been somewhat predictable: to avoid incurring the risk of 																																																																																																																																																																					
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/12/lsat-trends (noting the 2017 “Trump Bump” in LSAT test-
takers); Total LSATs Administered: Counts & Percent Increases by Year, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS 
COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-administered (last visited Nov. 1, 2017). The Law 
School Admission Council (LSAC) administers both the LSAT and serves as the clearinghouse for 
applications for admission to American law schools. 
14  Report from LSAC, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL (January 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/files/LSAC_January_Newsletter_(1).pdf (last visited April 1, 2018); End-of-
Year Summary: ABA (Applicants, Applications & Admissions), LSATs, Credential Assembly, LAW SCHOOL 
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-administered (last visited Nov. 1, 
2017); Daniel O. Bernstine, The State of Law School Admissions: Where Are We in 2014?, BAR EXAMINER 
12 (June 2014), https://www.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/State-of-Law-School-Admissions-
2014.pdf (last visited April 1, 2018). 
15 See Ilana Kowarski, Less Competitive Law School Admissions a Boon for Applicants, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, August 8, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/2017-08-08/law-school-admissions-less-competitive-than-2008; Ry Rivard, Lowering the 
Bar, INSIDE HIGHER ED, January 16, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-
compete-students-many-may-not-have-admitted-past. 
16 The author was part of a panel at the 2018 ABA Mid-Year Conference with the Managing Director 
of Accreditation and Legal Education at the American Bar Association, who noted as such in his remarks. 
Given that this department of the American Bar Association has access to law school data, including 
financial data that is not publicly available, these remarks serve as the only real source of information on 
this point. Barry Currier, Stephen Daniels, C.J. Ryan, Rachel Van Cleave, and Judith Welch Wegner, The 
Perennial (and Stubborn Challenge of Cost, Affordability, and Access in Legal Education: Has It Finally 
Hit the Fan?, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Bar Association Mid-Year Conference (February 3, 
2018). 
 6 
investing in legal education altogether. Based on uncertain job prospects and decreased 
likelihood of credentialing to enter practice for nearly one third of law school 
graduates—by recent estimates—some scholars have concluded that it no longer makes 
economic sense to attend law school.17 Others contend that the lifetime earnings premium 
for graduates of top law schools may still justify the consumption of legal education.18 
These arguments, which are not mutually exclusive, taken together with the declining 
demand for legal education, indicate that the publicly perceived value of legal education 
has fallen since the Great Recession of 2008.19 Yet, despite significant declines in 
																																																								
17 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Samuel P. Engel, Does Law School Still Make Economic Sense?: 
An Empirical Analysis of “Big” Law Firm Partnership Prospects and the Relationship to Law School 
Attended, 62 J.L. & EDUC. 242 (2015); Sandy Baum, A Framework for Thinking About Law School 
Affordability, Access Group Center for Research & Policy Analysis Research Paper No. 15-04 (2015); 
Rebecca L. Bowman, When a Law Degree Is Not Enough: The Necessity of a Second Professional Degree 
for Lawyers (Dissertation, 2010). 
18 See, e.g., Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUDIES 249-89 (2014) (using Bureau of Labor Statistics to compare lifetime earnings of bachelor’s 
and law degree recipients and finding that, for most law school graduates, there exists a significant earning 
premium for graduates of law school over their bachelor’s degree earning peers); and Michael Simkovic & 
Frank McIntyre, Value of a Law Degree by College Major, Access Group Center for Research & Policy 
Analysis Research Paper No. 16-03 (2016) (finding that law degree earnings premiums are highest for 
humanities and social sciences majors and lowest for STEM majors.) 
19 The declining demand for legal education has been linked to concerns about the rising tuition 
costs, increasing student debt, and diminishing prospects of bar passage and employment for recent law 
graduates. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, xiiii (2012) (noting that “[w]hile raising 
tuition to astronomical heights, law schools have slashed need-based financial aid, thereby erecting a huge 
financial entry barrier to the legal profession. Increasing numbers of middle-class and poor will be 
dissuaded from pursuing a legal career by the frighteningly large price tag. The future complexion and 
legitimacy of our legal system is at stake”); Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and the Competition 
in Legal Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and Legal 
Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 503 (2013); Harper, supra note 4. See also Paul F. Teich, The Near-
Term Employment Prospects of American Law School Graduates, Boston Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, No. 16-03 (2015); Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for 
New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541–607 (2013); George Critchlow, Kim 
Kardashian and Honey Boo Boo: Models for Law School Success (or Not), 45 CONN. L. REV. 1319-53 
(2013); Law School Tuition 1985-2012, AM. BAR ASS’N, available at: 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf. See also Sara Randazzo, Bar Exam Passage Rates Nationwide Keep 
Dropping, WALL STREET J. Nov. 24, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/11/24/bar-passage-rates-keep-
dropping-across-the-country/; Natalie Kitroeff, Bar Exam Scores Drop to their Lowest Point in Decades, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 17, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-17/bar-exam-
scores-drop-to-their-lowest-point-in-decades. While this trend has yet to be investigated in the academic 
literature, it has been considered recently, albeit with data before the 2008 recession. See Jane Yakowitz, 
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enrollment, there are a considerable number of current law students—110,156 of them in 
2017—still pursuing a law degree.20  
The dissertation proceeds in three parts and contains a brief concluding section in 
the pages that follow. Drawing on the economics of higher education literature—
including theories of student choice enrollment management, and student 
engagement21—and informed by the literature on organizational and behavioral economic 
theory,22 this dissertation explains why and how current law students decide to enroll in a 																																																																																																																																																																					
Marooned: An Empirical Investigation of Law School Graduates Who Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 3 (2010). 
20 End-of-year Summary: ABA (Applicants, Applications & Admissions), LSATs, and Credential 
Assembly, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL (2017), http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsac-
volume-summary. 
21 The economics of higher education broadly consider inputs to and outputs from higher 
education. Despite declining state appropriations in higher education investment, a considerable amount of 
public resources are still devoted to higher education. See, e.g., William G. Bowen, The ‘Cost Disease’ in 
Higher Education: Is Technology the Answer?, STANFORD UNIV. (Oct. 2012), available at: 
http://www.ithaka.org/sites/default/files/files/ITHAKA-TheCostDiseaseinHigherEducation.pdf (discussing 
the costs of higher education and their relationship to economic productivity). Other facets of the 
economics of higher education literature are devoted to specific investigation. For a leading study in 
student choice, see, e.g., Laura W. Perna, Studying College Access and Choice: A Proposed Conceptual 
Model, in 21 HIGHER EDUCATION HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 99-157 (2006). For a seminal 
work in student enrollment management, see, e.g., Stephen L. DesJardins, Using Economic Concepts to 
Inform Enrollment Management, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH 59-74 (2006). For a 
close examination of factors impacting student engagement, see, e.g., JOHN M. BRAXTON, AMY S. HIRSCHY, 
AND SHEDERICK A. MCCLENDON, UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING COLLEGE STUDENT DEPARTURE 
(2011). 
22  The application of organizational theory, such as the recognition of organizational 
isomorphism—the adopted similarity among organizations such as law schools—is well established; most 
notably, the ubiquity of the case method to study law is the result of Christopher Columbus Langdell’s 
adoption of the method at Harvard Law School, originally pioneered by Tapping Reeve at the Letchfield 
Law School, which became the pedagogical mode du jour at the turn of the 20th Century and is still used 
today in American law schools. See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA 
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983). In the higher education context, organizational theorists have 
considered the modern university and its component parts, such as a law school, as “not a neutral 
institution, indisputably devoted to further the public good in all that it touches.” JACOB ROOKSBY, THE 
BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW UNIVERSITIES CAPTURE, MANAGE, AND MONETIZE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND WHY IT MATTERS, xi (2016). Rather, as this dissertation attempts to show, 
as universities more closely resemble private sector enterprises, the decisions they make are increasingly 
not in the public interest but made instead to minimize loss and maximize acquisition of wealth. See, e.g., 
Jeffery J. Williams, Deconstructing Academe: The Birth of Critical University Studies, CHRONICLE REV., 
Feb. 23, 2012, available at http://chronicle.com/article/An-Emerging-Field-Deconstructs/130791/. 
Additionally, the survey instrument used in the second part of this dissertation derives from the behavioral 
economics literature on risk tolerance. See generally, JONATHAN E. INGERSOLL, JR., THEORY OF FINANCIAL 
DECISION MAKING (1987) (covering—exhaustively—theories of financial decision making and risk 
tolerance). See also, James E. Corter & Yuh-Jia Chen, Do Investment Risk Tolerance Attitudes Predict 
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professional law degree program and assesses the economic value of legal education to 
graduates of law school. 
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the common factors that influence 
choice in the undergraduate context to legal education. In reporting the results of an 
original survey administered to current law students, the first chapter descriptively 
assesses how location, reputation, job placement, career opportunities, and alumni 
networks factor into students’ decision to attend law school. This discussion also reveals 
the overwhelming commonality of sources of information on which law students rely to 
inform their decision to attend law school. Finally, it reveals the average opportunity cost, 
as operationalized by prior income, that law students forgo in the labor market to attend 
law school and the cost sensitivity that law students exhibit, not only for the legal 
education they consume, but also for legal education as an abstracted commodity. 
The next chapter of this dissertation leverages publicly available data from every 
American law school between 2011–2016 to assess whether financial aid—the primary 
incentive that law schools have at their disposal to increase demand for legal education—
actually increases matriculation. The results from the analysis in this chapter indicate that 
financial aid awards have differential salience to law students in terms of their 
matriculation. These results call into question the recent trend among law schools to 
increase financial aid in order to yield increases in matriculation as a means of dealing 
with declining enrollments, as an ineffective and potentially unsustainable practice for 																																																																																																																																																																					
Portfolio Risk?, 20 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 369-81 (2006) (suggesting that investment risk tolerance may not 
explainable by a general cross-domain appetite for risk); Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and 
Decision Making, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 25-42 (2005) (finding significant correlation between cognitive 
ability and risk averse financial decision making); and Terrence A. Hallahan, Robert W. Faff & Michael D. 
McKenzie, An Empirical Investigation of Personal Financial Risk Tolerance, 13 FIN. SERV. REV. 57-78 
(2003) (finding that self-assessed risk tolerance relates to psychometrically derived financial risk tolerance 
scores). 
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many law schools in the long term. 
The final chapter of this dissertation examines the extent to which law graduates 
have reaped short-term labor market returns on their legal education investment since 
2000. Utilizing data from a nationally representative dataset, a Mincerian approach to 
estimating individual wage returns to legal education is conducted in this chapter that 
evaluates law schools by the outcomes of their graduates via the education production 
function. The results uncover existing stratifications, not only in terms of the wage 
returns to individuals by the reputation of the law school the law graduate attended and 
the performance of the law graduate in law school, but also among law school graduates 
on the basis of their gender. 
Among other important contributions, this dissertation employs mixed methods, 
leveraging existing national quantitative datasets and new information from an original 
qualitative dataset—a survey instrument cataloguing the decision-making process of law 
students. By investigating these questions, this dissertation provides an improved 
understanding of the extent to which sources of information and preferences, as well as 
the role of financial aid awards, motivate decision making in the legal education 
marketplace, and the effect of law school reputation and individual performance on labor 
market returns to legal education. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ANALYZING LAW SCHOOL CHOICE 
INTRODUCTION 
Higher education in the 21st Century is commonly depicted as a commercialized 
marketplace.1 From a market standpoint, the value of a good, such as post-baccalaureate 
credentialing, is assessed by the cost and benefits of its consumption. Thus, the 
discussion of legal education as, simultaneously, both a good and a marketplace is not 
new.2 As part of the broader higher education sector, legal education can be said to 
contribute to private benefits such as increased salary and career mobility.3 Legal 
education also produces positive public externalities, such as better-trained lawyers to 
perform a variety of jobs in a progressively complex and specialized legal sector, in 
addition to the private benefits, such as economic and social mobility, that have 
traditionally derived from legal training. However, significant declines in law school 
outcomes since 2013 are indicative of the costs and negative externalities of legal 
education. These externalities shape perceptions of the economic value associated with 
legal education and influence demand for legal education. 
Nationally, enrollments at law schools have been dramatically reduced since 
2010; comparing Fall 2017 to Fall 2010 enrollments, losses to enrolled students exceed 																																																								
1 See, e.g., DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2009); SHEILA SLAUGHTER AND LARRY L. LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, 
POLICIES, AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY (1997). 
2 The discussion of legal education as a market place is not new. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL & 
PHILLIP S.C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (1988) (discussing the place of lawyers in society and 
classifying this place in terms of public and private good); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The 
Economy of Legal Practice as a Symbolic Market: Legal Value as the Product of Social Capital, Universal 
Knowledge, and State Authority 10 ECON. SOCIOLOGY 8-13 (2010), available at: 
http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_soc_10-3.pdf#page=8 (submitting that legal markets are artificially 
scarce because of the restricted supply of lawyers by law schools). 
3 ERNEST T. PASCARELLA & PATRICK T. TERENZINI, HOW COLLEGE AFFECTS STUDENTS (2005); 
LARRY L. LESLIE & PAUL T. BRINKMAN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988). 
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10,000 first-year students and 37,000 total J.D. degree-enrolled students, a 28.75% and 
25.33% reduction, respectively. Yet, more than 37,000 first-year students and over 
110,000 total students are currently enrolled in J.D. degree programs as of Fall 2017, 
notwithstanding bleak employment prospects and mounting debt that await many 
graduating law students. That many students still choose to pursue legal education despite 
economic disincentives to do so raises important questions about these students 
motivations to attend law schools and the information on which these students relied in 
making their decision to attend law school. To combat the trend of declining enrollment, 
while understanding the economically irrational behaviors of current law students and 
thereby satisfy the needs and desires of current and potential consumers—students—law 
schools must first identify the needs and desires of the consumer.4 
In order to address the present lack of understanding about what motivates post-
Recession law students to enroll in law school, this chapter examines several of the 
factors that bear on the choice to invest in legal education from the results of an original 
survey distributed to current law students in the 2017–2018 academic year. This chapter 
discusses the student choice literature in higher education, the survey, and its results. 
 
STUDENT CHOICE 
The literature on student choice, which indicates that choice decisions are 
complex and multifactorial, is well established in the undergraduate context. A 																																																								
4 Demetris Vrontis, Alkis Thrassou, and Yioula Melanthiou, A Contemporary Higher Education 
Student-choice Model for Developed Countries, 60 J. BUS. RESEARCH 979-89 (2007) (citing Lynn Eagle & 
Ross Brennan, Students as Customers: Why the Customer Concept May Not Be Right... and Students Might 
Not Know What They Need, 31 Middlesex University Business School Working Paper Series (2005)). See 
also, Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics. 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11–46. (1998) (reviewing a large 
number of studies from psychology, economics, and other fields demonstrating how, under some 
circumstances, individuals have changing preferences, make errors in judgments, do not pursue their own 
self-interest, and process information in ways that are not accounted for in typical economic models). 
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considerable number of studies in this area concern: how students decide how much 
education to acquire;5 what college to attend;6 and whether to continue toward degree 
completion or drop out.7 As relevant to this chapter, the leading factors that contribute to 
a student’s decision to enroll at a particular institution can be distilled by the academic 
disciplinary methods for studying student choice: sociological studies in the area identify 
family socio-economic status, academic ability, and environmental contexts as playing 
the largest roles in student choice;8 studies rooted in the psychological sciences indicate 
that reputation of the institution and recommendations of authority figures play 																																																								
5 See, e.g., JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS (1974); Elchanan Cohn & 
Terry G. Geske. Private Nonmonetary Returns to Investment in Higher Education, ECON. OF AM. HIGHER 
EDUC. 173-95 (1992); GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (1993); Elchanan Cohen and W.W. Huches, Jr., A Benefit-cost 
Analysis of Investment in College Education in the United States: 1969–1985, 13 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 
109–23 (1994); George Butlin, Determinants of Post-secondary Participation, 5 EDUC. Q. REV.  9–35. 
(1999); and James Monks, The Returns to Individual and College Characteristics: Evidence from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 19 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 279–89 (2000). 
6 Gregory A. Jackson & George B. Weathersby, Individual Demand for Higher Education: A 
Review and Analysis of Recent Empirical Studies, 46 J. HIGHER EDUC. 623-52 (1975); RANDALL G. 
CHAPMAN, TOWARD A THEORY OF COLLEGE SELECTION: A MODEL OF COLLEGE SEARCH AND CHOICE 
BEHAVIOR (1981); Don Hossler & Karen S. Gallagher, Studying Student College Choice: A Three-phase 
Model and the Implications for Policymakers, 62 COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 207-21 (1987); LARRY L. 
LESLIE & PAUL T. BRINKMAN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988); James C. Hearn, 
Determinants of Postsecondary Education Attendance: Some Implications of Alternative Specifications of 
Enrollment, 10 EDUC. EVAL. & POL’Y ANALYSIS 171-85 (1988); Michael B. Paulsen, College Choice: 
Understanding Student Enrollment Behavior, ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report No. 6 (1990); Stephen 
L. DesJardins, Halil Dundar, and Darwin D. Hendel, Modeling the College Application Decision Process in 
a Land-grant University, 18 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 117-32 (1999); Laura W. Perna, Differences in the 
Decision to Attend College among African Americans, Hispanics, and Whites, 71 J. HIGHER EDUC. 117-41 
(2000); Robert K. Toutkoushian, Do Parental Income and Educational Attainment Effect the Initial 
Choices of New Hampshire College Bound Students?, 20 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 245-62 (2001). 
7 Vincent Tinto, Dropout from Higher Education: A Theoretical Synthesis of Recent Research, 45 
REV. OF EDUC. RESEARCH 89-125 (1975); JAMES L. PRICE, THE STUDY OF TURNOVER (1977); John P. Bean, 
The Application of a Model of Turnover in Work Organizations to the Student Attrition Process, 6 REV. OF 
HIGHER EDUC. 129-48 (1983); Charles F. Manski, An Anatomy of the Selection Problem, J. HUMAN RES. 
343-60 (1989); Alberto F. Cabrera, Amaury Nora, and Maria B. Castaneda, College Persistence: Structural 
Equations Modeling Test of an Integrated Model of Student Retention, 64 REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 123-39 
(1993); JOHN BRAXTON, REWORKING THE STUDENT DEPARTURE PROPOSAL (2000). 
8 See, e.g., Laura W. Perna, Studying College Access and Choice: A Proposed Conceptual Model, 
in 21 HIGHER EDUCATION HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 99-157 (2006) (highlighting 
socioeconomic status and context as factors that both predict student choice as well as perpetuate 
institutional stratification); ROBERT ZEMSKY & PENNEY OEDEL, THE STRUCTURE OF COLLEGE CHOICE 
(1983) (noting that as students’ family income, educational aspirations, aptitude, and achievement, and 
parent’s educational attainment increase, their choices become more likely to include high cost, highly 
selective, more distant, private colleges and universities). 
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predominant roles in student choice;9 policy studies indicate that federal and state funding 
patterns and financial aid programs can influence students in the selection of certain types 
of higher education institutions;10 and economic studies indicate that cost, including 
opportunity cost and perceived cost, is the strongest predictor of student choice.11  
Yet, little is known about whether the model of student choice applies to graduate 
education, and legal education in particular. Specifically, there is a knowledge gap about: 
the sources of information on which current law students rely to shape their perceptions 
of the value of legal education and how these perceptions link to action, such as their 
decision to enroll in professional law degree programs; the extent to which their risk 
tolerance relates to their decision to invest in legal education; and their perceptions of the 
value their legal education has added to their job prospects and career preparation. In fact, 
the literature about law students, beyond demographic changes over time, and graduate 
student choice is scarce.12 Moreover, while a robust body of literature links risk tolerance 
																																																								
9 Don Hossler & Karen S. Gallagher, Studying Student College Choice: A Three-phase Model and 
the Implications for Policymakers, 62 COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 207-21 (1987) (suggesting that the 
student choice process is in fact a three part decision-making process, comprised of the search and 
information gathering, the application, and the choice or decision, where at each level the student making 
the choice is potentially concerned with the opinions and recommendations of others); David G. Erdmann, 
An Examination of Factors Influencing Student Choice in the College Selection Process, 100 J. COLLEGE 
ADMISSIONS 3-6 (1983) (noting that reputation—in addition to pre-established factors like cost, location, 
etc.—is an important consideration in choice). 
10 See, e.g., Laura W. Perna & Marvin A. Titus, Understanding Differences in the Choice of 
College Attended: The Role of State Public Policies, 27 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 501-25 (2004) (concluding 
that enrollment patterns are stratified by socioeconomic status and state policies addressing affordability are 
related to enrollment patterns); Bridget T. Long, How Do Financial Aid Policies Affect Colleges? The 
Institutional Impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship, 39 J. HUMAN RES. 1045-66 (2004) (finding that a 
statewide merit scholarship policy did stem “brain-drain”). 
11 See, e.g., Michael B. Paulsen & Edward P. St. John, Social Class and College Costs: Examining 
the Financial Nexus between College Choice and Persistence, 73 J. HIGHER EDUC. 189-236 (2002); 
Michael L. Tierney, Student College Choice Sets: Toward an Empirical Characterization, 18 RESEARCH IN 
HIGHER EDUC. 271-84 (1983); WILLIAM IHLANFELDT, ACHIEVING OPTIMAL ENROLLMENTS AND TUITION 
REVENUES (1980); and Girish N. Punj & Richard Staelin, The Choice Process for Graduate Business 
Schools, J. MARKETING RESEARCH 588-98 (1978). 
12 Girish N. Punj & Richard Staelin, The Choice Process for Graduate Business Schools, J. 
MARKETING RESEARCH 588-98 (1978) (investigating the application of choice to graduate business 
education—the only serious extant study of student choice in graduate professional education). 
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to other unsound behavioral economic responses, scholars have yet to connect risk 
tolerance to risks associated with debt and under-matching in the labor force among 
students and recent graduates of professional graduate schools, such as law school 
students and graduates.13 This chapter endeavors to address the paucity of understanding 
about the decision-making process of law students’ to attend law school and seeks to 
contribute to the growing literature connecting risk tolerance and the decision to invest in 
higher education. 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL CHOICE SURVEY 
Purpose and Research Questions 
While institutional surveys and a notable national survey of law students exist,14 
this dissertation contributes a novel survey instrument of law students. The Law School 
Choice Survey15 aims to reveal what motivates students to act on their perceptions such 
as enrolling in law school, what outcomes result from behavioral responses such as this 
decision, and the conditions under which they make decisions. Given that many of these 
students have information about the diminished opportunities for jobs after graduation 
prior to their enrollment in law school, the survey asked:  
1. Upon what sources of information did these law students rely in making the 
decision to enroll in law school? 																																																								
13  Stephen L. DesJardins and Robert K. Toutkoushian, Are Students Really Rational? The 
Development of Rational Thought and Its Application to Student Choice, in 20 HIGHER EDUCATION 
HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 191-240 (2005) (noting that rationality is “always defined relative 
to each person’s preferences and taste for risk. . . . [and] does not hold that given like information 
individuals will make the same decisions or make the decisions that an individual observing the situation 
would have made.”). It should also be noted that, as described below, because not every law school’s 
students received a survey instrument that contained questions about risk tolerance, a full discussion of risk 
tolerance will not be present in these pages. 
14 See, e.g., the Law School Survey of Student Engagement, available at http://lssse.indiana.edu. 
15 The Law School Choice survey is included at the end of the dissertation, and not at the end of 
this chapter, because of its considerable length. 
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2. What factors played the largest roles influencing their decision to attend their 
law school? 
3. What choices of law schools did these students have? 
4. Whether the following constructs were salient to these law students, 
influencing their decision to attend their law school: 
a. The location of the law school; 
b. The reputation of the law school; 
c. The institutional financial aid package offered by the law school; and 
d. The student’s marginal opportunity cost. 
5. What career interests these law students have. 
6. What levels of price sensitivity and risk tolerance these students demonstrate. 
 
These research questions, and others, are answered descriptively from the results 
of an original survey that was administered at four ABA-accredited law schools, helping 
to describe how current law students’ perceptions of the value of legal education relate to 
decisions and action. As each law school corresponds not only to a particular typology of 
law school, but also to the four tiers of academic reputation,16 the data provide an 
illustrative portrait of current law students’ perception of the economic value of legal 
education. 
The survey questions came from a variety of sources, but most are original 
framings. Most of the descriptive questions, such as the student’s background 
information (race, gender, parental education, undergraduate major, etc.), were questions 
that derive from existing national surveys of students.17 Answer choices about previous 
employment experience and industry, as well as prior income, were drawn from Bureau 
of Labor Statistics classifications of industry.18 Questions about a student’s confidence in 
																																																								
16 For instance, the private elite law school is a top ranked law school. The public flagship law 
school falls just outside of the top 50 law schools ranked by the U.S. News & World Report. The public 
regional law school is ranked outside the top 100 law schools by U.S. News & World Report, and the 
private new law school is ranked outside the top 150 law schools as ranked by the same publication. As 
such, these schools are illustrative of their peers on the basis of these ubiquitous rankings. 
17 See, e.g., the Law School Survey of Student Engagement, available at http://lssse.indiana.edu; 
and the National Survey of Student Engagement, available at http://nsse.indiana.edu. 
18  See, e.g., Industries at a Glance, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, available at 
https://www.bls.gov/iag/. 
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their training and job prospects were modified from surveys such as the Strada-Gallup 
College Student Survey.19 However, one question, on price sensitivity was a totally 
original application of an existing economic concept.20 Additionally, several questions in 
this survey, notably those related to the research questions, were completely novel 
inquiries in studies of students. The data collected from responses to these novel survey 
questions include information on the sources of information on which law students relied 
when making the decision to enroll in law school, their risk tolerance, and their 
perceptions of value associated with their law training, among other constructs. The 
survey instrument aims to fill in the research gap related to student perceptions of the 
value of their investment in law school, the utility gained from their learning experiences 
in their law school environment, and their projected prospects of bar passage and 
employment in the legal labor market. This survey is the first to collect this information 
on law students for public research purposes. 
 
Data 
To begin the study, six law schools, including one unaccredited law school, were 
invited to participate in this research survey, titled the “Law School Choice Survey.” 
Three law schools formally agreed to participate, and one law school allowed its students 
to be surveyed but did not formally endorse its students’ participation in the survey. Two 
law schools, including the unaccredited law school, declined to participate in the survey. 
																																																								
19  See, e.g., the Strada-Gallup College Student Survey, available at 
http://news.gallup.com/reports/225161/2017-strada-gallup-college-student-survey.aspx. 
20 The concept of a consumer’s price sensitivity relative to an economic good or service was first 
developed by Van Westendorp and prior to this dissertation research had not been applied to the context of 
higher education. See Peter Van Westendorp, NSS-Price Sensitivity Meter: A New Approach to Study of 
Consumer Perception of Price, PROCEEDINGS FROM ESOMAR CONGRESS (1976). 
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These law schools were chosen not merely because of convenience but because they 
closely track the several model typologies of law schools and among tiers of their ranking 
in the U.S. News & World Report. As a condition of their participation in the survey, the 
law schools cannot be specifically identified. However, the law schools participating in 
this survey can be described as follows: a private elite law school; a public state-flagship 
law school; a public regional law school; and a private new law school. 
Data collection for the survey commenced in the Fall semester of 2017, with a 
response period of October 1-November 15, 2017. The survey was administered on the 
Qualtrics survey online platform and included a modest respondent incentive for 
participation in the survey.21 Response rates, on completion of the survey period, were as 
follows:  
Table 2.1: Survey Response Rates  
Law School Type Percentage 
  
Private Elite Law School 44.70 
  
Public Flagship Law School 33.62 
  
Public Regional Law School 39.17 
  
Private New Law School 42.54 
  
 
The response rates within this sample are quite robust, given the population is trends 
lower for response rates relative to other populations. For example, a recent national 
survey of undergraduate students averaged a response rate of 29% with private university 
students outpacing their public university peers in terms of response rates.22 Even if 																																																								
21 Responding students were entered into a drawing for one of ten $50 Amazon gift cards at each 
participating law school. This respondent incentive was supported through the generosity of the funders of 
the survey: Vanderbilt University, the American Bar Foundation, and the AccessLex Institute. 
22 NSSE Response Rate FAQ, NATIONAL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT (2016), available at 
http://nsse.indiana.edu/pdf/Resp_Rate_FAQ.pdf. The phenomenon of private university participants 
exceeding their public university counterparts in terms of survey participation has been born out in a meta-
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response rates were lower than the robust participation rate exceeding 40%, there would 
still be strong support that the descriptive claims made herein are unbiased, given the 
population studied.23 Additionally, respondents to the survey were representative of their 
law school’s entire population on the basis of race and gender, within 2%, in each 
category. The survey instrument consisted of 36 questions, of which 5 questions 
contained multiple parts generated by the respondent’s response to the first part. 
However, because an agreement with one of the law schools required the omission of ten 
questions, one law school received an abridged version of the survey, with these ten 
questions removed. The descriptive analysis in this chapter makes use of the common 
data between the surveys (i.e., the 26 questions to which all participating law schools’ 
students responded). 
The first part of the survey covered background information about the 
respondents. The first cluster of questions asked students to indicate background 
information about the student, such as: what law school they attend; their enrollment 
status; their law school year; whether they transferred to the law school they attend; their 
ethnicity; their gender; their age; their parents’ highest level of education; their parents’ 
income; the distance from their law school to the home in which they last lived before 
attending law school; their law school grade point average; their class rank; their 
undergraduate grade point average; and their Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score. 
																																																																																																																																																																					
analysis of university student survey research, which also indicated that students with the highest and 
lowest academic credentials are most likely to participate in survey research. See Stephen R. Porter & Paul 
D. Umbach, Student Survey Response Rates across Institutions: Why Do they Vary?, 47 RESEARCH IN 
HIGHER EDUC. 229-47 (2006). 
23  Recent research has questioned whether lower response rates indicate biased results. See, e.g., 
Douglas S. Massey & Roger Tourangeau, Where Do We Go from Here? Nonresponse and Social 
Measurement, 645 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOCIAL SCI. 222–36 (2013); and Andy 
Peytchev, Consequences of Survey Nonresponse, 645 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOCIAL 
SCI. 88-111 (2013). 
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The next three questions asked students to indicate their approximate income in the year 
immediately prior to entering law school, their employment status prior to law school, 
and whether they had an additional graduate degree. Based on responses to these 
questions, students were asked about: their sector of employment; and the area of 
previous graduate studies, degree, and degree granting institution. Students were also 
asked about the area of their undergraduate studies, degree, and degree granting 
institution. 
The next part of the survey dealt with choice, specifically: the law schools to 
which students applied and were admitted; whether the law school they attend was their 
first, second, third, fourth-or-more choice at various times from the period before they 
applied to law school to the date on which they responded to the survey; and their second 
choice law school to which they were admitted. This section also queried students about 
the factors influencing their choice and information available to law students in making 
their decision to attend law school, specifically: the factors of greatest, average, and least 
consideration in making their decision to attend law school; and the information upon 
which students relied in making their decision to attend law school. 
The final section of the survey covered several constructs, including: post-
graduation career interests and occupational field; how the respondent was paying for 
legal education; the annual cost of attendance at the respondent’s law school and the 
respondent’s second choice law school; and the respondent’s price sensitivity to legal 
education in general. 
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Framework and Analytic Strategy 
The survey created for this study assesses current law students’ choice of law 
school and various factors related to their cost sensitivity and projected outcomes that 
frame their the perceptions of the economic value of legal education. It also tests the 
limits of central economic theories, such as the rationality of economic agents, 
organizational and firm behavior, and the education production function, as applied to the 
context of the competitive legal education market and its participants.24 Specifically, the 
constructs from which the survey questions originated are derived from the literature on 
student choice, the economics of higher education, and related theories of decision 
																																																								
24 Adherents to rational choice theory posit that, given certain social, psychological, or economic 
constraints, an actor will behave rationally. For a lengthier discussion of the rationality of economic agents, 
see, in order of contribution to the knowledge about the merits and limits of rational choice theory, Herbert 
A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, Q. J. ECON. 99-118 (1955); Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263-91 (1979); JAMES 
S. COLEMAN & THOMAS J. FARARO, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: ADVOCACY AND CRITIQUE (1992). 
Specifically, the analysis of the survey in this chapter seeks to test the limits of the rationality of economic 
agents in the legal education market, given that “wealth maximizing” activities are fundamentally at odds 
with risk aversion in the current legal education market. For more information on the organizational and 
firm behavior frame that this analysis will employ, see Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937). Coase’s theory of the firm finds purchase in relation to legal education’s 
responses to various market conditions. That is, when viewing legal education as a good provided to 
consumers, law school firm behavior appears to have emerged in response to (perverse) incentives created 
by: the U.S. News and World Report law school rankings; the impact of the recession on the demand for 
legal education; and the emergence of an increasingly crowded market for the provision of legal education. 
For example, law schools may bear the transaction costs of delivering the legal education required to be 
eligible for bar passage and later practice, but they transfer the transaction costs of paying for the good and 
the value of the good in the market by relying on student performance on bar examinations and success in 
practice to set the external signaling mechanism and the value of the good. While this model of firm 
behavior is not entirely unique to law schools, the response of law schools to continue to enroll less and 
less qualified law students, despite the unlikelihood that these students will successfully pass the bar and 
secure and job in law, law schools are at the center of the factors contributing to the uncertainty of the legal 
professional market. See also, Organ, supra note 10 (analyzing this recent trend); E. Gordon Gee & Donald 
W. Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695 (1977) 
(discussing this trend historically). For an explanation of the education production function, see, e.g., Peter 
Arcidiacono, Patrick Bayer and Aurel Hizmo, Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the 
Revelation of Ability, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 76-104 (2010) (relating the revelatory ability of 
educational credentials, via signaling, to the labor market); Alan B. Krueger, Experimental Estimates of the 
Education Production Function, 114 Q. J. ECON. 497-532 (1999) (equating, through causal estimates, the 
effect of schooling inputs on developmental outcomes); and Paul Glewwe and Hanan G. Jacoby, Economic 
Growth and the Demand for Education: Is There a Wealth Effect, 74 J. DEV. ECON. 33-51 (2004) (studying 
the relationship, in a comparative national sense, between human capital investment, national wealth, and 
the demand for education). 
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making. In its novel application of these constructs for the first time to the context of 
professional graduate education, this survey, above all, assesses behavioral responses of 
consumers of legal education to incentives that exist within the legal education 
marketplace.25 By assessing the salience and sources of information about which students 
rely to inform their decision to attend law school, this survey also helps point to 
informational monopolies and sources of informational asymmetry. 26  Perhaps most 
importantly, this survey collects information about student buying behavior and choice of 
law school.27 This survey also explores the link between risk tolerance and investment in 
graduate education.28 
An analysis of responses to this survey helps to reveal the factors that relate to 
law school choice and the extent to which perceptions of value motivate consumer action 
in the legal education marketplace vis-à-vis the norms of their institution and cohort and 
values they place on their legal education. This chapter presents timely findings on the 
present crisis in legal education, developing more clarity around the incentives created by 
market forces and market players in the legal education space and the responses by 
consumers to these forces. As one of the first studies of these constructs in legal 
education rooted in the economics of higher education literature, and informed by a 																																																								
25 See, e.g., Donald R. Lichtenstein, Nancy M. Ridgway & Richard G. Netemeyer, Price 
Perceptions and Consumer Shopping Behavior: A Field Study, 30 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 234-45 
(1993); Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, Social Preferences and the Response to 
Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data, 120 Q. J. ECON. 917-62 (2005); RICHARD L. OLIVER, 
SATISFACTION: A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONSUMER (2014). 
26 In the higher education context, the idea of informational asymmetry is not new. See, e.g., David 
D. Dill & Maarja Soo, Transparency and Quality in Higher Education Markets, in MARKETS IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION, 61-85 (2005); Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of the Pricing of 
Higher Education and Other Services in which the Customers Are Inputs, 103 J. POL. ECON. 573-86 (1995). 
27 Girish N. Punj & Richard Staelin, The Choice Process for Graduate Business Schools, J. 
MARKETING RESEARCH 588-98 (1978) (investigating the extent to which buying power relates to student 
choice in the context of graduate business education). 
28  Stephen L. DesJardins and Robert K. Toutkoushian, Are Students Really Rational? The 
Development of Rational Thought and Its Application to Student Choice, in 20 HIGHER EDUCATION 
HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 191-240 (2005). 
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behavioral economic framework, this dissertation not only uncovers trends in legal 
education but also law students’ experiences with these trends, providing insight into how 
the economics of legal education affect its most important constituent group—law 
students. It is hoped that the findings from this survey will contribute to a dialogue about 
necessary areas of reform in the business model of legal education. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Overview 
The results from the survey, reported below, are a function of the responding 
sample of students at each of the four participating law schools. In addition to the 
typological descriptions of the law schools, context about the students at these law 
schools helps to frame the survey results. The descriptions that follow provide this 
context from the most recent ABA data.29 
Like their law school, students at the private elite law school are elite law 
students. First-year students beginning their legal studies in 2017 recorded a 166 median 
LSAT score and 3.75 undergraduate grade point average. Overall, the private law school 
is racially diverse, with 30.88% J.D. degree-enrolled students from underrepresented 
minority groups. It would be fair to say that these students would have good odds of 
admission at any law school in the country.30 
																																																								
29  See 2017 Standard 509 Information Report Data Overview, AM. BAR ASS’N (2017), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/2017_standard_509_data_overview.authcheckdam.pdf. 
30 Admissions decisions, like enrollment decisions are multifactorial processes. See, e.g., How 
Law Schools Determine Whom to Admit, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL (2018), 
https://www.lsac.org/jd/applying-to-law-school/whom-to-admit. However, to provide the reader with a 
better sense of the modal student enrolled at each of the participating law schools, the author compared 
entering law student credentials of students at these law schools to other law schools nationally and reports 
these comparisons for the facility of the reader to draw his or her own conclusions. 
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First-year students at the public flagship law school maintained a 158 LSAT 
median score and 3.52 undergraduate grade point average, with 22.51% of all students 
coming from underrepresented minority groups. The average credentials of these students 
suggest that they would be competitive with the next tier of law schools, placing them 
around the top third of all first-year law students nationally. 
Law students in their first-year at the public regional law school had a 152 median 
LSAT scores and a 3.30 undergraduate grade point average, and 25.32% of all law 
students at this law school identified with underrepresented minority groups. Based on 
these entering credentials, students from the public regional law school would be 
competitive applicants for admission at slightly less than half of all law schools. 
Students in their first-year of law school at the private new law school averaged a 
148 LSAT score and a 3.08 undergraduate grade point average, with 27.27% of all law 
students reporting their race as belonging to an underrepresented minority group. The 
students from this law school could be expected to compete for admission among a much 
smaller group of law schools, likely comprising just under one quarter of all law schools. 
In sum, the law schools participating in this survey are illustrative of their peer 
institutions, roughly corresponding to the common typological description of law schools 
in each of the four quartiles of law schools on the basis of their reputation in the U.S. 
News rankings. Likewise, their students are relatively good proxies for their peer students 
at law schools that share a similar ranking. The results of the survey, which follow below, 
can thus be read as providing a representative illustration of law students at law schools 
that are similar to the participating law schools by typological description as well as by 
reputation. 
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Location 
For years, studies of undergraduate student choice have determined that the 
salience of location ultimately relates to student choice of higher education institution, 
particularly for students living in low socioeconomic communities or geographically 
remote areas.31 Yet, the salience of location in the context of choice in professional 
graduate education, and more specifically legal education, has not yet been established. 
As such, in one of the first questions on the survey, the Law School Choice survey asked 
respondents about the proximity of the location of the law school at which they are 
currently enrolled to the home in which they last lived before they began law school. The 
answers varied by institution type but tended to coalesce around a dominant response for 
each institution. 
Table 2.2: Location 
 Private Elite 
Law School 
Public Flagship 
Law School 
Public Regional Law 
School 
Private New Law 
School 
     
Metropolitan Area 
(0 – 50 miles) 
4.48 26.71 51.89 30.77 
     
State or Region 
(51 – 250 miles) 
12.44 38.61 24.05 46.16 
     
Out of Region 
(251+ miles) 
83.09 32.67 24.05 23.08 
     
 
These patterns indicate that the typological descriptions of the law schools used in 
this dissertation are relatively fitting. The private elite (national) law school’s students are 
overwhelmingly drawn from not only outside of the metropolitan area in which the law 
school is located, but also from outside the state and region (83.09%) in which the law 																																																								
31 See, e.g., David Card, Using Geographic Variation in College Proximity to Estimate the Return 
to Schooling, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON., Research Paper No. w4483 (1993) (discussing the relationship 
between university location, enrollment, and outcomes, for among the very first time); and William R. 
Doyle and Benjamin T. Skinner, Estimating the Education-earnings Equation Using Geographic Variation, 
53 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 254-67 (2016) (employing a latter-day application of the Card analysis). 
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school is located. While the greatest balance between response categories can be found 
within the responses at the public flagship law school, its students come mostly from the 
state and region (38.61%). While more than one quarter of respondents at the public 
flagship law school come from the metropolitan area (26.71%), almost one third 
(32.67%) come from out of region. Taken together, responses from students at the public 
flagship law school would seem to suggest a more regional pool from which the law 
school sources its students, especially when compared to the private elite law school. By 
contrast, the public regional law school sources a majority of its students locally, from 
within the metropolitan area (51.89%), with even numbers of students coming from 
regional and out-of-region locations (24.05%). This would indicate that the regional law 
school’s functional pool of law students is essentially a local one, and only to a lesser 
extent drawing from the national region and areas outside of this national region. Finally, 
a preponderance of student respondents at the private new law school indicated that they 
come from the state or region (46.16%) or the local area (30.77%), while less than a 
quarter of respondents were attracted to the law school from areas out of the region 
(23.08%), also implying a fairly regional drawing radius.  
While the literature on undergraduate choice indicates that location influences 
enrollment decisions,32 the patterns from the responses to the Law School Choice Survey 
suggest that a law school’s location is only salient for certain types of students. Clearly, 
the location of the law school is least salient for students at the private elite law school. 
Arguably, location is of only average consequence to students at the public flagship law 																																																								
32 See, e.g., Nicholas W. Hillman, Geography of College Opportunity: The Case of Education 
Deserts, 53 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH J. 984-1021 (2016); Ruth N. López Turley, College Proximity: Mapping 
Access to Opportunity, 82 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 82 126-46 (2009); Amanda L. Griffith and Donna S. 
Rothstein, Can’t Get There from Here: The Decision to Apply to a Selective College, 28 ECON. OF EDUC. 
REV. 620-28 (2009). 
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school, given that students at that law school attend in greater numbers from the state or 
national region but, on average, come from all areas at rather similar rates. Finally, over 
75% of the public regional law school and the private new law school’s students come 
from the metropolitan area, or the state or national region, with the public regional law 
school’s students principally coming from the metropolitan area and the private new law 
school’s students mostly coming from the state or national region. Of course, these 
responses represent only a portion of each law school’s total population of law students; 
moreover, the composition of a law school is taken from the students who apply, are 
admitted, and who actually enroll at the law school. However, directors of admission 
have anecdotally described the relationship between applicant pool, admitted pool, and 
yield pool as strong over the last several years, with admission rates topping 50% 
nationally since 2011. This trend, taken together with the survey’s descriptive findings, 
would support the notion that certain law schools may geographically target potential 
students, or conversely, that potential law students with non-elite backgrounds tend to 
enroll in law schools within a closer proximity of their home. Regardless of the 
explanatory source of this trend, it suggests a multiplicity of legal education sub-markets 
within the broader legal education market. 
 
Information and Choice 
A principal concern of this survey was to identify the sources of information on 
which students relied when applying to law school and the role that this information 
played in shaping their preferences and eventual law school choice. The first question 
dealing with the relationship between preferences and choice asked students to rank the 
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law school they currently attend according to their preferences at the following time 
frames: before applying to law school; when they had applied to law school but not yet 
received acceptance letters; when they received all of their acceptance letters; and 
today—or the date at which they were taking the survey. This question, more than any 
other question, introduced temporality into a cross-sectional survey but helps gauge, 
better than any other question, how the student felt about their law school, not only net of 
a variety of factors that are discretely measured in the survey but also in terms of the 
process of “updating” or coming to terms with a decision that the behavioral economics 
literature identifies.33 The responses from this question are described in Table 2.3. 
Additionally, Figure A2.1 in the Appendix, which follows this chapter, maps the 
proportion of respondents in each category by law school for the facility of the reader in 
interpreting these relationships visually. 
Table 2.3: First Choice 
 Private Elite 
Law School 
Public Flagship  
Law School 
Public Regional 
Law School 
Private New 
Law School 
     
Before applying to law school 
 
28.89 53.76 64.38 38.30 
     
When you had applied to law school but 
not received acceptance letters 
30.00 56.53 71.43 41.30 
     
When you had received all of your 
acceptance letters 
68.89 75.00 87.50 73.91 
     
Today 
 
82.22 83.52 84.51 85.42 
     
 																																																								
33 An early application of the updating phenomenon is outlined in Kevin F. McCardle, Information 
Acquisition and the Adoption of New Technology, 31 MANAGEMENT SCI. 1372-89 (1985). A more recent 
application, particularly involving a decision to incur risk, like the investment in additional credentialing, is 
outlined by Gary Charness & Dan Levin, When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of 
Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect, 95 AM. ECON. REV, 1300-09 (2005). Other research, describes 
the phenomenon of individuals coming to terms with their decision, especially in the face of risk. See, e.g., 
Helena Chmura Kraemer, Alan E. Kazdin, David R. Offord, Ronald C. Kessler, Peter S. Jensen, and David 
J. Kupfer, Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337-43 (1997). 
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An interesting pattern emerges from these responses. First, across all law schools, 
students ranked their current law school as their first choice law school at the time of the 
survey at a rate exceeding 82%, implying a “coming to terms” with their decision to 
enroll at their law school.34 However, the law student respondents at the private elite law 
school averaged only 28.89% in indicating their law school was their first choice when 
they applied to law school or before, providing evidence that they may have had the 
greatest overall choice of law schools. This number more than doubled by the time these 
students had received all of their acceptance letters and reached 82.22% at the time of 
survey, seeming to demonstrate the “coming to terms” phenomenon most clearly of any 
of the four law schools. 
Figures for students at the public flagship law school remain relatively constant 
between their preference for their law school before they applied to law school (53.76%) 
and when they applied to law school (56.53%). But this number jumps to 75.00% once 
these students received their letters of acceptance and 83.52% at the time of the survey. 
Respondents from the public regional law school overwhelming thought of their current 
law school as their first choice before they applied to law school (64.38%), and by the 
time they applied to law school, 71.43% indicated that their current law school was their 
first choice. This number increased to the highest percentage of students from any law 
school that thought of their law school as their first choice once they received all of their 
letters of admission (87.50%) but dropped to 84.51% at the time of taking the survey—
the only such decrease between the last two time periods. Students at the public law 																																																								
34 This idea has been more fully discussed in recent behavioral economic research on accepting a 
decision in the face of ultimatums. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology 
for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449-75 (2003); Alan G. Sanfey, James K. Rilling, Jessica 
A. Aronson, Leigh E. Nystrom, and Jonathan D. Cohen, The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-making in 
the Ultimatum Game, 300 SCIENCE 1755-58 (2003). 
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schools appear to be better “matched” with their choice of law school. That is, students at 
these law schools registered the highest percentages of students who indicated that their 
law school was their first choice law school from the outset of the enrollment decision 
process, and these numbers only increased from that baseline, which may also illustrate a 
lower overall choice of law schools among these students. 
The private new law students indicated in nearly equal numbers that their law 
school was their first choice before applying (38.30%) and once they had applied to law 
schools (41.30%). This number increased once these students received all letters of 
acceptance (73.91%) and again to the date of their participation in the survey (85.42%). 
These responses would indicate, not only that law students in this survey sample “came 
to terms” with their decision over time, but also that, as the respondents gathered new 
information, this new information led them to believe, overwhelmingly, that their 
decision was the right one for them. Moreover, the responses capture a recent trend where 
law students are atritting, and transferring, in fewer numbers in the previous academic 
year, 2016-2017: the private elite law school had 2 first-year students attrite and 3 first-
year students transfer out; the public flagship law school had 1 first-year law student 
attrite and 1 first-year student transfer out; the public regional law school had 19 first-
year students attrite and 1 transfer-out; and the private new law school had 14 first-year 
law students attrite and 0 first-year students transfer out. While the attrition numbers at 
the public regional and private new law schools may seem large, they are common for 
law schools of the same peer reputation.35 These attrition and transfer rates, taken 
																																																								
35  See 2017 Standard 509 Information Report Data Overview, AM. BAR ASS’N (2017), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/2017_standard_509_data_overview.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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together with the results from this survey, tend to corroborate a coming to terms with the 
decision to enroll in law school. 
The next set of questions asked students about what factors were among the 
greatest, average, and least considerations influencing their decision to enroll in their law 
school. Respondents had a host of options to sort and rank into these categories. Among 
them were: academic reputation; alumni network; bar passage rate; campus or law 
building’s aesthetic appeal; city or town amenities; co-curricular opportunities; diversity 
of faculty; diversity of students; extra-curricular opportunities; faculty interaction; 
financial aid package; job placement rate; law career opportunities in the local area; law 
career opportunities in the regional area; location in my preferred bar jurisdiction; 
proximity to home or family; religious affiliation; size of the classes and law school; 
social opportunities; sports teams; and reputation, as defined by the U.S. News & World 
Report (U.S. News) rankings, among others. The top five factors of greatest consideration 
for each law school follow in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Factors of Greatest Consideration in Attending Law School 
 Private Elite 
Law School 
Public Flagship  
Law School 
Public Regional 
Law School 
Private New 
Law School 
     
Top Factor (1) Reputation Financial Aid Bar Passage Bar Passage 
 (98.85) (79.52) (79.69) (90.91) 
     
Tap Factor (2) Job Placement Reputation Local Career 
Opportunities 
Financial Aid 
 (81.29) (77.38) (67.21) (84.09) 
     
Top Factor (3) Financial Aid Local Career Opportunities Job Placement Job Placement 
 (73.59) (56.76) (67.19) (69.57) 
     
Top Factor (4) Regional Career 
Opportunities 
Bar Passage Financial Aid Reputation 
 (60.71) (56.41) (62.90) (61.36) 
     
Top Factor (5) Alumni Network Job Placement Proximity to Home Proximity to Home 
 (45.68) (50.00) (55.93) (56.82) 
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Several of the top five factors of greatest consideration are common between law 
schools. For instance, respondents from all four law schools indicated that job placement 
was among the most important factors for them. A majority of respondents from three 
law schools indicated that reputation (private elite, public flagship, and private new law 
schools), bar passage (public flagship, public regional, and private new law schools), 
financial aid (private elite, public regional, and private new law schools), and career 
opportunities (regional career opportunities for the private elite law school and local 
career opportunities for the public flagship and public regional law schools) were among 
the most important factors. Alumni networks were only salient to respondents from the 
private elite law school, and proximity to home and family was only important to 
students from the public regional and private new law schools. These results tend to show 
that outcomes, such as job placement, bar passage career opportunities, are extremely 
important for law students, while reputation and financial aid are also important but vary 
in their importance in terms of the institution that a law student attends. Other factors, 
such as alumni networks and proximity to home and family are generally less important 
but still an important factor for some law students. 
The next question in this series asked students to select and rank the top five 
sources of information they considered when deciding to attend the law school they 
currently attend from the following choices: ABA 509 Disclosure Reports; Above the 
Law rankings; Law School Admission Council (LSAC) data; law school’s acceptance 
letter and materials; law school’s website; National Association for Law Placement 
(NALP) data; another newspaper or periodical; state bar website; Vault rankings; U.S. 
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News rankings; word of mouth reputation of the law school, among others. The results of 
responses are reported in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Sources of Information 
 Private Elite 
Law School 
Public Flagship  
Law School 
Public Regional 
Law School 
Private New 
Law School 
     
Top Factor (1) U.S. News Ranking LSAC Data Law School’s Website Law School’s Website 
 (93.68) (79.31) (89.39) (85.11) 
     
Tap Factor (2) Acceptance Letter & 
Materials 
U.S. News Ranking Word of Mouth 
Reputation 
Word of Mouth 
Reputation 
 (67.24) (77.01) (81.32) (72.34) 
     
Top Factor (3) Word of Mouth 
Reputation 
Word of Mouth 
Reputation 
LSAC Data Acceptance Letter & 
Materials 
 (66.09) (74.71) (74.24) (68.09) 
     
Top Factor (4) Law School’s Website Law School’s Website U.S. News Ranking LSAC Data 
 (64.94) (71.26) (57.58) (68.09) 
     
Top Factor (5) LSAC Data Acceptance Letter & 
Materials 
Acceptance Letter & 
Materials 
ABA 509 Disclosures 
 (58.09) (56.32) (57.58) (53.19) 
     
 
 Here, too, a consensus emerges between law schools regarding the primary 
sources of information on which they based their decision. In fact, a majority of the same 
sources of information appeared in the top five responses to the question for all 
participating law schools. For example, word of mouth reputation appeared in the top 
three sources of information for every law school. While the law school’s website was 
only the fourth most reported source of information for the private elite and public 
flagship law schools, it was the first choice source of information for the public regional 
and private new law schools. The law school’s acceptance letter and materials was the 
second choice and third choice source of information for the private elite and private new 
law schools, respectively, but the fifth choice source of information for the public 
flagship and public regional law schools. LSAC data, the fifth choice for private elite law 
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students, was the first choice for public flagship students, and was third, or tied for third, 
choice for the public regional and private new law schools, respectively. The U.S. News 
rankings were among the top two sources of information for the private elite and public 
flagship law schools but was only the fourth choice of students at the public regional law 
school and did not rank in the top five sources of information for students at the private 
new law school. Only the private new law school indicated that the ABA 509 Disclosures 
were among the top five sources of information, ranking fifth for these students. 
A priori, it was not readily determinable that a law school’s website or data from 
the LSAC would have such a ubiquitous influence on a student’s decision to enroll would 
have, but given that a majority of new enrollees to law school are millennials, the 
influence of this source of information should not be discounted. Somewhat by contrast, 
low-tech resources, such as a law schools’ admission letter and recruitment materials and 
word of mouth reputation, still hold an important place in informing students’ decisions 
to enroll in the law school they ultimately choose. Based on their longevity, since 1987, it 
is also unsurprising that the U.S. News rankings of law schools continue to be a leading 
source of information, for better and for worse, informing a student’s decision of 
enrollment in law school. Responses to this question seem to indicate a fairly strong 
monopoly of the same five or six sources of information upon which law students rely to 
inform their decision to attend law school. When these sources of information are time 
invariant or are not forthcoming about what they purport to be reporting, it can lead to 
informational monopoly and asymmetry. 
The final questions of this series of questions about information and choice, 
particularly those relating to the other law schools to which the students applied and were 
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admitted, are redacted from publication of this dissertation chapter. This is because an 
analysis of these responses would likely reveal which schools participated in this survey 
and would violate participation agreements with these schools. However, a description of 
these schools, using the same typologies used to describe the participating law schools 
helps to provide an oblique reference to student choice, as indicated by the responses to 
these questions: the private elite law school’s competition consisted mostly of other 
national, private, elite law schools; students at the public flagship law school mostly 
applied to and were admitted to other upper-tier public universities in the national region 
in which the public flagship law school is located; similarly, the public regional law 
school’s competition consisted mostly of other mid-tier law schools in its national region; 
and the private new law school’s competitor institutions consisted of mostly private, 
lower-tiered law schools in the national region. In sum, the same tiered characterization 
of the competitor law schools to which respondents applied and were admitted is also true 
of the law schools that participated in this research, by law school typological 
classification. 
 
Cost of Attendance 
The next set of questions examined the descriptive relationship between the 
annual cost of attendance at the respondent’s current law school and the student’s second 
choice law school (or the law school the student would have attended, conditional on 
admission). The purpose of this question was to see, in effect, how much money law 
students “left on the table” by attending the law school they currently attend, as well as to 
ascertain—in terms of dollars in $5,000 increments, although the analysis in this chapter 
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discusses results in terms of $10,000—how much they actually spend to attend their 
current law school. These results should be read within each price bracket, by law school, 
in terms of the percentage of students who attend their current law school as compared to 
the percentage of law students at that law school who could have attended another law 
school at the same price bracket. The results are detailed in Table 2.6, as well as graphed 
in Figure A2.2 in the Appendix. 
Table 2.6: Cost of Attendance (Percentage of Respondents by School) 
 Private Elite Public Flagship Public Regional Private New 
 Law 
School 
2nd 
Choice 
Law 
School 
2nd 
Choice 
Law 
School 
2nd 
Choice 
Law 
School 
2nd 
Choice 
         
$0,000 - 4,999 5.92 13.02 30.59 18.29 26.15 25.81 18.60 17.95 
         
$5,000 - 9,999 2.37 6.51 10.59 8.54 15.38 4.84 4.65 5.13 
         
$10,000 - 14,999 5.92 5.92 11.76 7.32 7.69 8.06 13.95 5.13 
         
$15,000 - 19,999 4.73 8.28 16.47 10.98 18.46 12.90 6.98 12.82 
         
$20,000 - 24,999 8.28 4.14 14.12 19.51 18.46 12.90 11.63 10.26 
         
$25,000 - 29,999 16.57 9.47 3.53 6.10 1.54 12.90 11.63 5.13 
         
$30,000 - 34,999 7.69 8.88 3.53 6.10 6.15 4.84 11.63 7.69 
         
$35,000 - 39,999 8.28 7.10 2.35 3.66 4.62 3.23 2.33 7.69 
         
$40,000 - 44,999 10.06 8.88 3.53 4.88 0.00 6.45 13.95 7.69 
         
$45,000 - 49,999 8.88 7.69 0.00 2.44 0.00 3.23 2.33 5.13 
         
$50,000+ 21.30 20.12 3.53 12.20 1.54 4.84 2.33 15.38 
         
 
 The percentage of students whose reported cost of attendance is less than $10,000 
varies by law school. At the private elite law school, only 8.29% of respondents reported 
attending law school at a rate under $10,000,36 but more than double that percentage of 
																																																								
36 In reporting statistics to the deans of participating law schools, only the dean from the private 
elite law school expressed some dismay at figures less than $10,000 reported cost of attendance and 
indicated that some student respondents may have actually reported cost of tuition as cost of attendance, 
given that the number of respondents in this category likely exceeds they standard number of scholarships 
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the law school’s respondents reported that they would have paid in that price bracket for 
a total cost of attendance at their second choice law school. By contrast, at the public 
flagship law school, more than 30% of the respondents reported that they pay less than 
$10,000 to attend law school and less than 19% of respondents at that law school would 
have paid less to attend their second choice law school. Public regional and private new 
law school respondents reported in almost equal number that their cost of attendance and 
their second choice law school’s cost of attendance was less than $10,000. Trends from 
responses in this cost of attendance bracket seem to suggest that private elite law students 
are less responsive to financial aid, public flagship students are highly responsive to the 
financial aid their law school offers them, and public regional and private new law school 
students are roughly in equilibrium between the proportion of law students that attend 
law school for less than $10,000 and those that could have attended law school for the 
same amount. 
 In the next cost of attendance bracket, only students at the private elite law school 
reported that their cost of attendance fell between $10,000–19,999 in fewer numbers 
(10.02%) than those that reported they could have attended law school in the same price 
bracket at their second choice school (14.20%). At the public flagship law school 
(28.23%), the public regional law school (18.30%), and the private regional law school 
(20.93%), respondents reported that their cost of attendance, in the $10,000–19,999 price 
bracket, was proportionally less than their second choice law school (18.30%, 20.96%, 
and 17.95%, respectively). While responses in the first two annual cost of attendance 
																																																																																																																																																																					
they provide to make this cost of attendance reasonably related to the number of students that reported this 
cost of attendance. However, as the respondents from each law school are merely a sample of their overall 
population, it is conceivable that this percentage of students whose cost of attendance is less than $10,000 
is accurate. 
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brackets follow a relatively predictable pattern, heterogeneity in responses is first 
introduced at the next cost of attendance price bracket. 
At the private elite law school, 24.85% of respondents reported a cost of 
attendance between $20,000–29,999, with only 13.61% reporting this same cost of 
attendance for their second choice law school, while 17.65% public flagship law students 
(versus 25.61%), 20.00% of public regional law students (versus 25.80%), and 23.26% of 
private new law students (versus 15.39%) reported a cost of attendance in this bracket 
and would have paid this same amount to attend their second choice law school, 
illustrating the lack of coherence in responses between typological categorizations of law 
schools at this price bracket. In the next cost of attendance range, $30,000–39,000, only 
fewer public flagship law school respondents (5.88%) reported their annual cost of 
attendance in this price bracket as compared to their second choice law school (9.76%), 
indicating, once again, their preference for a subsidized cost of attendance. Similarly, at 
the next price bracket, $40,000–49,000, only students from the private law school 
recorded a greater percentage of responses (18.94%) within this cost of attendance 
bracket, as compared to their second choice law school (16.57%). Finally, only the 
private elite law school had proportionally more respondents indicate that their cost of 
attendance exceeded $50,000 (21.30%), as compared with the respondents from that law 
school’s second choice institution (20.12%). The heterogeneity between responses to this 
question, particularly among respondents whose cost of attendance equals or exceeds 
$20,000, suggests the multiplicity of markets of law students within the broader legal 
education market alluded to in the earlier sections of this chapter but also the 
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responsiveness of certain law students, particularly those at public law schools, to a 
reduced or subsidized cost of attendance. 
 
Opportunity Cost and Cost Sensitivity 
The final set of survey questions discussed in this chapter assessed two important 
economic constructs. The first, a law student’s opportunity cost of attending law school, 
is measured by students’ prior income immediately preceding their attending law school. 
This decision is supported by the bedrock research on human capital theory and 
individual investment in education. In fact, the most significant works in this area all 
analyze the premise that people make most of their investments in themselves by 
foregoing current earnings.37 However, a measurement of foregone current earnings can 
be operationalized two ways: in terms of prior income or in terms of future income. 
Because future income is speculative and to a significant extent unknowable, this 
dissertation analyzes students’ effective opportunity cost in terms of their prior income. 
The results of responses to the question related to opportunity cost are reported in Table 
2.7 and visualized in Figure A2.3, in the Appendix. 
The second, price sensitivity, measures the price at which law students exhibit 
price discrimination or view the cost of investing in legal education to exceed its value, 
relative to the student’s own sensitivities to price.38 This analysis represents a completely 
																																																								
37 See, e.g., Milton Friedman & Simon Kuznets, Income from Independent Professional Practice, 
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (1945) (noting that present investment is usually made for the purpose 
of enjoying future returns). This idea would be borne out by Mincer and Becker: Jacob Mincer, Investment 
in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution, 66 J. POL. ECON. 281-302 (1958); and Gary S. 
Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretic Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9-49 (1962). 
38 This latter measure was, in effect, an adaptation of the Van Westendorp Price Sensitivity Meter, 
which assesses a consumer’s relative price discrimination to a good based on a five part question, asking: 
the price at which the consumer would believe the price of the good to be too cheap to be of good value; 
the price at which the consumer would believe the price of the good to be cheap but a good value; the price 
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novel application of the economic construct of price sensitivity to the context of 
investment in additional educational credentialing. The results of the responses to the 
questions related to price sensitivity are plotted in Figures 2.1–2.4. 
Table 2.7: Opportunity Cost (Percentage of Respondents by School) 
 Private Elite 
Law School 
Public Flagship 
Law School 
Public Regional 
Law School 
Private New 
Law School 
     
$0,000 - 9,999 47.74 36.36 37.66 33.33 
     
$10,000 - 19,999 11.56 18.18 10.39 17.65 
     
$20,000 - 29,999 6.03 10.10 16.88 7.84 
     
$30,000 - 39,999 7.54 14.14 9.09 15.69 
     
$40,000 - 49,999 7.54 9.09 10.39 9.80 
     
$50,000 - 59,999 6.53 2.02 7.79 3.92 
     
$60,000 - 69,999 5.03 1.01 6.49 5.88 
     
$70,000 - 79,999 4.02 1.01 0.00 0.00 
     
$80,000 - 89,999 2.01 2.02 1.30 1.96 
     
$90,000 - 99,999 1.01 1.01 0.00 3.92 
     
$100,000 - 149,999 0.50 5.05 0.00 0.00 
     
$150,000 - 199,999 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
$200,000+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
 
With regard to opportunity cost, a near majority (47.74%) of respondents from the 
private elite law school reported that they were paid less than $10,000 before starting law 
school. This trend indicates that the opportunity cost, as measured by prior income, of 
attending law school for these students is rather low, given that they likely attended 																																																																																																																																																																					
at which the consumer would believe the price and quality of the good to be in equilibrium; the price at 
which the consumer would believe the price of the good to start to get expensive but that the consumer 
would still consider buying it; and the price at which the consumer would believe the price of the good to 
be too high to consider buying it. This is the first application of such a line of questioning posed to 
consumers of legal education and maybe of any consumer of higher education. See Peter Van Westendorp, 
NSS-Price Sensitivity Meter: A New Approach to Study of Consumer Perception of Price, PROCEEDINGS 
FROM ESOMAR CONGRESS (1976). 
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undergraduate or graduate school immediately before attending law school. By contrast, 
the proportion of students earning less than $10,000 in the year immediately before 
attending law school is over 10% lower at the other law schools. Likewise, less than 20% 
of respondents at the private elite law school earned between $10,000–29,999, while no 
less than 25% of all remaining law school’s respondents earned income in this category 
before beginning law school. Similarly, just over 15% of private elite law students 
reported earning between $30,000–49,999, while not less than 19% of the other law 
schools’ respondents reported incomes in this income bracket. The responses from these 
two income brackets would indicate that very few students from the private elite law 
school worked in lower wage positions (for baccalaureate graduates), and a greater 
percentage of students at the other law schools did.  
Relatedly, in the income bracket between $50,000–69,999, the public regional law 
school recorded the greatest percentage of respondents (13.28%), followed by private 
elite law students (11.56%), while the remainder of law schools only reported less than 
10% of respondents in this income bracket, indicating that these law schools have a 
greater percentage of mid-level income earners (for baccalaureate graduates) than their 
peers at the private elite or public flagship law schools. Between $70,000–89,999, private 
elite respondents (6.03%) nearly doubled public flagship respondents (3.03%), and more 
than tripled public regional law (1.30%) and private new law school students (1.96%), 
indicating that the percentage, while still nominal, of higher income earners (for 
baccalaureate degree holders) is greatest at the private elite law school. Among law 
schools with respondents with incomes exceeding $90,000 prior to attending law school, 
the public flagship law school had the greatest proportional number of highest income 
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earners (5.05%), followed by the private new law school (3.92%), the private elite law 
school (2.01%), and the public regional law school (0.00%). Taken together, these trends 
would indicate that the private elite law school students have proportionally the least 
opportunity cost—as measured by prior income—and students at the remaining law 
schools have a greater opportunity cost, on average. However, among high earning 
students, students at the public flagship and private elite law schools have a greater 
proportional opportunity cost than their peer institutions. 
Relatedly, a consumer’s price sensitivity for a good or service typically occurs at 
the point which the consumer no longer believes to be a bargain but instead that the price 
of the good or service starts to get expensive, such that the expense would make the 
consumer consider not purchasing the good or service. In terms of graphical 
representation of this phenomenon in legal education, the general consensus is that the 
extent to which the blue and green lines, graphed below in Figures 2.1–2.4, intersect—
with the blue line indicating a price at which legal education represents the perfect 
balance and value and quality and green line indicating the price at which the consumer 
would believe the price of the legal education to start to get expensive such that the 
consumer would consider not attending law school—is the point of price sensitivity. The 
price point indicating the price sensitivity of the respondents to this survey may approach 
a national average of the average cost of attendance, net of scholarships, but the 
granularity provided by the visualizations in Figures 2.1–2.4 reveal that this price 
depends almost entirely on law school type. 
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Figure 2.1: Price Sensitivity (Private Elite Law School) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Price Sensitivity (Public Flagship Law School) 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Price Sensitivity (Public Regional Law School) 
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Figure 2.4: Price Sensitivity (Private New Law School) 
 
 
At the private elite law school, this intersection happens at the $35,000–39,999 
bracket, indicated in Figure 2.1. At the public flagship and the private new law schools, 
this nexus occurs at $30,000–34,999, as graphed in Figure 2.2 and 2.4, respectively. 
However, at the public regional law school, this point occurs $5,000 lower still, at the 
$24,999-30,000 bracket, reported in Figure 2.3. These differences further support the 
earlier discussion that law schools operate not only within a broad legal education 
marketplace but also within submarkets of legal education—competing for students on 
the basis of their entering credentials, cost sensitivity, opportunity cost, and price 
discrimination limits. The price points at which law students reveal they would pay for 
legal education in the abstract also coincide, relatively closely, with the average cost of 
attendance, net of financial aid, at their respective law schools—another indication of 
coming to terms with their decision to enroll at the law school that the currently attend. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Information and choice are multifactorial terms. However, this chapter 
analyzes these terms, as well as the salience of location, information, opportunity 
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cost, and cost sensitivity, in the context of a law student’s decision to enroll in law 
school. The results from this survey emphasize two important descriptive facts about 
the legal education market. Principally, elements related to choice—such as location, 
information, opportunity cost, and cost sensitivity—which derive from the 
undergraduate education choice and behavioral economic literature, are applicable in 
the context of graduate professional education. However, their salience varies by 
educational institution typology. 
Yet, the disparity between law school students’ responses for each construct 
of choice indicates a stratified market for consumers on the basis of their 
preferences. For example, a national reputation is most important for students at the 
private elite law school—but is a lesser factor for all other law student respondents—
and career placement is a factor that is salient to all law students. Additionally, the 
results from this original survey indicate that factors that were thought to be the sole 
motivations of enrollment, such as financial aid and opportunity cost, are not 
monolithic, particularly in how private elite law students respond to these factors. 
Moreover, the importance of financial aid, which will be explored in the next 
chapter, may indeed be overstated, given that decisions of consumers in the legal 
education market are driven by many other factors. As such, the market for law 
students should be viewed, henceforth, as a heterogeneous and highly competitive 
market. It is hoped that these results will shed greater light on and knowledge of the 
most understudied group in professional graduate education—law students. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYZING THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL AID ON LAW SCHOOL MATRICULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal education—like the entire higher education sector—is a competitive 
market. Law students first face competition through the admissions process to enter 
law school. Once enrolled in law school, law students only encounter competition in 
greater doses, as they compete for grades, law review positions, and ultimately, job 
placement. 1  As the previous chapter details, reputation is an important factor 
influencing the enrollment decision for many law students, who seek admission to 
the best law schools. Likewise, law schools want the most talented students—
sometimes resorting to unethical practices in the process.2 In short, legal education 
mirrors the competitive and adversarial elements that are commonplace in the 
practice of law. 
The demand for legal education has been linked to available jobs in the legal 
profession. The strong demand for legal services and competition among law schools 
culminated in an historic rise in law school applicants, students, and graduates in the 
																																																								
1 See Jesse Rothstein, & Albert Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do 
Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649-93 (2007); William D. Henderson & Andrew P. 
Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News 
Rankings Era, 81 IND. L. J. 163-217 (2006). 
2 Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure Scholarly 
Performance, 81 IND. L. J. 86-136 (2006); Brian Leiter, How to Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 47-85 
(2006); Ry Rivard, Lowering the Bar: More Law Schools Are Admitting Less Qualified Students, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED., Jan. 16, 2015, available at 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-compete-students-many-may-not-
have-admitted-past (2015); Andrew Wolfson, Former University of Louisville Admissions Director to 
Pay $25,000 in Restitution for Offering Bogus Law Scholarships, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, 
Feb. 10, 2014, http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/crime/2014/02/10/former-university-of-
louisville-admissions-director-to-pay-25000-restitution-for-offering-bogus-law-
scholarships/5376555/. 
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early 2000s.3 However, the legal profession has recently suffered diminished demand for 
legal services—the latest sign that the future practice of law will be starkly different than 
any other time in history.4 Resultantly, the demand for legal education continues to fall, 
due to increased concern over rising tuition and student debt, concurrent with diminishing 
prospects of employment upon graduation.5 In 2010, for example, a total of 145,575 law 
students were enrolled in J.D. degree programs, but by 2017, this number had fallen to 
110,156—by far, the lowest enrollment since 1974, when there were 49 fewer accredited 
law schools.6 
																																																								
3 Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland 
Athletics. 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1483 (2004); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Reaching for the Brass Ring: the U.S. 
News & World Report Rankings and Competition, 26 REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 145-62 (2002); Jeffrey E. 
Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings 
Mislead, 81 IND. L. J. 229-70 (2006). 
4  See, e.g., Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2018), http://legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-Report-on-the-
State-of-the-Legal-Market.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (2017), http://static.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/static/pdf/peer-
monitor/S042201-Final.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (2016), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/upload/2016_PM_GT_Final-
Report.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(2015), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/upload/FINAL-
Report-1-7-15.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2014), https://peermonitor.thomsonreuters.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/2014_PM_GT_Report.pdf; Report on the State of the Legal Market, CENTER FOR 
THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2013), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/continuing-legal-
education/executive-education/upload/2013-report.pdf. 
5 Paul F. Teich, The Near-Term Employment Prospects of American Law School Graduates, Boston 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 16-03 (2015); Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New 
Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541–607 
(2013); George Critchlow, Kim Kardashian and Honey Boo Boo: Models for Law School Success (or Not), 
45 CONN. L. REV. 1319-53 (2013); Law School Tuition 1985-2012, AM. BAR ASS’N, available at: 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf; Margaret Lofuts, Drop in Applications Spurs Changes at Law 
Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 11, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/articles/2015/03/11/drop-in-applications-spurs-changes-at-law-schools (2015). 
6 See Figure 1.1, infra. See also, Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, 1963-2012 Academic Years, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR (2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf; 2016 Standard 509 Information Report Data 
Overview, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/2016_standard_509_data_overview.authcheckdam.pdf. This is not the first recession to impact 
enrollments in higher education, and though similarities exist between institutions in terms of the 
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This decline in demand for legal education, previewed in the introduction of this 
dissertation, carries additional externalities. Previously competitive law school 
admissions standards have fallen. On average, law schools are admitting students with 
lower GPA and LSAT scores than before 2010.7 Law school outcomes—in the form of 
employment and bar passage rates—have significantly declined over the same period of 
time.8 Simultaneously, the average indebtedness of law school graduates, as well as the 
disparity of salaries between private- and public-sector attorneys, continues to increase.9 
These trends are reflected not only in overall J.D. degree-seeking enrollment totals, but 
also and perhaps most importantly, in first-year law student matriculation statistics.10 As 
these trends illustrate, both the legal profession and legal education are at a crossroads. 
These developments significantly impact the signals that law schools are sending to the 
public, especially potential consumers of legal education. 
Declining law school enrollments have brought about new interventions—or 
natural experiments—to confront the present realities of an already competitive legal 
education market. Thus, while the market for legal education remains competitive, the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
manifestations of these impacts, the effects can vary by institution type and even within institution type. 
See EARL F. CHEIT, THE NEW DEPRESSION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A STUDY OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS AT 
41 COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1971). 
7 See Table 3.1, infra. 
8 Id. 
9 William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: Federal Loans Inflate 
College Budgets, But How Long Will That Last If Law Grads Can't Pay Their Bills?, 98 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 
30 (2012); Jerome M. Organ, Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal Education, 41 WASH. U. 
J. L. POL’Y, 33-56 (2013); John A. Sebert, The Cost and Financing of Legal Education, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
516-27 (2002); Marilyn Yarbrough, Financing Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457-92 (2001). 
10 See Figure 1, supra, Chapter 0 – Introduction. This figure was drawn using data from the ABA 
records of enrollment over time. See Longitudinal Charts: First Year Enrollment/Total 
Enrollment/Total Degrees Awarded, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the
_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
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nature of the competition has changed.11 Where historically law students competed for 
admission to law schools, law schools to a large extent, have begun to compete over law 
students as never before—yet another sign of the competition intensifying in the legal 
education market. This shift demands examination. 
This chapter aims to assess the impact of one such market-based response: 
financial aid award allocation at the law school level. In the competition for shrinking 
pools of potential law students, law schools can discount the expected cost of attendance 
through financial aid awards provided by individual law schools. This chapter assesses 
the efficacy of such an intervention—the effect of increasing median financial aid award 
amounts on matriculant enrollment totals. Part I of this chapter describes financial aid 
practices in higher education, generally, and as applied in law schools. Part II discusses 
the theoretical and analytical framework for this chapter, and Part III shares the results of 
an empirical analysis of whether increases to financial aid result in matriculation 
increases. 
 
I. FINANCIAL AID AWARDS AS INCENTIVES 
The Use of Financial Aid Awards to Incentivize Enrollment 
As a matter of policy, higher education institutions can and do discount the 
expected cost of student attendance by using financial aid awards in order to drive 
																																																								
11 The nature of this shift in competition is discussed in the introduction of this dissertation. See, e.g., 
Ilana Kowarski, Less Competitive Law School Admissions a Boon for Applicants, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, August 8, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/2017-08-08/law-school-admissions-less-competitive-than-2008; Ry Rivard, Lowering the 
Bar, INSIDE HIGHER ED, January 16, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-
compete-students-many-may-not-have-admitted-past. 
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enrollments.12 This phenomenon is borne out in the literature on the use of scholarships, 
including merit-based aid, in higher education. The majority of this literature focuses on 
undergraduate education and centers around the use of financial aid to influence an 
undergraduate student’s decision to enroll at a university, as well as the inputs and 
outcomes of student financial aid packages.13 The leading studies in this area examine 
how total financial aid packages between institutions can influence student behavior to 
enroll at one institution over another—to the extent the aid package at that institution 
minimize marginal costs of attendance.14 These studies seem to indicate the strong 
positive influence of scholarship and grant aid on influencing whether and where a 
student decides to enroll at an undergraduate higher education institution.15 																																																								
12 This behavior is well documented throughout the last century on college campuses across the 
country. See RUPERT WILKINSON, AIDING STUDENTS, BUYING STUDENTS: FINANCIAL AID IN AMERICA 
(2005). See also, James Wetzel, Dennis O'Toole & Steven Peterson, An Analysis of Student Enrollment 
Demand, 17 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 47-54 (1998); Larry L. Leslie & Jonathan D. Fife, The College Student 
Grant Study: The Enrollment and Attendance Impacts of Student Grant and Scholarship Programs, 24 J. 
HIGHER EDUC. 651-671 (1974).  
13 See, e.g., Laura W. Perna, Studying College Access and Choice: A Proposed Conceptual Model, in 
21 HIGHER EDUCATION HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 99-157 (2006); Laura W. Perna & Marvin 
A. Titus, Understanding Differences in the Choice of College Attended: The Role of State Public Policies, 
27 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 501-25. (2004) (concluding that enrollment patterns are stratified by socioeconomic 
status and state policies addressing affordability are related to enrollment patterns); Bridget T. Long, How 
Do Financial Aid Policies Affect Colleges? The Institutional Impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship, 39 
J. HUMAN RES. 1045-66 (2004); Gary T. Henry, Ross Rubenstein & Daniel T. Bugler, Is HOPE Enough? 
Impacts of Receiving and Losing Merit-based Financial Aid, 18 EDUC. POL’Y 686-709 (2004); Thomas J. 
Kane, A Quasi-experimental Estimate of the Impact of Financial Aid on College-going, NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RESEARCH, Paper No. w9703 (2003) (using a regression discontinuity approach to study the impact 
of the CalGrant program in California on college enrollment and estimating large overall impacts of grant 
eligibility on college enrollment among financial aid); Susan Dynarski, HOPE for Whom? Financial Aid 
for the Middle Class and Its Impact on College Attendance, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 629–61 (2000) (concluding 
that the HOPE Program raised the overall college attendance probability of first-time in-state students by 
about 25%). 
14 See CAROLINE M. HOXBY, COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO GO, WHEN TO GO, 
AND HOW TO PAY FOR IT (2007); Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, Does Student Aid Affect 
College Enrollment? New Evidence on a Persistent Controversy, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 309-18 (1991); 
Edward P. St. John, Price Response in Enrollment Decisions: An Analysis of the High School and Beyond 
Sophomore Cohort, 31 RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUC. 161-76 (1990). 
15 See, e.g., Christopher Cornwell, David B. Mustard & Deepa J. Sridhar, The Enrollment Effects of 
Merit-based Financial Aid: Evidence from Georgia’s HOPE Program, 24 J. LABOR ECON. 24, 761-86 
(2006) (using Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) data to examine the effects of the 
HOPE Program on Georgia colleges and universities enrollments and attributing attributed a significant, 
5.9%, college enrollment increase in Georgia—not seen in control states—to the HOPE Program); Liang 
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Institutionally-funded grant aid—or tuition discounting, the practice of permitting 
some students to pay less than full tuition by either writing off or providing institutionally 
funded grants—is among the fastest-growing line-items in most university operating 
budgets, perhaps due to pressures to increase enrollment in order to make up for state 
appropriation shortfalls.16 While the literature on state-based grant aid indicates that these 
policies do often yield positive outcomes for students and universities, the literature about 
institutional grant aid and tuition discounting indicates that these institutional practices 
may produce unintended and highly negative externalities. For example, tuition 
discounting may actually reduce student affordability, as well as student retention and 
attainment, and put institutions on the brink of financial danger while not actually 
influencing the college choice of students to whom the discounts are directed.17 This is 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Zhang & Erik C. Ness, Does State Merit-based Aid Stem Brain Drain?, 32 EDUC. EVAL. & POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 143-65 (2010); James Monks, The Impact of Merit-based Financial Aid on College Enrollment: 
A Field Experiment, 28 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 99-106 (2009); and David M. Linsenmeier, Harvey S. Rosen 
& Cecilia E. Rouse, Financial Aid Packages and College Enrollment Decisions: An Econometric Case 
Study, 88 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 126-145 (2006) (studying a university’s financial aid administrative 
data using a differences-in-differences analysis and finding that changing low-income student aid from 
loans to grants resulted in a significant positive impact on the likelihood of enrollment among low-income 
minority students.). 
16 See Nicholas W. Hillman, Tuition Discounting for Revenue Management, 53 RESEARCH IN HIGHER 
EDUC. 263-81 (2012); Loren L. Hubell & Lucie Lapovsky, Tuition Discounting in Challenging Times, 35 
BUSINESS OFFICER 24-30 (2002); Ronald G. Allan, Taxonomy of Tuition Discounting, 29 J. STUDENT FIN. 
AID 7-20 (1999). The use of tuition discounting and institutional aid can be employed for myriad reasons, 
such as to shape incoming class compositions on the basis of socio-economic diversity (need) or academic 
profile (merit). However, recent studies into the use of tuition discounting imply that they are used 
primarily for merit, or even more simply to fill empty seats. See, e.g., William R. Doyle, Changes in 
Institutional Aid, 1992-2003: The Evolving Role of Merit Aid, 51 RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUC. 789-810 
(2010); William R. Doyle, Jennifer A. Delaney & Blake A. Naughton, Institutions Amplifying State Policy: 
How Public Colleges Award Institutional Aid, 36 CHANGE 36-41 (2004). 
17 See, e.g., Jerry Sheehan Davis, Unintended Consequences of Tuition Discounting, 5 LUMINA 
FOUNDATION FOR EDUCATION REPORT (May 2003), available at: 
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK
EwjQ79y_2svVAhUFI8AKHYl1BxkQFggpMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.luminafoundation.org%2
Ffiles%2Fpublications%2FTuitiondiscounting.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHKIEb3q5VA6O3iaO1PLm7vfrBNgw 
(noting that, for many private colleges and some public colleges, “losing net tuition revenue means fewer 
resources are available for academic and student support services. This situation, in turn, may make the 
colleges less valuable to their students and less able to compete in the marketplace for future students . . . 
[but] the primary reason tuition discounting has not been as effective as its users intended is that financial 
factors do not significantly influence the college choices of many affluent students to whom discounts are 
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because tuition discounts, which are largely unfunded, are essentially an investment in 
providing education to students in order for those students to continue to pay tuition and 
fees to keep tuition revenue streams open. As such, they can and do exceed rates beyond 
which higher education institutions experience diminishing revenue returns.18 
While there are myriad positive externalities of tuition discounting, these negative 
externalities call into question the practice of tuition discounting. Critics note that tuition 
discounting is essentially a gamble, given that student choice as a function of price 
sensitivity and is complex and difficult to explain by data to which tuition-discounting 
decision-makers have access, such as student aptitude, parental education and incomes, 
and student locational preferences. 19  From the perspective of a consumer, in the 
competitive legal-education marketplace, cost becomes a critical factor, particularly for 
																																																																																																																																																																					
directed.”). Among the reasons why this phenomenon plagues many institutions is by using tuition 
discounts incorrectly, such as: offering too many tuition discounts, or too large of a dollar figure in tuition 
discounts, to students who would have enrolled at the institution anyway; offering discounts to students 
who would not have enrolled at the institution regardless of the net tuition; and offering discounts that 
entice students to enroll, but these students later decide to transfer. See id. See also Robert E. Martin, 
Tuition Discounting: Theory and Evidence, 21 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 125-36 (2002) (debunking the notion 
that increases through enrollment can improve an institution’s financial condition and discussing the 
marginal benefit, net of marginal cost of increased enrollment, varies across public and private institutions 
and across institutions with different missions); Kenneth E. Redd, Discounting toward Disaster: Tuition 
Discounting, College Finances, and Enrollments of Low-income Undergraduates, USA Group Foundation 
Research Report (2000), available at: http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED447775.pdf (noting that tuition 
discount spending outstripped revenue increases at the institutions studied and did not positively affect the 
academic profile of admitted undergraduates but finding that it did appear to make higher education 
accessible for low-income students). 
18 See id.; Nicholas W. Hillman, Tuition Discounting for Revenue Management, 53 RESEARCH IN 
HIGHER EDUC. 263-81 (2012) (identifying the tuition discount rate of 13 percent as the threshold for 
diminishing return). 
19 See Davis, note 18, supra; Stephen L. DesJardins, Using Economic Concepts to Inform Enrollment 
Management, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH 59-74 (2006); David J. Berg & Stephen A. 
Hoenack, The Concept of Cost-related Tuition and Its Implementation at the University of Minnesota, 58 J. 
Higher Educ. 276-305 (1987) (finding that the student tuition elasticity of enrollment for upperclassmen are 
more inelastic and less sensitive than more junior students at the university, given that the costs, real and 
perceived of transfer or attrition are greater). See also CAROLINE M. HOXBY, COLLEGE CHOICES: THE 
ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO GO, WHEN TO GO, AND HOW TO PAY FOR IT (2007); Michael S. McPherson & 
Morton O. Schapiro, Does Student Aid Affect College Enrollment? New Evidence on a Persistent 
Controversy, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 309-18 (1991); Edward P. St. John, Price Response in Enrollment 
Decisions: An Analysis of the High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort, 31 RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUC. 
161-76 (1990). 
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prospective students of a majority of higher education institutions, which are not 
considered elite, as discussed in the previous chapter.20 The relative benefit afforded to 
the student by receiving a greater discount to his or her cost of attendance, through a 
financial aid award, at one higher education institution over another is of paramount 
importance. The challenge is that financial aid funds are increasingly insufficient to cover 
the full costs of educating each student. Increases to operational costs while revenue 
streams remain stagnant or in decline yields increasing costs of educating students.21 
Thus, many universities—and law schools—are becoming more tuition dependent than 
ever before.22  
 
The Use of Financial Aid Awards in Law Schools 
Most of the academic exploration of the impact of cost on student enrollment 
decisions comes from the literature on undergraduate education and has not yet been 
applied to legal education. Yet, the problems facing legal education are more similar to 																																																								
20 See, e.g., Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Nurturing the Law Student’s Soul: Why Law Schools Are Still 
Struggling to Teach Professionalism and How to Do Better in an Age of Consumerism, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 
1021 (2016) (describing legal education now operates in a marketplace where “consumers purchas[e] a 
product, and law schools increasingly see themselves as purveyors of a product”); Nicholas W. Hillman, 
Tuition Discounting for Revenue Management, 53 RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUC. 263-81 (2012) (discussing 
cost as the primary factor in choice in a competitive marketplace). See also Michael B. Paulsen & Edward 
P. St. John, Social Class and College Costs: Examining the Financial Nexus between College Choice and 
Persistence, 73 J. HIGHER EDUC. 189-236 (2002); Michael L. Tierney, Student College Choice Sets: 
Toward an Empirical Characterization, 18 RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUC. 271-84 (1983); WILLIAM 
IHLANFELDT, ACHIEVING OPTIMAL ENROLLMENTS AND TUITION REVENUES (1980); and Girish N. Punj & 
Richard Staelin, The Choice Process for Graduate Business Schools, J. MARKETING RESEARCH 588-98 
(1978). 
21 For example, state appropriations are an important revenue stream for public universities, yet while 
they have leveled recently, they have declined significantly as real dollar amount for decades. See, e.g., 25 
Years of Declining State Support, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., March 3, 2014, available at 
http://www.chronicle.com/interactives/statesupport. Thomas J. Kane, Peter Orszag & David L. Gunter, 
State Fiscal Constraints and Higher Education Spending: The Role of Medicaid and the Business Cycle, 
URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CENTER, 
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310787_TPC_DP11.pdf (2003). 
22 Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, THE STUDENT AID GAME: MEETING NEED AND 
REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1999). 
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issues in undergraduate education than may outwardly appear. However, the problems 
facing each law school individually differ; in fact, law schools themselves are difficult to 
lump together. Although only 203 law schools comprise the entire population of law 
schools accredited by the American Bar Association (ABA), considerable variation exists 
among them in terms of their students, faculty, mission, and outcomes.23 The same is true 
of the motivations influencing financial aid practices, and the resources supporting these 
practices, from law school to law school.24 
For instance, a number of law schools offer grant aid only or, put another way, 
only award need-based aid but do not offer merit-based scholarships. Two notable 
examples of law schools that purport to offer only need-based aid are Harvard Law 
School and Yale Law School.25 Also, several law schools offer incoming students 
scholarships that are only promised for one year and explicitly require students to reapply 
for scholarship consideration in their second year.26 The causes of the variation in law 
schools’ financial aid award processes are to a large extent unknowable; however, this 
study views the election of these schools not to award merit-based scholarships, or only 
to award competitive merit-based scholarships, as contributing to the variability of the 
																																																								
23 See Report and Recommendations: American Bar Association Taskforce on the Future of Legal 
Education, AM. BAR ASS’N, January 2014, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_
recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf (2014); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: 
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983). 
24 See Jerome M. Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law School, 
61 J. Legal Educ. 173-211 (2011). Because this study utilizes institution reported financial aid information 
that does not distinguish between schools with one-year scholarships that require reapplication and those 
which guarantee scholarship packages for a student’s full length of study, these competitive and non-
competitive scholarships are considered together as offering general scholarship aid. 
25  See, e.g., Harvard Law Financial Aid Policy, available at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/sfs/index.html; and Yale Law Cost and Financial Aid, available at: 
http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/Costs&FinancialAid.htm. 
26  See, e.g., Maine Law Scholarships, available at: 
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/admissions/scholarships.html, and Creighton Law Scholarships, available at: 
http://www.creighton.edu/law/admissions/financinglawschool/scholarships/index.php. 
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sample and includes them in its analysis.27 
As Table 3.1 illustrates, the “sticker-price” cost of legal education is very high, 
but it is subject to discounts in the form of merit-based scholarships, which are frequently 
based on past academic performance and LSAT scores. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables by Year 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Mean 
        
Full-time 1L Matriculants 209.29 190.23 176.58 170.71 164.70 167.69 179.87 
[Avg. Raw Number] (93.95) (92.72) (86.42) (84.37) (81.83) (83.60) (86.46) 
        
Median Financial Aid Amount 12,137.78 12,583.97 13,432.29 14,084.72 15,251.45 16,749.74 14,038.78 
[Avg. Raw Dollar Amount] (6576.46) (6836.74) (6713.50) (6596.57) (7063.72) (7.895.91) (7123.36) 
        
Expected Cost of Att. - NRFT 51,038.21 50,768.56 52,255.68 52,509.19 51,689.02 51,129.83 51,565.08 
[Avg. Raw Dollar Amount] (8221.45) (12831.08) (10483.64) (11586.15) (8022.84) (8371.82) (9919.50) 
        
Admission Selectivity Rate 39.63 46.60 51.57 52.95 52.81 50.27 48.97 
[Avg. Percentage] (14.79) (16.73) (16.47) (17.44) (16.51) (15.49) (16.88) 
        
LSAT Median – FT 157.98 157.17 156.11 155.56 155.33 155.40 156.25 
[Avg. Median LSAT Score] (6.14) (6.40) (6.49) (6.80) (6.69) (6.79) (6.62) 
        
GPA Median – FT 3.42 3.40 3.39 3.38 3.38 3.39 3.39 
[Avg. Median GPA Score] (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) 
        
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
While requirements for eligibility for these funds vary, most institutional financial aid 
grants base eligibility criteria on academic achievement and/or financial need.28 Student 
choice in law schools, as described in the previous chapter, is influenced by myriad 
factors, including: academic ability, environmental contexts, institutional reputation, 
information, location, and cost. Of these listed factors, the single factor over which law 
schools have the greatest control is cost. Thus, law schools also use financial aid awards 
to achieve institutional objectives unique to the law school, such as enrolling: a diverse 																																																								
27 Traditionally, law schools, like most professional degrees, have offered little if any aid, except in 
cases of extreme need. The returns on the degree were such that it could be financed on credit. Not so 
anymore.  
28 See Yarbrough, supra note 11. 
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student body, a student body evincing a commitment to public service, or a student body 
with leadership experience.29 Thus, in an average year, one law school may allocate 
scholarship resources differently than another law school.30 However, there is evidence to 
suggest that, since 2010, while rewarding academic achievement and achieving 
institutional priorities through scholarship allocation is still a focus of admissions 
decisions, scholarship allocation might also be influenced by increased pressure to meet 
minimum enrollment requirements.31 
The literature about financial aid at law schools, though limited, considers the law 
school as the unit of analysis.32 These studies suggest that the competitive scholarship 
practice is motivated by implicit incentives in the U.S. News & World Report law school 
rankings methodology, specifically: the possibility of attracting a first-year student 
population with strong academic indicators, which can correspond to an increase in the 
law school’s U.S. News’ ranking.33 Both a traditional understanding of tuition discounting 
practices and scarce resource theory suggests that, like many institutionally-funded grant 
aid, the majority of law scholarships are unfunded tuition discounts or “cross-subsidized” 
by incoming students; that is, one student pays full tuition—often financed through 
loans—so that another student can receive a scholarship to attend law school.34  
																																																								
29 See Organ, supra note 23. 
30 See id. 
31 See Wolfson, supra note 2; see also Ben L. Trachtenberg, Law School Marketing and Legal Ethics, 
91 NEB. L. REV. 866 (2013). 
32 See Organ, supra note 23 (observing that 122 of 160 ABA-accredited law schools in his sample 
awarded “competitive” scholarships). See also Organ, supra note 22 (observing that 122 of 160 ABA-
accredited law schools in his sample awarded “competitive” scholarships. A law school with competitive 
scholarships award scholarships that are guaranteed for only one year, after which students reapply 
annually for scholarships, typically given according to a student’s academic standing.) 
33 See Black & Caron, supra note 2; see also Leiter, supra note 2. 
34 See id; see also Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 11. 
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However, this method of distributing aid between and among students has 
consequences for law students as well as law schools. Because of this system of variable 
tuition, some law students graduate with little or no debt, while a majority of law students 
graduate with substantial debt.35 Most recently, financial aid award packages and the 
percentage of students receiving financial aid have been significantly increased in a 
thinly-veiled effort to combat declining enrollments. However, tuition discounting, which 
can stem declining law student enrollments in the short term, can ultimately lead to 
diminished returns, impacting the financial viability of law schools. Yet, little is known 
about whether students who enroll in law school respond to the enticing financial aid 
award packages. Additionally, in the context of the declining post-recession demand for 
legal education, there is a dearth of knowledge about whether “pulling the money lever” 
yields the intended effect in driving up student enrollment. In fact, relatively few studies 
on tuition discounting or student choice focus specifically on institutional aid and its 
effects at the graduate and professional level.36 As such, a study of tuition discounting in 
post-recession legal education is timely. 
 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND DATA 
Framework and Research Question 
This study contributes to the literature on the efficacy of institutionally funded 
financial aid awards by applying rational choice and scarce resources theoretical 
frameworks to law school data to assess whether they can be used to explain demand for 
																																																								
35 See Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 11. 
36 See Christopher P. Loss & Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., The Dissertation Dilemma and the Challenge of 
American Graduate Education, 18 GOOD SOCIETY 313-31 (2017) (noting the noticeable lack of research 
attention paid to graduate professional education). 
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legal education. To answer this question, this study employs econometric methods, 
specifically OLS regression, single fixed effects, and multiple fixed effects estimation, as 
well as instrumental variables estimation for sensitivity analysis. 
The underlying theoretical framework around student response to financial aid 
incentives—rational choice theory—will be tested in this study. According to the rational 
choice literature, demand is a function of an actor having the information necessary to 
make the dominant choice—that is, the choice which most clearly results in the actor’s 
pecuniary benefit—and choosing the dominant choice on the basis of this information.37 
In other words, rational choice adherents would maintain that increasing financial aid 
awards, which reduce the marginal cost of legal education, could result in greater demand 
of legal education. Under a rational choice framework, prospective law students would be 
concerned with post-graduation outcomes, including indebtedness, and a law school’s 
financial aid award information—for the current and prior year—provides potential law 
students with a mechanism to assess marginal costs and benefits associated with each 
institution of legal education.38 As financial aid awards are made public, through ABA 
Rule 509 Disclosure Reports, law school websites, law school recruiting materials, and 
admission acceptance letters, this study assumes the freeflow of information about 
financial aid from the law school to the prospective law student.39 
																																																								
37 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, 3 HANDBOOK OF PUB. ECON. 1661-
1784 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law. STANFORD L. REV. 
1551-75 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. 49 J. 
Bus. S251-78 (1986). 
38 See Caron & Gely, supra note 9; Henderson & Morriss, supra note 1; Andrew P. Morriss, & William 
D. Henderson, Measuring Outcomes: Post-graduate Success in the U.S. News & World Report Law School 
Rankings, 83 IND. L. J. 422-61 (2008); Russell B. Korobkin, Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A 
Response to Posner and Sunstein, 81 IND. L. J. 35-45 (2006). 
39 See Report and Recommendations, supra note 25. 
 58 
However, critics have contended that evaluating the effect of financial aid on 
student enrollment decisions is complicated by the likely endogeneity of the financial aid 
offer variable in a student enrollment equation.40 Furthermore, adherents to scarce 
resources theory argue that the student response to financial aid awards is not the proper 
direction for the theory of action; instead, the appropriate theory of action models how 
law schools change financial aid awards to influence student enrollment, given 
increasingly scarce and often fixed resources.41 
Thus, this study seeks to test whether the demand for legal education, as measured 
through first-year law-school matriculants, is a function of a law school’s financial aid 
awards, which theoretically reduce the marginal costs of consuming legal education to 
the prospective student, net of factors that influence student choice, such as institutional 
reputation and student aptitude. Specifically, this study seeks to answer: 
To what extent is a law school’s first-year matriculant enrollment 
influenced by financial aid awards, controlling for student- and institution-
specific characteristics? 
 
Data 
This analysis makes use of the only publicly available data on the salient 
institutional characteristics of law schools—the ABA Rule 509 Disclosures Reports. 
These reports cover a vast array of data from each of the 203 fully ABA-accredited law 
schools, including: admissions selectivity; entering-class median GPA; entering-class 
median LSAT; cost of tuition, room, and board; degrees awarded; bar passage rate; and 
mode state jurisdiction bar passage rate. This data, intended for consumer and public 																																																								
40 Wilbert van der Klaauw, Estimating the Effect of Financial Aid Offers on College Enrollment: A 
Regression–Discontinuity Approach, 43 INT’L ECON. REV. 1249-87 (2002). This study attempted to root 
out the endogeneity by using instrumental variables estimation described below. 
41 See Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 11; see also McPherson & Schapiro, supra note 23. 
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transparency, is required to be furnished annually to the ABA as a condition of a law 
school’s accreditation.42 The ABA hosts an online public repository containing these 
reports from each accredited institution by year. The data set used in this study represents 
data collected from 2011-2016 by each accredited law school in the country, as reported 
to the ABA. I accessed this portal and both hand-coded the ABA Rule 509 Disclosure 
data by accredited institution for each year between 2011-2016.43 After coding this 
information for each institution and year used in this analysis, I then supplemented the 
Rule 509 Disclosure data set using U.S News rankings and peer review rankings for each 
institution for the same year, plus one, in the sequence, given that, for example, U.S. 
News’ rankings released in 2012 utilize 2011 data.44 Last, the U.S. News’ rankings and 
peer assessment rankings for each institution from calendar years 2012 through 2017 
were merged into the full data set. 
The full data set surveys all 203 nationally-accredited law schools—coded as 
observations by year in the complete data set—and 8 provisionally accredited law schools 
and records their institutional responses to over 400 variables relating to key metrics of 
equal-access, student characteristics and outcomes, curriculum, faculty demographics, 
institutional resources, as well as their U.S. News’ rankings and peer assessment rankings. 
This study employs a smaller subset of variables from the full data set. In total, this data 																																																								
42 See Report and Recommendations, supra note 24; Changes to the Standards for Approved Law 
Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, March 17, 2011, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the
_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/20110317_hod_concurrence_s509_r10_r22_r24.authcheckdam
.pdf (2011). 
43 It should be noted that ABA Rule 509 Disclosure data is now released at the end of the calendar year 
for which its data is collected, while earlier iterations were released at the end of the academic year. 
44 This fact is further complicated by the fact that U.S. News would have referred to its rankings 
released in 2009, using 2008 data, as its 2010 rankings. This study merged together observations of 
calendar year data (i.e. 2008 data) with the rankings observations for calendar year in which the rankings 
were released (i.e. 2009 ranking publication) as a one-year observation, and not according to the U.S. News 
year convention (i.e. “2010” rankings). 
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set comprises 47 variables per year per institution from 2011 through 2016, and U.S. 
News’ rank and peer-rankings data for each participating law school from 2012 through 
2017. Because researchers who have previously used the ABA Rule 509 Disclosure data 
in studies have voiced concern about the reporting validity of the data, results are 
reported as statistics and not population parameters, to allow for the possibility of 
measurement error. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
In order to test the rational choice framework of the first research question, this 
study culled from the dataset a series of variables to serve as the principal student- and 
institution-specific covariates that have been demonstrated to impact a student’s decision 
to attend, or a law school to admit a student.45 These salient independent variables 
include: the law school’s admission selectivity rate, as measured by the number of 
admission offers divided by the number of applications received; LSAT and GPA of 
incoming matriculants, which represent the only student-level data available in the 
dataset; and the U.S. News’ average peer assessment rating for the law school as a proxy 
for institutional prestige.46 
The primary dependent variable used in models responsive to the research 
questions is first-year matriculant student totals. This variable is the total number of 
																																																								
45 See Yarbrough, supra note 11. 
46 To illustrate how a law school is assigned a peer review score, consider the following. In Fall 2014, 
the U.S. News’ peer review survey asked law school deans, deans of academic affairs, chairs of faculty 
appointments and the most recently tenured faculty members to rate programs on a scale from marginal (1) 
to outstanding (5). Those individuals who did not know enough about a school to evaluate it fairly were 
asked to mark “don't know.” Responses of “don't know” counted neither for nor against a law school. 
Hovering around annual averages, about 66 percent of those surveyed responded in Fall 2014. See Robert 
Morse, Methodology: Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 15, 2016, 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-schools-methodology. 
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matriculating first-year students as reported by law schools in ABA Rule 509 Disclosure 
Reports. An alternate specification of the dependent variable—which is not reported in 
this chapter because of inconsistencies in the way that this variable was reported over the 
2011-2016 time period, is the first-year matriculant yield, which divides first-year 
enrollment totals by the total number of admission offers the law school gave to measure 
the matriculation rate of the students to which the law school offered admission. Thus, 
the naïve model specification is: 
 
This analysis employs year fixed effects, school fixed effects, and year and school 
multiple fixed effects. Fixed effects present conservative, de-meaned estimates, and 
rely on the assumption that there are no changes over time that have not been 
controlled.47 Thus, they are unbiased to the extent that omitted variable bias is not a 
concern.48  
 
 
 
																																																								
47 A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMETRICS: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 
(2005). That said, these estimates may still be inconsistent, due to endogenous regressors. If a valid 
instrument can be obtained, the use of instrumental variables estimation may provide a way to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates. Id. Both approaches were employed in this study, given the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The instrument used was year-to-year change in market 
value of the law school’s parent university’s endowment on the theory that returns to endowments 
may be used to fund scholarships. However, this instrument was only a good instrument for the law 
schools at universities with large endowments, not for universities with smaller endowments, making 
the instrument unreliable for the entire population of law schools. The degree and magnitude indicated 
by the multiple fixed effects model holds when testing the sensitivity of the results for bias of the primary 
independent variable—a law school's median financial aid award amount—using instrumental variable 
estimation. Because the fixed effects estimates are fairly robust to omitted variable bias, the 
instrumental variable estimates are only used for sensitivity testing. Thus, the fixed effects estimates 
proffered below are thus the preferred estimates. 
48 Cameron & Trivedi, supra, n. 47. 
Matricit = β0 +β1FinAidit +β2PRscoreit−1 +β3Selectit +β4GPAit +β5LSATit +αi +εi
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Results 
This study uses a host of independent variables as controls to isolate the effect of 
financial aid on matriculant enrollment totals. Among them is an admissions selectivity 
rate, which is expressed as a percentage and, in this case, is a function of the number of 
offers for admission a law school gave, divided by the number of applications for 
admission it received. Lower values of this variable represent increased admissions 
selectivity. Over the 6 years in this study, growth in the admissions selectivity rate 
indicates that law schools have become far less selective. Median LSAT score is 
expressed as the median score for incoming full-time matriculants and runs along a 
theoretical range from 120 – 180 scoring scale. Between 2011 and 2016, median LSAT 
scores, on average declined, but seem to have reached a relative plateau since 2014. 
Median undergraduate GPA is expressed on a theoretical 0.00 – 4.00 scale and represents 
the median undergraduate GPA for incoming full-time matriculants.49 This variable 
displays a similarly steady decline and leveling off over this time frame—from 3.42 in 
2011 to 3.39 in 2016—indicating a downward trend in the average entering law student’s 
undergraduate GPA.  
The primary independent variable used in this study is the median financial aid 
award amount reported by each institution. This number is expressed in Table 1, below, 
as a raw dollar amount, but is rescaled in thousands of dollars in the regression models 
that follow in Table 3.2, below. The average median financial aid award markedly 
increases over the timeframe analyzed in this chapter. In addition to the median financial 																																																								
49 I subdivided this variable into quartiles by each observation year to disaggregate the effect of 
financial aid on matriculant totals under the multiple fixed effects model in Part D, below. 
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aid award variable, an original independent variable noted below captures the annual 
expected cost of attendance of a law school. The expected cost of attendance is expressed 
as the real dollar average cost of attendance, for full-time non-resident students. This 
variable is generated by summing the full-time tuition and living expenses, less 
probability-adjusted scholarship money. Like median financial award, the expected cost 
of attendance is operationalized as a raw dollar value. This variable is noisy over the 
period of the study.  
Finally, the primary dependent variable, used in the models responsive to the 
research questions, is first-year matriculant student totals. This variable is the total 
number of matriculating first-year students as reported by law schools in ABA Rule 509 
Disclosure Reports. Matriculant totals fall steadily from 2011–2015 and appear to 
rebound slightly in 2016. 
 
Testing Theory Using OLS and Fixed Effects Regression Specifications 
This study tested the rational choice theory, which holds that demand for legal 
education, measured here as first-year matriculant total, is determined by the exchange of 
information about marginal costs and benefits, namely financial aid awards. This 
relationship is modeled by regressing first-year matriculant enrollment totals on median 
financial aid awards and: covariates measuring institutional characteristics, such as 
lagged first-year matriculant enrollment totals, U.S. News Peer Review score, and 
admissions selectivity; covariates measuring student characteristics, such median LSAT 
and GPA; all previously referenced covariates, also known as the full model; the full 
model with year fixed effects; the full model with law school fixed effects; and the full 
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model with year and law school fixed effects. Each model below reports robust standard 
errors. Several of the variables in the regression models presented below are significantly 
and linearly correlated with first-year matriculant enrollment totals and matriculant yield 
rates independently.50 However, as the regression models below indicate, when subjected 
to the rigors of predicting first-year matriculant enrollment totals and yield rates, many of 
these variables could not account for the variability in peer review score at statistically 
significant levels. 
In the first two model specifications displayed in Table 3.2, below, in which first-
year matriculant enrollment totals are specified as the dependent variable, law school 
indicators, Model 1, and student indicators, Model 2, are significant predictors of 
matriculant enrollment totals. When all covariates are present in the full naïve model, 
Model 3, the statistically significant effect of increasing a law school’s median financial 
award by $1,000 results an increase of matriculant enrollment totals of nearly 1 student, 
on average. Two other estimates in this model require explanation: because a one unit 
increase in GPA on a 4 point scale and a one unit increase in peer review score on a 5-
point scale are so unlikely as to be unattainable, their stated effect is unrealistically large. 
However, as controls, these estimates help to isolate the effect of the main independent 
variable on the dependent variable of matriculant enrollment totals. 
The preferred estimates in this table employ fixed effects for a quasi-experimental 
analysis of this effect.51 In Model 4, looking within year and across schools, raising the 																																																								
50 See Table A1, in the Appendix, below. 
51 Because this study uses panel data with observations from every ABA-accredited law school, 
concluding with a cross-sectional or pooled results analysis would be inappropriate given that regressions 
from these results rely on inter-law school and inter-year variation. See Badi H. Baltagi, Peter Egger & 
Michael Pfaffermayr, A Generalized Spatial Panel Data Model with Random Effects, 32 ECONOMETRIC 
REV. 650-85 (2013). Doing so would be problematic for two reasons: (1) though unlikely, it is possible that 
the median financial aid award variable is endogenous; and (2) potentially omitted variables may bias our 
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median financial aid award by $1,000 results in a 1.54 matriculant enrollment total 
increase, or over one and a half additional students more than the previous year’s 
matriculant total, on average. This initial finding may point to evidence that students are 
in fact drawn in by promise of more generous financial aid awards; that is, this result may 
evince students’ preference to consume legal education when it is subsidized by 
institutionally-provided financial aid awards, net of secular year trends. However, while 
this model controls for within-year differences as well as law school and student 
predictors, it does not fully account for differences between schools. 
Table 3.2: OLS & Fixed Effects Regressions: Matriculant Enrollment Totals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS Year FE School FE Y/S FE 
       
Median Financial Aid Award 0.759*** 0.560** 0.928*** 1.541*** -1.623*** -0.282 
 (0.282) (0.283) (0.290) (0.199) (0.369) (0.342) 
FT Admission Selectivity Rate 0.723***  0.481** 0.841** 0.556* 1.259*** 
 (0.175)  (0.407) (0.281) (0.283) (0.293) 
US NEWS Peer Review Score 54.55***  67.71*** 85.19*** 108.9*** 65.84*** 
 (4.368)  (7.123) (7.312) (31.35) (23.70) 
LSAT Median – FT  7.289*** 4.439*** 1.264 5.392*** 0.0232 
  (0.770) (1.284) (1.300) (1.506) (1.328) 
GPA Median – FT  -68.80* -200.7*** -166.0*** 33.19 60.31** 
  (39.99) (21.10) (11.91) (28.57) (26.22) 
Constant 2.558 -66.44*** -32.05 277.8 -1,042*** -209.8 
 (16.08) (17.59) (165.5) (187.7) (287.7) (245.4) 
       
Observations 1167 1208 1116 1166 1166 1166 
R-squared 0.210 0.179 0.258 0.274 0.216 0.356 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The school fixed effects estimate presented in Model 5 illustrates the marginal 																																																																																																																																																																					
estimates bias. See Van Der Klaauw, supra note 41; see also JEFFREY WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY 
ECONOMETRICS (2008). With regard to the possible endogeneity of the main independent variable, aid 
amount may be raised by lower status law schools to compensate for lower yields in prior year and status or 
quality may also be associated with outcomes. The possible endogeniety problem is accounted for by 
instrumental variable estimation in the sensitivity analysis available upon request. Importantly, this study 
accounts for omitted variable bias by: (1) assuming that there is little change in demand within each law 
school over time that is not controlled-for; and (2) focusing on variation within year and within school or 
within tiers of peer review ratings. Fixed and random effects specifications reduce the omitted variable bias 
by demeaning the data, helping to isolate the effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable of 
interest on the dependent variable looking within variable groups. Thus, after conducting a Hausman 
specification test to determine whether fixed or random effects was more appropriate, this study 
incorporated fixed effects on year and school in Models 4, 5, and 6. 
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effect of increasing median financial aid awards by $1,000 and deviate from the previous 
models’ estimates of the effect of median financial aid award changes both in magnitude 
and directionality. Looking within a school across years, a $1,000 increase the in median 
financial aid award actually results in a decrease of first year matriculant enrollment 
totals by 1.62 students. This result suggests evidence of scarce resources; that is, to the 
extent that scholarship funds are stagnant or declining with enrollments, they would be 
awarded to fewer students, resulting in a greater median award on average. This result is 
perhaps expected when, examining the descriptive increase in the average median 
financial aid award from 2011–2016 while average first-year matriculant enrollment 
totals decreased over this same period of time. Thus, while these estimates account for 
differences between schools, they are unable to overcome the overwhelming secular trend 
of declining enrollments. The results for the multiple fixed effects specification in Model 
6, which use year and school fixed effects, are the preferred model are explored in the 
section that follows. 
 
Multiple Fixed Effects Results 
 As previously noted, this study analyzes the entire population of law ABA-
accredited law schools, where the unit of observation is the law school itself rather than a 
smaller unit of analysis. Ordinarily, in studying a population, the significance of the 
effect sizes from multiple fixed effects regression results are, in essence, irrelevant if the 
estimates are construed as parameters of the population. However, to acknowledge the 
possibility of measurement error inherent in the institutionally-reported ABA data, the 
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estimates from the multiple fixed effects regression are reported with indications of 
statistical significance.  
A priori, there is reason to believe that the best estimates, for purposes of this 
analysis, are proffered by the year and school multiple fixed effect model, Model 6 in 
Table 3.2. This is because these estimates remove both the secular trend of declining 
enrollment with year fixed effects and the differences between schools with the school 
fixed effect—at the same time. If significant, these estimates would seem to indicate that 
financial aid award increases do not necessarily have the intended effect: a $1,000 
increase in median financial aid awards results in a .28 student loss for the marginal 
school within a given year. However, the multiple fixed effect model produces an 
estimate of the impact of median financial aid awards on enrollment that is not 
significant. This result indicates that the null hypothesis—that a law school’s increasing 
its median financial aid awards does not directly impact its student matriculation, even 
accounting for other factors that are directly related to matriculation—cannot be rejected. 
As such, the rational choice theory—and the line of research that find a strong positive 
influence of financial aid on influencing whether and where a student decides to enroll 
for undergraduate education52—does not find support in its application to the relationship 
between financial aid increases and matriculation in the context of legal education. 
																																																								
52 See, e.g., Christopher Cornwell, David B. Mustard & Deepa J. Sridhar, The Enrollment Effects of 
Merit-based Financial Aid: Evidence from Georgia’s HOPE Program, 24 J. LABOR ECON. 24, 761-86 
(2006) (using Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) data to examine the effects of the 
HOPE Program on Georgia colleges and universities enrollments and attributing attributed a significant, 
5.9%, college enrollment increase in Georgia—not seen in control states—to the HOPE Program); Liang 
Zhang & Erik C. Ness, Does State Merit-based Aid Stem Brain Drain?, 32 EDUC. EVAL. & POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 143-65 (2010); James Monks, The Impact of Merit-based Financial Aid on College Enrollment: 
A Field Experiment, 28 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 99-106 (2009); and David M. Linsenmeier, Harvey S. Rosen 
& Cecilia E. Rouse, Financial Aid Packages and College Enrollment Decisions: An Econometric Case 
Study, 88 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 126-145 (2006) (studying a university’s financial aid administrative 
data using a differences-in-differences analysis and finding that changing low-income student aid from 
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Sensitivity Testing 
To test the sensitivity of the null finding produced by the multiple fixed effects 
model, two primary strategies were used. The first, a more econometrically rigorous 
approach, employs instrumental variable estimation. This method of sensitivity testing 
the estimates from the multiple fixed effects regression model relies on the theory that if 
changing median financial aid awards were operationalized as a type of “treatment,” the 
problem with the data analyzed in this sample is that the treatment may not be allocated 
randomly. For instance, the characteristics of the law schools that increase financial aid in 
order to increase matriculant enrollment could differ from the characteristics of those 
who do not. These differences may exist with regard to observable characteristics 
controlled for in the OLS models above, but more threateningly, the differences may also 
exist with regard to unobservable characteristics and could therefore confound the effects 
of treatment.53 If this confound were due to endogeneity of the independent variable, it 
could bias the above estimates. 
As such, I investigated the endogeneity of the median financial aid awards to test 
the sensitivity of the results, as well as the scarce resources theory by implication, using 
instrumental variables estimation. I employed a Durbin-Wu-Hausman F-Test of 
endogeneity of the median financial aid award variable, which first regresses median 
financial aid award on the model covariates and then predicts residuals of from this 
																																																																																																																																																																					
loans to grants resulted in a significant positive impact on the likelihood of enrollment among low-income 
minority students.). 
53 See Joseph P. Newhouse, & Mark McClellan, Econometrics in Outcomes Research: The Use of 
Instrumental Variables, 19 ANNUAL REV. PUB. HEALTH 17-34 (1998). 
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regression.54  In the next stage, the dependent variables matriculant yield rate and 
enrollment totals were regressed on model covariates, including median financial aid 
award and its residuals from the first stage.55 
Testing the F-distribution differences indicated that median financial aid award is 
very close to the cut point for exogeneity but could be endogenous in the analytical 
sample when the dependent variable specified is matriculant enrollment totals. This same 
test indicated that median financial aid award could be endogenous in the analytical 
sample when the dependent variable specified is matriculant yield rates. To see if this 
bias could be removed, I employed an instrumental variables estimation was used, 
exploiting a law school’s parent university endowment value as the excluded instrument. 
Instrumental variables estimation has two properties—the exclusion restriction and 
the prediction restriction. The exclusion restriction requires finding an excluded 
instrumental variable that and only influences the dependent variable through the 
endogenous independent variable. The prediction restriction also requires that this 
instrumental variable be a statistically significant predictor of the endogenous 
independent variable. For example, if decisions about financial aid at a law school are 
tied to returns from the law school’s parent university’s endowment, the university 
endowment value may affect matriculant yield or enrollment; however, for this to be a 
valid instrument, it must only affect matriculant yield or enrollment through the median 
financial aid award amount to satisfy the exclusion restriction.  
Theoretically, the lagged-year parent endowment value would have bearing on the 
median financial aid award amounts in the current year in a more binding fashion than 																																																								
54 See Cameron & Trivedi, supra note 47; Wooldridge, supra note 51. 
55 See id. 
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current year parent endowment value. Moreover, a valid instrument must not have direct 
relationship with the dependent variable, and lagged year parent university endowment 
value is not directly related to matriculant yield rates or enrollment totals. Also, a valid 
instrument must be a significant predictor of the endogenous variable, median financial 
aid award. The lagged year parent endowment value is a statistically significant predictor 
of the dependent variables at p < 0.05 levels of a chance finding, even controlling with 
model covariates. This study’s tests indicate that the lagged-year parent university’s 
endowment annual value is an ideal instrumental variable for testing scarce resources 
theory, because it influences the dependent variable only through the endogenous 
independent variable and is a statistically significant predictor of the endogenous 
variable. Thus, the lagged-year parent endowment value satisfies the requirements for a 
valid instrument theoretically and statistically. Recall that scarce resources theory holds 
that actors in higher education make decisions amidst declining resources in an 
increasingly more competitive environment. Instrumenting on a law school’s parent 
university endowment value, this analysis aims to test the sensitivity of the earlier 
findings by isolating the effect of increasing median financial aid awards on matriculant 
yield rates and enrollment and totals that is would not be attributable to the endogeneity 
of the median financial aid award. Thus, the lagged-year parent endowment value 
instrument was specified against median financial aid award with year fixed effects. 
However, it was only a valid instrument for law schools in the top three tiers, a majority 
of which have substantial fair market endowment values. 
Controlling for law school and student indicators and instrumenting on the lagged-
year parent endowment value, the effect of increasing median financial aid award by 
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$1,000 on the matriculant outcomes results in a .25 student loss in matriculant enrollment 
totals—the same direction and relative magnitude as the multiple fixed effects model 
explained in the previous section. The directionality seems to indicate generally that, 
instrumenting on endowment values, increases to median financial aid awards result 
marginal decreases in matriculant enrollment totals. However, the instrumental variable 
estimates are local average treatment effects, which means that the instrumental variable 
estimates would only apply to those schools that did change their financial aid. Because 
these estimates only refer to the difference between schools at the cutoff, they are not 
generalizable in the same way the fixed effects estimates are. Moreover, while the 
excluded instrument, the law school’s parent university’s endowment value, satisfied 
both the exclusion and prediction restrictions, the eigenvalues on the instrument revealed 
that this variable is in fact a very weak instrument for lower tier law schools. The 
eigenvalue is 4.36, indicating the chance of a committing a Type I error from these 
estimates could exceed as much as 25 percent. Thus, the results from this sensitivity test 
should only be viewed as local estimates and not generalizable to all law schools. 
As such, the results from the analysis incorporating year and peer review score fixed 
effects are proffered as the preferred causal estimates. This is because: (1) the possible 
endogeneity of the median financial aid award variable is merely speculative and rides 
the line of exogeneity in statistical testing; and (2) the only cause of possible bias in these 
estimates would come from omitted variable bias. The specter of omitted variable bias, a 
silent but omnipresent threat in regression modeling, is the only real threat to the fixed 
effects estimates and is due to limitations in both the dataset—taken from the ABA Rule 
509 Disclosure Reports—and the lack of sufficient publicly available data on law school 
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and law students. This limitation highlights the need for more complete publicly available 
data on law schools and law schools, as well as researchers to contemplate causal 
estimates of decisionmaking in the area of law school attendance. 
Finally, because it is unlikely than any single mechanism not accounted-for in the 
fixed effects analysis would influence student choice to the same degree as financial aid, 
the results from the sensitivity test are only included to satisfy detractors of the results 
from multiple fixed effects model. The direction and magnitude of the instrumental 
variables estimation results largely agrees with those results, bolstering the effect size 
found in the null result from the multiple fixed effects model. 
The second method of testing the sensitivity of the null finding is essentially a 
granular analysis of the non-significant effect of financial aid awards on matriculation, 
yielded by the multiple fixed effects regression model. For this analysis, law school 
observations were censored by reputational tier, breaking the 203 accredited law schools 
into quartiles by U.S. News’ peer reputational scores. The results do not change the major 
conclusion of the null finding: that financial aid is an inefficient instrument to increase 
matriculation. These results describe the effect of financial aid on matriculation by 
reputational tier and are reported in the figures in the appendix below with stars 
indicating the level of statistical significance for censored results by each law school 
tier.56  
Looking within year and school, Tier 1 law schools fare best of all. In fact, law 
schools in this tier can expect a $1,000 median financial aid award increase to result in a 
																																																								
56 However, it should be noted that the censored analysis only approaches a true disaggregation of the 
result reported in the multiple fixed effects model. Each censored effect roughly sums to the result reported 
in the multiple fixed effects model, but in order to truly disaggregate that effect, a fully interacted model 
would be required. 
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1.83 student matriculant enrollment increase. However, it should be noted that increasing 
median financial aid awards by $1,000 is no small feat, especially when it only results in 
a fewer than 2 student matriculation gain. Additionally, the pattern revealed by these 
findings is quite interesting, because Tier 1 law schools have traditionally been more 
interested in balancing their student body on various characteristics, including gender, 
race, socioeconomic status, and other factors, and since 2010 have been preoccupied with 
maintaining the average entering credentials of their students, not on necessarily growing 
their class sizes. Yet, this result indicates that increasing financial aid awards as a means 
of increasing class size for Tier 1 law schools may indeed be effective. 
Similarly, Tier 2 law schools realize a matriculant enrollment increase for an increase in 
median financial aid awards. But the resulting increase in matriculants is only marginally 
beneficial to Tier 2 law schools—0.45 students per $1,000 increase in median financial 
aid awards. However, these results would tend to support rational choice theory: students 
are more likely to enroll at Tier 1 and 2 law schools when presented with the prospect of 
greater financial aid awards at law schools enjoying a better peer reputation. Meanwhile, 
Tier 3 law schools lose .61 students and Tier 4 law schools lose 1.94 students for each 
$1,000 increase in median financial aid awards. These results would seem to support a 
scarce resources theory interpretation: law schools in Tiers 3 and 4 would only be likely 
to increase median financial aid awards when there are fewer students to whom they will 
be awarded. Still, law schools in Tier 3 and 4 may be losing fewer law students than they 
otherwise would by increasing median financial aid awards. Regardless, these results 
underscore the fact that, even accounting for secular trends in declining enrollment and 
differences between schools, increasing median financial aid awards is unlikely to result 
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in meaningful matriculant enrollment increases. This finding suggests that law schools, 
across tiers, may already be engaging in financial aid allocation practices that lead to 
diminished returns. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Reliable indicators of marginal cost and benefit are essential to inform market 
participants’ expectations. Financial aid is one such indicator. The results from this 
study suggest that demand for legal education may be bound up with the incentives 
law schools offer prospective students to mitigate marginal costs, when accounting 
for secular trends or even for the marginal law school in a given year in the top two 
reputational tiers. Importantly, however, this study illustrates that the effect of 
increasing financial aid is not uniformly beneficial and does not benefit the marginal 
school in the bottom tiers, even net of secular trends. 
The estimates resulting from this analysis suggest: support for the rational 
choice theory—when controlling for student and law school level covariates—finding 
that increases in financial aid awards result in increased matriculant enrollment totals 
looking within year; but the scarce resources theory cannot be fully discounted, as the 
marginal effect of increasing financial aid awards result in decreased matriculant yield 
rates, using school fixed effects and year and school multiple fixed effects. Ultimately, 
these results indicate that the effect of increasing matriculant enrollment totals by 
increasing median financial aid awards is inefficient—marginally beneficial at best 
and ineffective at worst. When viewed together with the survey results from the 
previous chapter, the results of the analysis from this chapter seem to indicate that, 
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while increases to financial aid awards may yield more matriculants at elite law 
schools, the increases in awards are not particularly salient to elite law students, and 
although financial aid awards are salient to middle-tier law students, middle-tier law 
schools do not reap the same matriculant benefits from increases to financial aid 
awards. 
Despite its inefficiency, this method has been and continues to be the quick-
fix approach to boosting enrollment, not only in law schools but also in higher 
education more broadly. The efficacy of this practice should be questioned in the 
context of law schools and particularly at lower-tiered law schools. Because the 
analysis in this chapter was motivated by the debate surrounding the appropriate 
incentives law schools can use to increase enrollment, it is hoped that this study will 
contribute to the literature about law schools as competitive market participants and 
underscore the absolute necessity of good data and effective measurements to assess 
law schools, especially during a time of great change. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYZING WAGE RETURNS TO LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES 
INTRODUCTION 
The consumer’s understanding of quality and value are essential to the success of 
any commodity or service, even for non-profit enterprises.1 In fact, public perceptions of 
quality and value are critical to sustaining public support of higher education. However, a 
uniform definition of these terms has proven elusive in legal education, even though 
value is generally considered to be an economic virtue. To date, a majority of the 
scholarship on legal education describes its value in abstract terms and in relation to the 
legal profession—that legal education is valuable because it educates the next generation 
of attorneys—positing normative relationships between legal education and the legal 
profession.2 A valid criticism of the existing literature is that it is over-determined, 
inherently reductive, and may not accurately measure the value of legal education as 
perceived by its consumers. Moreover, the current literature tends to bypass 
considerations of the near-term effects of market trends on law students, particularly in 
																																																								
1 See Gordon C. Winston, Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher 
Education, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 13-36 (1999); Charles T. Clotfelter, The Familiar by Curious 
Economics of Higher Education: Introduction to a Symposium, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3-12 (1999). 
2 See, e.g., John B. Garvey & Anne F. Zinkin, Making Law Students Client-Ready: A New Model 
in Legal Education, 1 DUKE FORUM L. SOC. CHANGE, 101-30 (2009) (suggesting a more practice-based 
approach to legal education); Editorial, The Empirical Turn in Legal Education, 89 JUDICATURE 312 
(2006) (touting the benefits of the incorporation of empirical methods in legal academic research and the 
law school curriculum). But see Bryant Garth, Legal Education Reform: New Regulations, Markets, and 
Competing Models of Supposed Deregulation, 83 BAR EXAMINER 17-26 (December 2014) (describing 
several current law school reform proposals); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (noting the growing rift between law 
school curriculum and the practice of law); Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal 
Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1992) (positing an alternate take on the same 
phenomenon as Judge Edwards’ article). But see Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., A Value-Added Ranking of Law 
Schools, SSRN WORKING PAPER (April 6, 2018), available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2623728 (ranking schools on the basis of the value 
they actually add to their law students bar passage and job placement, net the value what they were 
predicted to add to those students upon their entry to law school). 
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relation to their effect on law graduates’ labor market outcomes. It thus fails to answers 
questions about the outcomes of law school market participants, let alone describe value 
in real economic terms.3 
The analysis in this chapter addresses this gap in the literature by defining value 
in legal education in terms of post-graduate outcomes, which were found to be important 
factors in the decision to enroll in law school in the first chapter of this dissertation. This 
chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part of this chapter describes conceptions of 
value in higher education and assesses the applicability of these conceptions to the legal 
education market. The next part describes the data used to examine the value of legal 
education in quantifiable terms. The third part discusses the results of this study, and a 
brief conclusion uniting these results with the wider literature on stratification ends this 
chapter of the dissertation. 
 
A DEFINITION OF VALUE 
Value in Context 
Value is not merely an economic term, and its non-economic characteristics can 
help define quality. For instance, the literature on the economics of education identifies 
institutional characteristics—such as low student to faculty ratios, high selectivity, non-
instructional support infrastructure—as being related to value and determinative of 
																																																								
3 For an explanation of the education production function, see, e.g., Peter Arcidiacono, Patrick 
Bayer and Aurel Hizmo, Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability, 2 
AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 76-104 (2010) (relating the revelatory ability of educational credentials, via 
signaling, to the labor market); Alan B. Krueger, Experimental Estimates of the Education Production 
Function, 114 Q. J. ECON. 497-532 (1999) (equating, through causal estimates, the effect of schooling 
inputs on developmental outcomes); and Paul Glewwe and Hanan G. Jacoby, Economic Growth and the 
Demand for Education: Is There a Wealth Effect, 74 J. DEV. ECON. 33-51 (2004) (studying the relationship, 
in a comparative national sense, between human capital investment, national wealth, and the demand for 
education). 
 78 
quality.4 Additionally, studies in undergraduate student engagement have long held 
student engagement to be a proxy for quality and carry important implications for non-
monetary economic outcomes, related to wages, such as grades and degree completion.5 
Examples of robust qualitative studies that explore enrollment, learning experiences, 
persistence to graduation in law schools, and placement in the profession, have been 
significant in impact, though few in number.6 Because these factors derive from the same 
theory of investment in human capital as purely monetary understandings of value, the 
inclusion of these factors in an operationalization of value may indeed more accurately 
capture the value law schools add to their students and graduates and that they ought to 
																																																								
4 See, e.g., Douglas A. Webber & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Do Expenditure Other than Instructional 
Expenditures Affect Graduation and Persistence Rates in American Higher Education, 29 ECON. OF EDUC. 
REV. 947-58 (2010) (finding that for some institutions, non-instructional expenditures positively impacted 
graduation rates); Mark Hoekstra, The Effect of Attending a Flagship State University on Earnings: A 
Discontinuity Based Approach, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 717-24 (2009) (finding that attending the most 
selective state university causes earnings to be as much as 20 percent higher for certain demographical 
groups); Juan Carlos Calcagno, Thomas Bailey, Davis Jenkins, Gregory Kinzel, and Timothy Leinbach, 
Community College Student Success: What Institutional Characteristics Make a Difference?, 27 ECON. OF 
EDUC. 632-45 (2008) (noting the importance of low student to faculty ratios); Dominic J. Brewer, Eric R. 
Eide & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Does it Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Cross-Cohort Evidence on 
the Effect of College Type on Earnings, 34 J. HUMAN RES. 104-23 (1999) (finding that after controlling for 
selection effects, significant economic returns accrue to those who attend a private elite institution, and 
some evidence suggest this premium has increased over time). 
5 See, e.g., Ella R. Kahu, Framing Student Engagement in Higher Education, 38 STUDIES IN 
HIGHER EDUC. 758-73 (2013) (noting that engagement is a proxy for quality); JOHN M. BRAXTON, AMY S. 
HIRSCHY, AND SHEDERICK A. MCCLENDON, UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING COLLEGE STUDENT 
DEPARTURE (2011) (discussing the positive effects of student engagement, in terms of universities, on 
student retention rates); George D. Kuh, Ty M. Cruce, Rick Shoup, Jillian Kinzie, Robert M. Gonyea, 
Unmasking the Effects of Student Engagement on First-Year College Grades and Persistence, 79 J. HIGHER 
EDUC. 540-63 (2008) (finding highly positive effects of student engagement on academic outcomes); 
Vincent Tinto, Research and Practice of Student Retention: What Next, 8 J. COLL. STUDENT RETENTION 1-
19 (2006) (recapitulating the connection between student engagement and academic as well as economic 
outcomes); Paul D. Umbach & Matthew R. Wawrzynski, Faculty Do Matter: The Role of College Faculty 
in Student Learning and Engagement, 46 RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUC. 153-84 (2005) (finding a link 
between student engagement and the use of active and collaborative faculty learning techniques in the 
university classroom). 
6  See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER” (2007) (focusing on the language of law schools, how legal education is developed and 
reproduced over time, and how this impacts law students and the profession). The need for greater use of 
qualitative methods is research on legal education has been noted by legal academics. See Alyson M. 
Drake, The Need for Experiential Legal Education Research, Social Science Research Network Working 
Paper (2016).. 
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be considered in addition to the real economic terms of value in legal education.7 
However, in the absence of national surveys linking both qualitative and quantitative 
outcome of law graduates, those that consider the quantitative outcomes of law graduates 
simultaneously with the qualitative inputs of those same respondents as law students 
greatly improves the understanding of the value that law schools provide to those 
students over their career. 
In fact, most of the research that constructs measures of value in higher education 
more broadly uses the latter approach. The literature on the value of higher education 
relies heavily on the education production function, which relates inputs, such as 
students’ characteristics, to measured educational outputs, such as standardized test 
scores, persistence and graduation, and labor market success.8 Yet, this approach has 
been slow to take hold in the graduate education sector, and especially in law schools. 
Beyond descriptive trends, little is known about the near-term wage returns and labor 
market outcomes law graduates actually realize. Recently, a small but growing body of 
literature has begun to apply an education production framework to legal education. A 
quantitative application of this approach uses econometric methods to address the 
relationship among legal education, law students, and the legal profession. It both 
discusses the difficulty of quantifying the value of legal education while attempting to do 																																																								
7 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, American Higher Education in Transition, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3-12 
(2012) (describing the shifting of university expenditures toward student support services); Ronald G. 
Ehrenberg, Econometric Studies in Higher Education, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 19-37 (2004) (identifying the 
econometric study of higher education as deriving from the human capital theory and the estimation of 
rates of return to higher education as an important constructs of value in higher education). 
8 See, e.g., Edward Lazear, Education: Consumption or Production, 85 J. POL. ECON. 569-97 
(1977); Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, and 
Economic Growth, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 69-75 (1966) (applying the education production function and 
economic growth theories to higher education in the United States); and James S. Coleman, Ernest Q. 
Campbell, Carol J. Hobson, James McPartland, Alexander M. Mood, Frederic D. Weinfeld & Robert L. 
York, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966) (performing the first major study to use an educational 
production function theoretical framework). 
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so through a quasi-Mincerian approach, which compares earnings of law graduates to 
baccalaureate degree holders.9 In perhaps the most informative application of quantitative 
methodologies to examine the outcomes of legal education, studies from the results of a 
three-wave survey on the Class of 2000 graduate cohort from law schools consider their 
longitudinal outcomes since 2003.10 This research has focused on qualitative outcomes, 
such as job satisfaction.11 This line of research is important but more is needed to 
establish consensus around the value of legal education that can be communicated in real 
economic terms to consumers and prospective consumers of legal education. 
 
The “Value-Proposition” 
Investment in legal education—indeed, any education beyond baccalaureate 
credentialing—assumes that the investment accrues private returns to law school 																																																								
9 See, e.g., Baum, supra note 12; Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a 
Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUDIES 249-89 (2014) (using Bureau of Labor Statistics to compare lifetime 
earnings of bachelor’s and law degree recipients and finding that, for most law school graduates, there 
exists a significant earning premium for graduates of law school over their bachelor’s degree earning 
peers); and Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, Value of a Law Degree by College Major, Access Group 
Center for Research & Policy Analysis Research Paper No. 16-03 (2016) (finding that law degree earnings 
premiums are highest for humanities and social sciences majors and lowest for STEM majors.) See also, 
Jacob Mincer, Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution, 66 J. POL. ECON. 281-302 
(1958). 
10 See, e.g., Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, & Joyce S. Sterling, Buyers’ Remorse?: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211-34 (2013) 
(discussing empirically the appeal of a career in law to since the Recession); Robert Nelson, Ronit 
Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, Joyce Sterling, Gita Wilder, and Terry Adams, Observations from the After 
the Bar Survey of the Bar Class of 2000, 24 QUINNIPAC L. REV. 539-54 (2006) (describing early results 
from the first wave of respondents). Using this approach, a few researchers have developed one-off studies 
with new samples that consider the same kinds of questions as the After the JD survey; see, e.g., Deborah J. 
Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010: Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal 
Profession, 2015(3) MICH. ST. L. REV., 1043-1124 (2015) (using publicly available sources to compile a 
national sample, this study offers an empirical survey of early career outcomes for the Class of 2010); 
Atinuke O. Adediran, John Hagan, Patricia Parker & Gabriele Plickert, Making the Best of a Bad 
Beginning: Young New York Lawyers Confronting the Great Recession, LSAC Grants Reports No. 16-01, 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747419 (2016) (employing survey data 
and 31 interviews, this study sheds light on the experiences of lawyers admitted to the New York state bar 
and practicing in the New York metropolitan area during the Recession). 
11 See, e.g., Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of Structuring 
Legal Careers, 41 L. &SOC. REV. 1-50 (2013). 
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graduates.12 This refrain is decades old, stemming from a mid-20th Century American 
Bar Association report on financing legal education, commissioned to address a then-
forecasted lawyer shortage. The purpose of this report was to present “a recommended 
plan for use by [ABA] approved law schools for conducting a student loan program”—
the first to discuss the “value proposition” of legal education.13 This report noted that, 
among other things, law schools, which were (and remain) tuition-dependent, need to 
charge higher tuitions to compensate for the dearth of lawyers resulting from the World 
War II period and that institutional loan programs would help students pay the increased 
rate of attendance.14 
 The report detailed how such a loan program could work and was based on the 
premise that  
(e)ducation is a long range capital investment capable of returning high 
yields. The difference between the cost of a legal education and its value 
in terms of lifetime earnings is proportionately much greater than the 
return ordinarily experienced on invested capital. The average annual 
earnings of lawyers exceed that of skilled industrial workers . . . . This 
greater annual return makes legal education a sound investment.15  
																																																								
12 American Bar Association Special Committee of the Conference on Personal Finance Law, 
Loans for Law School Students, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 298 (1952). In fact, the report noted that, “there are too 
few properly trained lawyers in the United States.” Id. at 312. 
13 Id. This report sought to examine the state of institutional loan programs by law schools in the 
mid-20th Century. Only a handful of the law schools responding to the survey on which the report was 
based had any sort of loan program. Id. at 316. In fact, the report recognized that most law schools in the 
early 1950s did “not have sufficient funds to furnish the necessary financial assistance to qualified and 
deserving students.” Id. at 312. This report was the first to discuss the federal government’s role in 
financing legal education through the GI Bill. Importantly, it noted that the main purposes of legal 
education should be to make legal education available “without regard to financial status or social 
standing,” given that the cost of legal education “of all kinds has risen greatly and is still rising.” Id. at 312, 
314. 
14 Id. In fact, the report noted that, “a loan program would be a distinct asset in the public relations 
program of the American Bar Association.” 
15 Id. at 314. 
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Thus, this report serves as the first articulation of the value proposition on which the 
investment in legal education has been premised since the mid-20th Century.16  
This view has stayed the test of time, and value proposition is now the dominant 
view of investment in post-baccalaureate credentialing. Yet, the value proposition 
depends on the availability of law jobs; debt incurred by law students must “be 
manageably repaid over some amount of time after graduating and obtaining a well-
paying lawyer job.”17 This position was tenable through the mid-1980s, when opposition 
to the value proposition began to arise as law school enrollments and the number of new 
law schools fell amidst an economic recession.18 However, economic growth and demand 
for legal services from the 1990s and late 2000s precipitated ripe conditions for the 
rhetoric of the value proposition once again until the Great Recession. 
At base, the rhetoric of the value proposition views the investment in legal 
education as accruing mostly private returns. As a corollary, because an investment in 
legal education is, in part, based on the individual student’s gain from this investment, 
any positive externalities of this private investment, such as having a sufficient number of 
lawyers to keep up with demand for legal services and providing the public with access to 
justice, are—according to current notions of the value proposition—coincidental. 19 																																																								
16 This is not to say that the consumption of legal education has uniformly been conceived of as 
issuing a purely private benefit. William Tucker Dean, invoking earlier arguments by Alfred Reed, noted 
that “(e)everyone will agree that the lawyer is a member of a public profession with responsibilities in a 
democratic society”. See William Tucker Dean, Who Pays the Bills? The Costs of Legal Education and 
How to Meet It, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 416 (1964). However, Dean also noted that law schools needed a 
sustainable source of revenue, which could be derived through increased tuition, which inevitably required 
greater private investment by law students. See id. at 419. 
17 Stephen Daniels, The Perennial (and Stubborn) Challenge of Cost, Affordability, and Access in 
Legal Education: “We Will Continue to Muddle Through,” Working Paper (2018) (one file with the 
author). 
18 See, e.g., David H. Vernon and Bruce I. Zimmer, The Demand for Legal Education: 1984 and 
the Future, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261 (1985). 
19 This positive externality that accrues to the public benefit should not be discounted; in fact, the 
notion that the output of lawyers is linked to access to justice may be among the most important 
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However, as the costs to the consumption of legal education continue to rise—well 
beyond those presaged in the ABA’s 1952 report—a systematic study of the returns to 
legal education as a measurable value of the investment of legal education is necessary to 
define the private returns to graduates of legal education, amidst a tidal wave of 
assumptions that legal education is a poor investment since 2008.20 
 
The Mincerian Approach 
One operationalization of value in education dominates the literature. Just a few 
years after the 1952 ABA report on financing legal education, Jacob Mincer first created 
a single equation model of returns to education, which sought to explain wages as a 
function of schooling and experience.21 This model has now become the pre-eminent and 
“most-widely used models in empirical economics” used to explain private returns to 
																																																																																																																																																																					
justifications for a robust system of legal education. Yet, it is among the most elusive byproducts of legal 
education to quantify and frequently evades measurement and research attention. 
20 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Samuel P. Engel, Does Law School Still Make Economic Sense?: 
An Empirical Analysis of “Big” Law Firm Partnership Prospects and the Relationship to Law School 
Attended, 62 J.L. & EDUC. 242 (2015); Paul F. Teich, The Near-Term Employment Prospects of American 
Law School Graduates, Boston Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 16-03 (2015); Law School Tuition 
1985-2012, AM. BAR ASS’N, available at: 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/s
tatistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf; Margaret Lofuts, Drop in Applications Spurs Changes at Law 
Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 11, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/articles/2015/03/11/drop-in-applications-spurs-changes-at-law-schools (2015); Ry 
Rivard, Lowering the Bar: More Law Schools Are Admitting Less Qualified Students, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED., Jan. 16, 2015 from https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-compete-
students-many-may-not-have-admitted-past (2015); Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New 
Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541–607 
(2013); George Critchlow, Kim Kardashian and Honey Boo Boo: Models for Law School Success (or Not), 
45 CONN. L. REV. 1319-53 (2013); Jerome M. Organ, Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal 
Education, 41 WASH. U. J. L. POL’Y, 33-56 (2013); William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The 
Law School Bubble: Federal Loans Inflate College Budgets, But How Long Will That Last If Law Grads 
Can't Pay Their Bills?, 98 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 30 (2012); Sandy Baum, A Framework for Thinking About 
Law School Affordability, Access Group Center for Research & Policy Analysis Research Paper No. 15-04 
(2015); Rebecca L. Bowman, When a Law Degree Is Not Enough: The Necessity of a Second Professional 
Degree for Lawyers (Dissertation, 2010). 
21 Jacob Mincer, Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution, 66 J. POL. ECON 
281-302 (1958). 
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tertiary schooling.22 In his original and subsequent analysis, Mincer modeled the natural 
logarithm of an individual’s earnings as a function of the individual’s years of education 
and years of potential labor market experience, including this last term—years of 
potential labor market experience—modeled quadratically. 
The standard Mincerian approach is generally specified as follows: log ! = log !! + !" + !! ! + !! !!   
where y represents earnings, s represents years of schooling, and x represents years of 
potential experience in the workforce. This analysis, like the ABA Report of its time, also 
relies on the value proposition: that more schooling results in a private benefit. The 
Mincerian model specification has become the preferred model of returns to schooling, 
particularly in the context of tertiary schooling versus secondary education, and has even 
been used to compare graduates of legal education to their peers who only received a 
baccalaureate degree prior to the Great Recession of 2008.23 However, given dramatic 
shifts in economic conditions during and since the Recession, a new study of private 
returns in post-recession legal education is timely, particularly one that discusses value in 
terms of these private returns among graduates of legal education. The discussion that 
follows in this chapter provides precisely this analysis. 
 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND DATA 
Framework and Research Question 
To analyze private returns to graduates of law school, I employ a Mincerian 
																																																								
22 GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS (2d) 264-66 (2000). See also, James J. Heckman and 
Lance J. Lochner, Fifty Years of Mincer Earnings Regressions, Working Paper (2003), available at: 
http://athena.sas.upenn.edu/petra/papers/llmincer.pdf. 
23 See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 9 (2014). 
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approach, including the use of fixed effects regression analysis. This approach answers 
how returns to legal education vary on the basis of qualitative characteristics and, 
especially quantitative characteristics. Ultimately, this section assesses:  
1. To what extent do law graduates’ near-term labor market returns demonstrate 
differences on the basis of:  
a. Qualitative factors, such as gender and race; and 
b. Quantitative factors, such as the rank of the law school attended by the 
individual. 
 
This analysis is critical to understanding how law graduates reap economic value from 
their investment in legal education, not merely in terms of the binary condition of 
graduating from law school, but in a more nuanced way that considers the debt law 
graduates accrued to attend law school, their academic performance in law school, and 
the academic reputation of the law school they attended, as critical factors in their 
ultimate wage returns. This richer context more accurately focuses the full picture of the 
value of legal education. 
 
Data 
This analysis employs data from all three waves of the After the JD (AJD) 
dataset.24 The AJD study was “designed to track the careers of a nationally representative 
cohort of lawyers admitted to the bar in the year 2000 over the first 12 years of their 
careers.”25 The first wave of AJD study (AJD1) provided cross-sectional data about the 
lives and careers of this cohort of law school graduates about three years after they 
																																																								
24 Three waves (2002-2003, 2007-2008, and 2012-2013) of the After the JD dataset are publicly 
available from ICPSR. However, in 2018, the author obtained the full, restricted dataset from the American 
Bar Foundation, which oversaw the AJD survey and maintains the dataset. The data used in this study are 
from the restricted AJD dataset.. 
25 After the JD III: Third Results from a National Study of Legal Careers, AM. BAR FDN. 1, 14-18 
(2014). 
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entered the legal profession. The second wave of the study (AJD2) follows these lawyers 
approximately seven years into their careers. And the third wave of the study (AJD3) 
surveys this cohort 12 years after their first admission to the bar. This time period 
represents an important cross-sectional snapshot of lawyers in the years leading growth 
and decline of the demand for legal services before and after the Great Recession of 
2008. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw rapid growth for law firms and law schools, 
but by 2010s, the legal services and legal education landscapes had dramatically changed. 
The AJD study utilized a two-stage scientific sampling approach. First, it selected 
respondents from metropolitan areas  
to obtain a wide distribution of geographic areas with different population 
densities and, second, selecting individuals who met individual eligibility 
criteria. In the first stage, the nation was divided into 18 strata by region 
and size of the new lawyer population. Within each stratum, one primary 
sampling unit . . . was selected—either a metropolitan area, a portion of a 
state outside large metropolitan areas, or an entire state. The PSUs 
included all four major markets, those with more than 2000 new lawyers 
per year (Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC); five of 
the nine large markets, those with between 750 and 2,000 new lawyers a 
year; and nine of the remaining smaller markets.26 
 
In the second stage, “individuals were sampled from each of the primary sampling units 
at rates that would, when combined and properly weighted, generalize to the national 
population of new lawyers.”27 The first wave of data collection, occurring between 2002-
2003, garnered responses from 4,538 eligible respondents, with a response rate of 71% of 
individuals. The second wave of the data collection, taking place between 2007-2008, 
attempted to locate and survey the original sample group from the first wave, even if a 
sample member had not been located or surveyed in the first wave of responses. The 
second wave, or AJD2, “obtained completed surveys from 3,705 eligible respondents, 																																																								
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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including 70.4% of the respondents to AJD1 and 26.9% of those who were not surveyed 
in the first wave,” netting survey responses from 50.6% of eligible sample members.28 
The third wave, taking place during 2012-2013, 
sought to locate and survey only individuals who had previously 
responded to either [the first or second waves of the study]. Sample 
members who never responded to any survey wave were not located in 
[the third wave]. . . . In total, [the third wave] obtained complete surveys 
from 2,862 respondents, for a response rate of 53% of individuals who 
previously responded to either [of the first two waves, amounting] to a 
response rate of about 35 percent of the initial sample of 8,225 established 
in 2002.29 
 
The longitudinal and cross-sectional nature of the research design, consisting of 
observations of the same individuals at three time periods throughout their career, offers 
insights into causal dynamics over the career of the respondents. However, it should be 
noted that weights were not used in the estimates provided in the sections that follow. 
This is because results comparing weighted sample to the unweighted sample do not 
meaningfully vary, and as such, the AJD study’s reports recommend not weighting 
observations “for multivariate estimates of correlation or causality.”30 To date, this data 
has been used for a host of applications, but it has never been used to examine wage 																																																								
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 After the JD III: Third Results from a National Study of Legal Careers, AM. BAR FNDN. AND 
NALP FNDN. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, 96 (2015). “Table A2 shows the distinction 
between “unweighted” and “weighted” results, providing the distribution of AJD respondents by gender 
across the three waves. The results in Table B do not show significant differences between the weighted 
and unweighted percentages in the data for each wave of the AJD. While sample weights effectively ensure 
results are representative of the national population of lawyers first admitted in 2000, the similarity 
between unweighted and weighted results indicates that results remain valid for analyses that do not use 
complex sample weights. . . . Considering the use of weights for simple statistical analysis and the 
similarities between weighted and unweighted results, we recommend using weights only for estimating 
population averages (i.e., means and proportions), rather than for multivariate estimates of correlations and 
causality.” Id. Several recent studies using AJD data also did not weight data. See, e.g., Meghan Dawe & 
Ronit Dinovitzer, Immigrant Offspring in the Legal Profession: Exploring the Effects of Immigrant Status 
on Earnings among American Lawyers IN DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE: RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS IN LEGAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL CAREERS (Spencer Headworth, Robert L. Nelson, Ronit Dinovitzer, and David B. 
Wilkins 1 ed. 2016) (utilizing the same dataset and not using individual observation weights for regression 
analysis). 
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returns to graduates of law schools over a fiscal decade, the period of time for which the 
AJD study was designed to run. The analysis in this chapter is the first to do so. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
The analysis that follows investigates the value law schools create in terms of 
labor market returns to recent law school graduates as measured by total wages. Using 
econometric methods to examine the extent to which recent law graduates reap the 
economic benefits of the credential in which they have invested, this analysis answers to 
what extent law students’ post-graduate wage returns vary based on their background 
characteristics, such as: race, gender, and other attributes including tiers of their law 
school’s academic prestige. Following the standard Mincerian specification of returns to 
education, the primary specification of used for this analysis was as follows: log ! = log !! + !" + !! ! + !! !! +  ! +  !  
where y represents total earnings (including salary, bonus, profit-sharing, stock options, 
and other income, where applicable), s represents years of schooling (as taken above the 
baccalaureate degree),31 x represents years of potential experience in the workforce,32 ! 
																																																								
31  Although traditional Mincerian analysis specifications list total years of schooling, all 
respondents have received baccalaureate degrees and law degrees, at a minimum. Thus, the “s” term was 
coded as years of schooling above the baccalaureate, with recipients who had a J.D. and no further degrees 
with 3 years of “s.” Respondents with more schooling were coded as follows: an “other” degree in addition 
to the J.D. that was not enumerated was coded as 4 years of schooling; a master’s degree concurrent with 
the J.D. was coded as 4 years of schooling; a master’s degree separate from the J.D. was coded as 5 years 
of schooling; an LL.M. degree in addition to the J.D. was coded as 4 years of schooling; an M.B.A. degree 
concurrent with the J.D. was coded as 4 years of schooling; an M.B.A. degree separate from the J.D. was 
coded as 5 years of schooling; an M.D. degree concurrent with the J.D. was coded as 6 years of schooling; 
an M.D. degree separate from the J.D. was coded as 7 years of schooling; a Ph.D. degree concurrent with 
the J.D. was coded as 7 years of schooling; and a Ph.D. degree separate from the J.D. was coded as 8 years 
of schooling. A combination of additional degrees were coded as the sum of the total years of schooling 
above a J.D. (e.g. a separate M.B.A. and an LL.M. were coded as 6 years of schooling, and so on). Values 
for separate or concurrent degrees in Waves 2 and 3 had to be constructed using the additional degree’s 
year’s difference from the J.D. degree year. With regard to the additional variables used in this study, 
 89 
represents a vector of covariates—which include the respondent’s law school rank,33 
race,34 gender,35 log remaining debt, mother’s education, father’s education,36 law school 
grade point average,37 and in some cases, post-J.D. certification38 and interaction terms39 
between the foregoing terms—and ! represents the random error term. 
This analysis also employs fixed effects, based on the wave in which the data was 
collected, to remove secular trends in the data and more closely observe the relationships 
between wages and qualitative and quantitative characteristics. As with the analysis in the 
preceding chapter, fixed effects were utilized to present conservative, de-meaned 
estimates, and rely on the assumption that there are no changes over time that have 
not been controlled-for.40 Thus, they are unbiased to the extent that omitted variable 
bias is not a concern.41 The results from the regression analysis are proffered in the 
section that follows. 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
because the crosswalks for the underlying data were inconsistent and incorrect, a major contribution of this 
study is to correctly merge variables across waves and compare them across waves. 
32 This value was constructed using the difference of the wave year and the respondent’s 
baccalaureate degree year. 
33 This variable is represented by a tiered categorical classification, where Tier 1 schools are those 
that are ranked 1-50; Tier 2 are ranked 51-100, Tier 3 are ranked 101-150 and Tier 4 include the remainder 
institutions to approximate number 200. 
34 This variable is represented by dummy variables for Native American, Black, Hispanic, Asian, 
White, and other. 
35 This variable is represented by a dummy variable where 1 is equal to female. 
36 This variable is represented by a continuous variable of schooling for the total years of 
schooling for a respondent’s parent. 
37 This variable is represented by a value based categorical responses of a respondent in terms of 
one quarter of a GPA point (i.e. 4.0 and 3.75). 
38 This variable is represented by a dummy variable where 1 is equal to an additional post-
baccalaureate degree beyond the J.D. 
39 Because no statistically significant interactions between covariates exist, they have been omitted 
from the table and graph reported below. 
40  A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMETRICS: METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS (2005). The fixed effects estimates are fairly robust to omitted variable bias, given that 
there are no reliable instruments in this dataset. 
41 Id. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In a true Mincerian analysis, this study would examine only the returns to 
additional schooling beyond the respondent’s baccalaureate degree. However, given that 
all respondents in the study have a J.D. degree, which is equivalent to three additional 
years of schooling beyond a baccalaureate degree, it is functionally impossible to 
compare respondents to their peers that have only a baccalaureate degree. That said, 
comparisons can be made within the group of J.D.-credentialed respondents on the basis 
of their total years of schooling beyond their baccalaureate degrees as well as on a variety 
of qualitative factors, such as their gender, race, parent’s education, and quantitative 
factors, such as the rank of the law school they attended, their law school grade point 
average, and the amount of debt they have remaining. 
In Model 1 of Table 4.1, OLS regression was used to estimate these effects, with 
standard errors clustered on wave year, in order to provide more conservative estimates in 
the first instance. In Model 2, fixed effects on wave year were used to remove secular 
trends caused by major economic shifts over the time period of the AJD study.  
As mentioned above, most Mincerian analyses to date have focused discussions of 
the effects of schooling on wages through a discourse of the coefficient on s, or years of 
schooling. That number, while positive in this analysis, is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels in either the OLS or fixed-effects models. Even if it were, the results 
from either model would not indicate that additional year of schooling beyond the J.D. 
are associated with a percentage increase in wages exceeding 3.5 percent, a fairly modest 
increase in wages, given the opportunity cost of wages lost to a year of schooling. 
Moreover, the linear and quadratic specifications of years of potential experience in the 
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labor market, while statistically significant, do not indicate large returns to wages for 
law-trained individuals in this nationally-representative sample, with results from both 
the OLS and fixed effects models returning estimates of less than a 1 percent increase to 
wages for each additional year of potential workforce experience. 
That said, a good deal can be gleaned from these results. For instance, a one unit 
increase in the tiered rank of law school that a law graduate attended results in an 11 
percent increase in wages, on average, at a statistically significant rate. This effect 
underscores quite a large increase in wages that is attributable to a law school’s 
reputation and should not be overlooked. However, this result and others discussed below 
also corroborate the existing stratification of earnings in the legal profession. 
Problematically, white females earn 18 percent less than their male counterparts. 
However, the results indicate that Asian and Black females outearn white males at rates 
of 17 percent and 14 percent, respectively, at statistically significant rates, but rates for 
other racial subgroups are not statistically significant. 42  Likewise, wages are not 
associated with parental education and remaining debt at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. However, a 0.25 law school grade point average increase is associated with 
a substantial—nearly 46 percent—increase in wages, proving that hard work, or grade 
inflation, ultimately pays off.  
Most relevant to the discussion of this dissertation, the results from this analysis 
seem to indicate that a considerable stratification exists between graduates of legal 
education on the basis of the rank of the law school they attend and their academic 
performance in law school in terms of their wages. However, troublingly, these results 																																																								
42 Curiously, Hispanic females earn less than their white male peers by almost 30 percent in the 
OLS model at a statistically significant level, but this effect disappears—and in fact flips to a positive but 
not statistically significant rate—when taking into account wave years. 
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also establish a considerable difference between male and female law school graduates, 
where white females earn much less than their male counterparts, which is especially 
noticeable in the graphs that follow in the Appendix.43 
Table 4.1: Regression Results   
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS Wave FE 
   
Post-Baccalaureate Years of Schooling (s) 0.0293 0.0347* 
 (0.0193) (0.0193) 
Years of Potential Experience (x) 0.00886*** 0.00759*** 
 (0.00291) (0.00292) 
Years of Potential Experience – Squared (x^2) -4.49e-06*** -3.86e-06*** 
 (1.44e-06) (1.45e-06) 
Rank 0.111*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Female -0.182*** -0.181*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0218) 
Native American -0.163 -0.160 
 (0.104) (0.104) 
Asian 0.161*** 0.167*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0449) 
Black 0.133*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0414) 
Hispanic -0.297*** 0.0724 
 (0.0345) (0.0978) 
Other 0.0453 0.0524 
 (0.0865) (0.0861) 
Log(RemaingingDebt) 0.0243 0.0288* 
 (0.0149) (0.0148) 
Mother's Education - Total Years -0.00761* -0.00684 
 (0.00460) (0.00458) 
Father's Education - Total Years 0.00184 0.00226 
 (0.00420) (0.00419) 
Law School GPA - 4.0 Scale in 0.25 GPA Units 0.446*** 0.455*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0318) 
Constant 9.995*** 9.558*** 
 (0.232) (0.255) 
   
Observations 1,936 1,936 
R-squared 0.241 0.208 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 																																																								
43 The pay gap between genders is well established in other studies of the wages of lawyers. See, 
e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Full-time Female Lawyers Earn 77 Percent of Male Lawyer Pay, ABA 
JOURNAL, March 17, 2016, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/pay_gap_is_greatest_in_legal_occupations/. And, of course, this 
corresponds with broader labor market patterns where women consistently earn less than men. See, e.g., 
Kevin Miller, The Simple Truth about the Gender Pay Gap, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN (2018), 
https://www.aauw.org/research/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ (noting that women with an 
advanced degree earn, on average, 74% of their male peer’s wages, based on 2017 figures). 
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CONCLUSION 
Value, like the decision to enroll in law school that is explored in the previous 
chapters of this dissertation, is a multifactorial term. However, the prevailing 
understanding of value inures to an economic definition. When operationalized as 
individual wage returns accruing to law school graduates, the added-value is strongly 
reliant on the ranking of the law school from which an attorney, or non-practicing 
attorney, graduates. This is attributable to the signaling function that post-
baccalaureate education provides to prospective employers but is not responsible for 
all wage differentials between graduates of legal education. 
As with traditional Mincerian estimates of private returns to investments in 
post-baccalaureate education, years outside of the workforce while pursuing addition 
credentialing do indeed relate to increased wages. This finding can be explained 
fairly intuitively, given that one would expect law school graduates who forgo even 
more years—both linearly and quadratically—in the labor force in order to receive 
an additional postgraduate credential, such as an Master of Laws (LL.M.), Master of 
Business Admisitration (M.B.A.), Medical Doctor (M.D.), or Philosophical Doctor 
(Ph.D.) degree, to reap the greater wage benefits than their peers without these 
credentials. However, these returns are nominal in comparison to the wage returns 
realized by attending a better-ranked law school or for increases to law school grade 
point average. While increases to earnings based on school and performance are 
arguably justified as rewarding the hardest working law students, they only serve to 
increase stratification in the legal profession. 
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These results reveal a number of other patterns, which raise further concerns 
about stratification in the legal profession. Notably, white females earn much less 
than their male counterparts—an inequity that extends beyond the legal profession to 
other segments of the labor force.44 Given that the profession is tasked with ensuring 
equal treatment under the law as one of its core purposes, this pay gap is a troubling 
extension of a national trend in which women earn 89 percent of their male 
counterparts for all earners between the ages of 25 to 34—the same age range 
encompassing many of the respondents to the AJD Survey.45 
These results would tend to support the idea that the value proposition—that 
an investment in legal education accrues nearly exclusively private returns to law school 
graduates—may still have currency, even despite the impact of the Great Recession 
of 2008 on wage returns to graduates of law school. But the private returns, in terms 
of wages, disproportionally benefit certain types of law graduates, especially white 
males (except when compared to Asian and Black females, two groups which may 
have been oversampled in the AJD study). Importantly, these results also support the 
idea of stratification of the legal profession based on where a law graduate attends 
law school and how that law graduate performs in law school, the latter of which, in 
and of itself, is not entirely controversial. However, this information is important for 
prospective students deciding whether and where to attend law school. Thus, by 
investigating a previously unstudied area—wage returns among graduates of legal 
education—this analysis not only fills a gap in the knowledge about the private 
returns to this group of professional degree holders but also influences a more 																																																								
44 See, id. 
45 Nikki Graf, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in Pay, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, April 
9, 2018, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts/%3famp=1. 
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complete understanding of the economic value that law schools provide to their 
graduates, albeit differentially. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The changes that have taken place in legal education in the 21st Century have 
legitimized the discussion about legal education as a marketplace and commodity. The 
results of this dissertation illuminate aspects of this discussion. Yet, to date, little research 
has been produced to clarify the understanding of what motivates law students to 
consume legal education, whether law schools’ pursuit of law students using financial aid 
results in increased matriculation, or whether and how private investment in legal 
education results in positive individual returns. This dissertation addresses each of these 
questions in turn. 
The first chapter of this dissertation unpacks the multifactorial analysis of a law 
student’s choice and the information upon which a law student relies in making his or her 
decision to enroll in law school. Results from an original survey of current law students 
reveals that factors—such as location, reputation, and financial aid, which have been 
discussed in the literature about choice in the undergraduate education literature as salient 
factors in student choice—are also important to law students in deciding where to attend 
law school but have varied salience among the students, based on the typologies of the 
institutions in which they enroll. For instance, location is not as salient a factor, as a 
function of enrollment, for students attending a national, elite law school, but is relevant 
for students at public law schools. Reputation is most important to students at law schools 
that are ranked in the top 100 law schools by the U.S. News & World Report. Financial 
aid is super-salient to students at public law schools, and is less salient to students 
enrolling in private universities, regardless of their ranking, posing questions about the 
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applicability of the economic rationality of law students in their decision to enroll in law 
school. Moreover, opportunity cost, or the cost of sitting out of the labor market for three 
years—based on prior income—is least for students at the top-ranked law school, while it 
is greatest for the student respondents to an original survey at a public flagship law 
school. Finally, while price sensitivity to the cost of legal education is demonstrated to be 
relative, the inflection point is lowest for public regional law students and highest for 
private law school students, regardless of their institution’s typology or ranking.  
These findings represent the first ever application of constructs from the literature 
on undergraduate choice to the context of legal education and as such illuminates the 
considerations that factor most significantly into prospective students’ decision to attend 
law school. These results may help law schools better understand the considerations and 
information on which law students rely to make enrollment decisions. They are also 
important for law students to better understand how other law students in their position 
decided to attend law school. 
The second chapter of this dissertation examines the rationality of potential law 
students. While the first chapter focuses on law students as the unit of analysis, the 
second chapter uses law schools as its primary unit of analysis. It assesses whether 
increases to institutionally provided financial aid results in matriculant increases for a law 
school’s enrollment totals. Using national data from ABA-accredited law schools, the 
most econometrically rigorous test in this analysis yields a null result, which would 
indicate that increases to financial aid awards does not result in positive matriculation 
gains for the marginal law school. However, a more granular sensitivity test of this null 
result demonstrates that increases to median financial aid award by law schools accrue 
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positive matriculant totals only for law schools ranked in the top 100 of the 203 ABA-
accredited law schools. This result would seem to bifurcate the pool of rational actors in 
half for law schools competing for law students. Yet, law schools across the reputational 
spectrum compete for law students on the basis of their entering credentials, despite these 
differences in student’s economic rationality. Although institutional isomorphism is an 
unavoidable reality in legal education, this study demonstrates the variability of the law 
school market and the slim matriculant returns to increases in financial aid. It thus 
contributes a deeper understanding of the stratified market in which law schools operate. 
Finally, contributing to the discussion about the economic value of post-graduate 
credentialing, this dissertation uses a nationally-representative dataset to explore the 
private returns of legal education. Importantly, it finds a definition of value in terms of 
wage returns to graduates of law schools. However, it also underscores disparities 
between graduates of legal education, especially the wage gap between white females and 
males, which persists between three waves of the survey, even accounting for the 
economic shocks that occur between administrations of the survey, such as the Great 
Recession of 2008. Even though this survey is a national survey, its crosswalks are 
incorrect, and an additional contribution of this dissertation—above and beyond the 
original survey results, the first-ever national study of financial aid on law school 
matriculation, and the first-ever nationally representative wage-return analysis of law 
school graduates, in comparison to one another—is the fact that this study will be 
available to future researchers wishing to study the same datasets and constructs, without 
having to rely on faulty crosswalks. In addition, this dissertation contributes an original 
survey instrument to catalogue the decision-making process of law students in making 
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their choice to attend law school.  
These three chapters analyze and answer distinct questions about pre-enrollment 
preferences, cost sensitivity of law students, and wage returns to graduates of law 
school—a veritable lifecycle of a consumer of graduate professional education. However, 
these chapters cohere around active, and unstudied, questions about the economics of 
legal education in the 21st Century. Most importantly, this dissertation is the first work of 
academic scholarship to descriptively and empirically demonstrate the segmentation of 
the legal education marketplace. The competition among law schools for law students 
based on their varied preferences is discussed by the results of an original survey 
administered at four law schools, corresponding to the four reputational quartiles of law 
schools, in the first chapter. The second chapter develops this discussion by examining 
this competition among law schools and reveals that the natural experiment of increasing 
financial aid awards to stem declining enrollments yields differential returns of 
matriculants to law schools, based on their reputational tier. The third chapter extends the 
analysis of tiered legal education marketplaces by revealing the stratified wage returns 
that accrue to graduates of legal education, based on the reputational tier of the law 
school they attend. 
Throughout the three dissertation chapters, legal education is described as both a 
marketplace and a good. Collectively, these chapters contribute significantly to our 
understanding of legal education as a marketplace and a good, and more specifically the 
factors that impact a student’s decision to attend law school, the role financial aid plays in 
that decision, and the differentiated wage returns of law school graduates. As a nearly 
250-year-old institution, American legal education did not always resemble a 
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marketplace or good. However, as legal education comes to terms with the realities of the 
21st Century, it is hoped that this dissertation will not only shape public notions of legal 
education, as both a marketplace and good, but will also inform a more complete 
understanding of and national discourse about what the current state of legal education 
and what it can be. 
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APPENDIX 
ANALYZING LAW SCHOOL CHOICE APPENDIX 
Figure A2.1: First Choice 
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Private New Law School 
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Figure A2.2: Cost of Attendance 
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Figure A2.3: Opportunity Cost  
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ANALYZING THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL AID ON LAW SCHOOL MATRICULATION APPENDIX 
Table A3.1: Correlation between Dependent Variables and Independent Variables 
VARIABLES Matriculant Enrollment Totals Matriculant Yield Rate 
Median Financial Aid Award 0.188*** -0.272*** 
   
Expected Cost of Att. - NRFT 0.384*** -0.188*** 
   
US News Peer Review Score 0.402*** 0.105*** 
   
Admissions Selectivity -0.208*** -0.192*** 
   
LSAT Median - FT 0.352*** 0.0816* 
   
GPA Median - FT 0.233*** 0.0443 
   
Observations 808 808 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Figure A3.1: Year and School Fixed Effects Disaggregated Estimates 
for Tier 1 Law Schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tier 1 Law Schools 
(Year and School Fixed Effects) 
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1.83 Students 
*  *  * 
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Figure A3.2: Year and School Fixed Effects Disaggregated Estimates  
for Tier 2 Law Schools 
 
 
Figure A3.3: Year and School Fixed Effects Disaggregated Estimates 
for Tier 3 Law Schools 
 
 
Tier 2 Law Schools 
(Year and School Fixed Effects) 
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* * 
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Figure A3.4: Year and School Fixed Effects Disaggregated Estimates 
for Tier 4 Law Schools 
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ANALYZING WAGE RETURNS TO LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES APPENDIX 
Figure A4.1: Logged Earnings Differentials 
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LAW SCHOOL CHOICE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Law School Choice Survey 
 
Consent: You are invited to participate in a study being conducted with support from 
Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College, the American Bar Foundation, and the 
AccessLex Institute. The purpose of this research is to evaluate how law students’ made 
the decision to attend law school. We are interested in examining how law students in law 
schools across the state of Tennessee decided to attend law school and how they think 
their legal education has impacted their job market prospects. In order to participate in 
the project, we need your consent. By checking the consent box below, you indicate that 
you are voluntarily participating in research.     "I understand that this research is being 
undertaken to evaluate the decision-making process of attending law school. My 
participation will span this survey (~20 minutes) and may entail a follow-up interview. I 
understand that all information collected in this survey will be used only for research 
purposes. Furthermore, I understand that my responses will be maintained securely by 
and for the sole use of researchers at Vanderbilt University. I consent to participating in 
this study." 
m Yes (1) 
m No (2) 
 
Display This Question: 
If You are invited to participate in a study being conducted with support from Vanderbilt 
University’s Peabody College, the American Bar Foundation, and the AccessLex Institute. The 
purpose of this re... No Is Selected 
Opt-Out You have opted-out of this study and your response will not be recorded. Thank 
you for your time. 
 
Q1 What is your ethnicity? 
m African American / Black (1) 
m American Indian / Alaska Native (2) 
m Asian American / Asian (3) 
m Caucasian / White (4) 
m Hispanic / Latino (5) 
m Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander (6) 
m Other (please explain): (7) ____________________ 
 
Q2 What is your sex? 
m Female (1) 
m Male (2) 
m Intersex (3) 
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Q3 What is your current age? 
______ Age (1) 
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Q4 Please indicate your parents' highest level of education. 
 Parents' Education 
 Mother (1) Father (2) 
Did not finish high school (1) m  m  
Graduated from high school or 
equivalent (GED) (2) m  m  
Graduated from high school 
and attended a two-year school 
(such as a vocational or 
technical school, a junior 
college, or a community 
college), but did not complete 
a degree (3) 
m  m  
Graduated from a two-year 
school (such as a vocational or 
technical school, junior 
college, or a community 
college) (4) 
m  m  
Graduated from high school 
and went to college, but did 
not complete a four-year 
degree (5) 
m  m  
Graduated from college with a 
bachelor's degree (6) m  m  
Completed a Master’s degree 
(7) m  m  
Completed a J.D. degree (8) m  m  
Completed an M.D., Ph.D., or 
other advanced professional 
degree (9) 
m  m  
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Q5 What is your best estimate of your parents' income last year? Consider income from 
all sources before taxes. 
m Less than $10,000 (1) 
m $10,000 - $19,999 (2) 
m $20,000 - $29,999 (3) 
m $30,000 - $39,999 (4) 
m $40,000 - $49,999 (5) 
m $50,000 - $59,999 (6) 
m $60,000 - $69,999 (7) 
m $70,000 - $79,999 (8) 
m $80,000 - $89,999 (9) 
m $90,000 - $99,999 (10) 
m $100,000 - $149,999 (11) 
m $150,000 - $199,000 (12) 
m $250,000 - $299,999 (13) 
m $300,000 - $399,999 (14) 
m $400,000 - $499,999 (15) 
m $500,000 or more (16) 
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Q6 What law school do you attend? 
m Belmont University College of Law (1) 
m Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law (2) 
m Nashville School of Law (3) 
m University of Memphis Humphreys School of Law (4) 
m University of Tennessee College of Law (5) 
m Vanderbilt University Law School (6) 
 
Q7 Approximately how many miles is your law school from your permanent home (the 
home you last lived in before you attended college)? NOTE: If you it has been more than 
10 years since you lived in your permanent home, you may answer this question for 
where you lived last before you started law school. 
m 0 to 5 miles (1) 
m 6 to 10 miles (2) 
m 11 to 50 miles (3) 
m 51 to 100 miles (4) 
m 101 to 250 miles (5) 
m 251 to 500 miles (6) 
m Over 500 miles (7) 
 
Q8 What is your enrollment status? 
m Full-time student (1) 
m Part-time student (2) 
 
Q9 In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 
m 1L / First Year (1) 
m 2L / Second Year (2) 
m 3L / Third Year (3) 
m 4L / Fourth Year (4) 
m LLM Student (5) 
 
Q10 Did you transfer into the law school in which you are currently enrolled? 
m Yes (1) 
m No (2) 
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Display This Question: 
If In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 2L / Second Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 3L / Third Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 4L / Fourth Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? LLM Student Is Selected 
Q11a What is your approximate law school GPA? 
______ Law School GPA (1) 
 
Display This Question: 
If In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 2L / Second Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 3L / Third Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 4L / Fourth Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? LLM Student Is Selected 
Q11b What is your approximate class rank? 
______ Law School Class Rank (Top X%) (1) 
 
Q12 What was your approximate undergraduate GPA? 
______ Undergraduate GPA (1) 
 
Q13 What was your approximate LSAT score? 
______ LSAT Score (1) 
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Q14 With what law school co-curricular activities are you currently involved? 
q Moot Court Board (1) 
q Mock Trial or Trial Advocacy Board (2) 
q Primary Law Review (please list): (3) ____________________ 
q Secondary Law Review (please list): (4) ____________________ 
q None. (5) 
 
Q15 With what law school extra-curricular activities are you currently involved? 
q Academic or practice area society (e.g. Health Law Society) (1) 
q Advocacy society (e.g. Legal Aid Society) (2) 
q Cultural society (e.g. Black Law Students Association) (3) 
q Political society (e.g. American Constitutional Society or Federalist Society) (4) 
q Student bar association (5) 
q Special Interest Organization (e.g. Phi Delta Alpha or Phi Delta Phi) (6) 
q Other (please explain): (7) ____________________ 
q None. (8) 
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Q16 What was your approximate income in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Consider income from all sources before taxes. 
m Less than $10,000 (1) 
m $10,000 - $19,999 (2) 
m $20,000 - $29,999 (3) 
m $30,000 - $39,999 (4) 
m $40,000 - $49,999 (5) 
m $50,000 - $59,999 (6) 
m $60,000 - $69,999 (7) 
m $70,000 - $79,999 (8) 
m $80,000 - $89,999 (9) 
m $90,000 - $99,999 (10) 
m $100,000 - $149,999 (11) 
m $150,000 - $199,000 (12) 
m $250,000 - $299,999 (13) 
m $300,000 - $399,999 (14) 
m $400,000 - $499,999 (15) 
m $500,000 or more (16) 
 
Q17 What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to 
entering law school? 
m Employed full-time. (1) 
m Employed part-time. (2) 
m Full-time graduate student. (3) 
m Part-time graduate student. (4) 
m Full-time undergraduate student. (5) 
m Part-time undergraduate student. (6) 
m Unemployed. (7) 
m Other (please explain): (8) 
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Display This Question: 
If What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed full-time. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed part-time. Is Selected 
Q18a What best describes the industry or sector of your previous employment? 
m Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry, or Hunting (1) 
m Construction (2) 
m Educational Services (K-12 or Higher Education) (3) 
m Financial Activities (4) 
m Government or Public Administration (Federal) (5) 
m Government or Public Administration (State or Local) (6) 
m Information Services (7) 
m Leisure and Hospitality (8) 
m Manufacturing (9) 
m Medical or Health Services (10) 
m Mining or Natural Resources (11) 
m Professional and Business Services (12) 
m Retail Trade (13) 
m Social Assistance (14) 
m Technology or Communications (15) 
m Transportation and Warehousing (16) 
m Utilities (17) 
m Wholesale Trade (18) 
m Other (please explain): (19) 
 
Display This Question: 
If What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed full-time. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed part-time. Is Selected 
Q18b What was the name of your previous job title and employer? (e.g. Job Title: 
Director of Development)(e.g. Employer: University of Texas at Austin) 
Job Title: (1) 
Employer: (2) 
 
 117 
Display This Question: 
If What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Full-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Part-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Q18c What best describes the area of your previous graduate studies? 
m Agricultural Sciences (1) 
m Biology (2) 
m Business (3) 
m Chemistry (4) 
m Computer Science (5) 
m Earth and Space Sciences (6) 
m Economics (7) 
m Engineering and Technology (8) 
m Geography (9) 
m History (10) 
m Language and Literature (11) 
m Mathematics (12) 
m Medicine and Health Sciences (13) 
m Performing Arts (14) 
m Political Science (15) 
m Philosophy (16) 
m Psychology (17) 
m Physics (18) 
m Sociology (19) 
m Theology (20) 
m Visual Arts (21) 
m Other (please explain): (22) ____________________ 
 
Display This Question: 
If What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Full-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Part-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Q18d What graduate degree did you receive and from what institution? (e.g. Degree: 
Master of Business Administration)(e.g. Institution: University of Texas at Austin) 
Degree: (1) 
Institution: (2) 
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Display This Question: 
If What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Full-time undergraduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Part-time undergraduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Full-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Part-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed full-time. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed part-time. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Unemployed. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Other (please explain): Is Selected 
Q18e What best describes the area of your undergraduate studies? 
m Agricultural Sciences (1) 
m Biology (2) 
m Business (3) 
m Chemistry (4) 
m Computer Science (5) 
m Earth and Space Sciences (6) 
m Economics (7) 
m Engineering and Technology (8) 
m Geography (9) 
m History (10) 
m Language and Literature (11) 
m Mathematics (12) 
m Medicine and Health Sciences (13) 
m Performing Arts (14) 
m Political Science (15) 
m Philosophy (16) 
m Psychology (17) 
m Physics (18) 
m Sociology (19) 
m Theology (20) 
m Visual Arts (21) 
m Other (please explain): (22) ____________________ 
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Display This Question: 
If What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Full-time undergraduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Part-time undergraduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Full-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Part-time graduate student. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed full-time. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Employed part-time. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Unemployed. Is Selected 
Or What best describes your occupational status in the year immediately prior to entering law 
school? Other (please explain): Is Selected 
Q18f What undergraduate degree did you receive and from what institution? (e.g. 
Degree: Bachelors of Science in Biological Sciences)(e.g. Institution: University of Texas 
at Austin) 
Degree: (1) 
Institution: (2) 
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Display This Question: 
If In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 2L / Second Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 3L / Third Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 4L / Fourth Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? LLM Student Is Selected 
Q19a What was your employment status last summer? 
m I worked in a "biglaw" law firm (with over 1000 attorneys). (1) 
m I worked in a large law firm (between 100 and 1000 attorneys). (2) 
m I worked in a mid-size law firm (between 20 and 100 attorneys). (3) 
m I worked in a small law firm (between 2 and 20 attorneys). (4) 
m I worked in a sole practitioner's office. (5) 
m I worked in an international agency or court (e.g. the United Nations). (6) 
m I worked in a federal agency (e.g. US Attorney's Office). (7) 
m I worked in a federal court (e.g. US District Court). (8) 
m I worked in a state agency (e.g. State Attorney General). (9) 
m I worked in a state or local court (e.g. State Supreme Court). (10) 
m I worked in the public interest, with an advocacy organization or with a non-profit 
agency. (11) 
m I worked in business, not in a legal capacity (e.g. banking or consulting). (12) 
m I worked in academia or in university administration, not in a legal capacity. (13) 
m I worked in another professional position, not in a legal capacity (e.g., accountant, 
teacher, business manager, nurse). (14) 
m I worked in a non-professional position, not as an attorney (i.e. in a position that does 
not require any special professional skills or training). (15) 
m I took law school classes. (16) 
m Other (please explain): (17) ____________________ 
 
Display This Question: 
If In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 2L / Second Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 3L / Third Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? 4L / Fourth Year Is Selected 
Or In what year of law school are you currently enrolled? LLM Student Is Selected 
Q19b Where did spend your summer? 
City (1) 
State (2) 
Country (3) 
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Q20 The law school you currently attend was: 
m your first choice. (1) 
m your second choice. (2) 
m your third choice. (3) 
m your fourth choice. (4) 
m your fifth choice or more. (5) 
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Q21 To what other law schools did you apply?(Please use the CTRL key on PC and the 
Command key on a Mac keyboard to select multiple schools). 
q AKRON, UNIVERSITY OF (1) 
q ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF (2) 
q ALBANY LAW SCHOOL OF UNION UNIVERSITY (3) 
q AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW) (4) 
q APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW (5) 
q ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY (O'CONNOR COLLEGE OF LAW) (6) 
q ARIZONA SUMMIT LAW SCHOOL (PHOENIX LAW SCHOOL) (7) 
q ARIZONA, UNIVERSITY OF (ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW) (8) 
q ARKANSAS-FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (9) 
q ARKANSAS-LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF (BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(10) 
q AVE MARIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (11) 
q BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF (12) 
q BARRY UNIVERSITY (ANDREAS SCHOOL OF LAW) (13) 
q BAYLOR UNIVERSITY (14) 
q BELMONT UNIVERSITY (15) 
q BOSTON COLLEGE (16) 
q BOSTON UNIVERSITY (17) 
q BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY (CLARK LAW SCHOOL) (18) 
q BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL (19) 
q CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW (20) 
q CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF (21) 
q CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF (22) 
q CALIFORNIA-HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF (23) 
q CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF (24) 
q CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF (25) 
q CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY (26) 
q CAPITAL UNIVERSITY (27) 
q CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY (28) 
q CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA (29) 
q CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY (FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW) (30) 
q CHARLESTON SCHOOL OF LAW (31) 
q CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW (32) 
q CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF (33) 
q CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF (34) 
q CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (35) 
q CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY (CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF 
LAW) (36) 
q COLORADO-BOULDER, UNIVERSITY OF (37) 
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q COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (38) 
q CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY (39) 
q CONNECTICUT, UNIVERSITY OF (40) 
q CORNELL UNIVERSITY (41) 
q CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY (42) 
q DAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF (43) 
q DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF (STURM COLLEGE OF LAW) (44) 
q DEPAUL UNIVERSITY (45) 
q DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF (CLARKE SCHOOL OF LAW) (46) 
q DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF (47) 
q DRAKE UNIVERSITY (48) 
q DREXEL UNIVERSITY (KLINE SCHOOL OF LAW) (49) 
q DUKE UNIVERSITY (50) 
q DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY (51) 
q ELON UNIVERSITY (52) 
q EMORY UNIVERSITY (53) 
q FAULKNER UNIVERSITY (JONES SCHOOL OF LAW) (54) 
q FLORIDA A&M SCHOOL OF LAW (55) 
q FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW (56) 
q FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LAW (57) 
q FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY (58) 
q FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF (LEVIN COLLEGE OF LAW) (59) 
q FORDHAM UNIVERSITY (60) 
q GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (61) 
q GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (62) 
q GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (63) 
q GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY (64) 
q GEORGIA, UNIVERSITY OF (65) 
q GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY (66) 
q GONZAGA UNIVERSITY (67) 
q HAMLINE UNIVERSITY (68) 
q HARVARD UNIVERSITY (69) 
q HAWAII-MANOA, UNIVERSITY OF (RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW) (70) 
q HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY (DEANE SCHOOL OF LAW) (71) 
q HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF (72) 
q HOWARD UNIVERSITY (73) 
q IDAHO, UNIVERSITY OF (74) 
q ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF 
LAW) (75) 
q ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF (76) 
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q INDIANA TECH LAW SCHOOL (77) 
q INDIANA UNIVERSITY - BLOOMINGTON (MAURER SCHOOL OF LAW) (78) 
q INDIANA UNIVERSITY - INDIANAPOLIS (MCKINNEY SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(79) 
q INTER AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO (80) 
q IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF (81) 
q JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - ATLANTA (82) 
q JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - CHICAGO (83) 
q KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF (84) 
q KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY OF (85) 
q LA VERNE, UNIVERSITY OF  (86) 
q LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE (NORTHWESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW) (87) 
q LIBERTY UNIVERSITY (88) 
q LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY (89) 
q LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY (HEBERT LAW CENTER) (90) 
q LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW) (91) 
q LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY - LOS ANGELES (92) 
q LOYOLA UNIVERSITY - CHICAGO (93) 
q LOYOLA UNIVERSITY - NEW ORLEANS (94) 
q MAINE, UNIVERSITY OF (95) 
q MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY (96) 
q MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF (CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW) (97) 
q MASSACHUSETTS-DARTMOUTH, UNIVERSITY OF (98) 
q MEMPHIS, UNIVERSITY OF (HUMPHREYS SCHOOL OF LAW) (99) 
q MERCER UNIVERSITY (GEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW) (100) 
q MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF (101) 
q MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY (102) 
q MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF (103) 
q MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (104) 
q MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE OF LAW (105) 
q MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF (106) 
q MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF (107) 
q MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, UNIVERSITY OF (108) 
q MITCHELL | HAMLINE SCHOOL OF LAW (109) 
q MONTANA, UNIVERSITY OF (110) 
q NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, UNIVERSITY OF (111) 
q NEVADA-LAS VEGAS, UNIVERSITY OF (BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW) (112) 
q NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW (113) 
q NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIVERSITY OF (FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER) 
(114) 
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q NEW MEXICO, UNIVERSITY OF (115) 
q NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL (116) 
q NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (117) 
q NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY (118) 
q NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF (119) 
q NORTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (120) 
q NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (121) 
q NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY (122) 
q NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY (CHASE COLLEGE OF LAW) (123) 
q NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (124) 
q NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF (125) 
q NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (BROAD LAW CENTER) (126) 
q OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY (PETTIT COLLEGE OF LAW) (127) 
q OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY (MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW) (128) 
q OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY (129) 
q OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF (130) 
q OREGON, UNIVERSITY OF (131) 
q PACE UNIVERSITY (132) 
q PACIFIC, UNIVERSITY OF THE (MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW) (133) 
q PENN STATE UNIVERSITY (DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW) (134) 
q PENN STATE UNIVERSITY (PENN STATE LAW) (135) 
q PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF (136) 
q PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY (137) 
q PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF (138) 
q PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF P.R. (139) 
q PUERTO RICO, UNIVERSITY OF (140) 
q QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE (141) 
q REGENT UNIVERSITY (142) 
q RICHMOND, UNIVERSITY OF (143) 
q ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY (144) 
q RUTGERS UNIVERSITY (145) 
q RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - CAMDEN (146) 
q RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - NEWARK (147) 
q SAMFORD UNIVERSITY (CUMBERLAND SCHOOL OF LAW) (148) 
q SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF (149) 
q SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF (150) 
q SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY (151) 
q SEATTLE UNIVERSITY (152) 
q SETON HALL UNIVERSITY (153) 
q SOUTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF (154) 
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q SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (155) 
q SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW (156) 
q SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF (GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(157) 
q SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY - CARBONDALE (158) 
q SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY (DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW) (159) 
q SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER (160) 
q SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL (161) 
q ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY (162) 
q ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY (163) 
q ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY (164) 
q ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY (165) 
q ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (166) 
q STANFORD UNIVERSITY (167) 
q STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO (168) 
q STETSON UNIVERSITY (169) 
q SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY (170) 
q SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY (171) 
q TEMPLE UNIVERSITY (BEASLEY SCHOOL OF LAW) (172) 
q TENNESSEE-KNOXVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (173) 
q TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY (TEXAS WESLEYAN SCHOOL OF LAW) (174) 
q TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY (MARSHALL SCHOOL OF LAW) (175) 
q TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY (176) 
q TEXAS-AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF (177) 
q THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW (178) 
q THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL (179) 
q TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF (180) 
q TOURO COLLEGE (FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER) (181) 
q TULANE UNIVERSITY (182) 
q TULSA, UNIVERSITY OF (183) 
q UTAH, UNIVERSITY OF (QUINNEY COLLEGE OF LAW) (184) 
q VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY (185) 
q VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (186) 
q VERMONT LAW SCHOOL (187) 
q VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY (188) 
q VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF (189) 
q WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY (190) 
q WASHBURN UNIVERSITY (191) 
q WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY (192) 
q WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (193) 
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q WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF (194) 
q WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY (195) 
q WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY (196) 
q WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY (197) 
q WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW (198) 
q WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL (199) 
q WIDENER UNIVERSITY - HARRISBURG (200) 
q WIDENER UNIVERSITY - WILMINGTON (201) 
q WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY (202) 
q WILLIAM & MARY, COLLEGE OF (203) 
q WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW (204) 
q WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF (205) 
q WYOMING, UNIVERSITY OF (206) 
q YALE UNIVERSITY (207) 
q YESHIVA UNIVERSITY (CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW) (208) 
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Q22 What other law schools admitted you for acceptance?(Please use the CTRL key on 
PC and the Command key on a Mac keyboard to select multiple schools). 
q AKRON, UNIVERSITY OF (1) 
q ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF (2) 
q ALBANY LAW SCHOOL OF UNION UNIVERSITY (3) 
q AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW) (4) 
q APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW (5) 
q ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY (O'CONNOR COLLEGE OF LAW) (6) 
q ARIZONA SUMMIT LAW SCHOOL (PHOENIX LAW SCHOOL) (7) 
q ARIZONA, UNIVERSITY OF (ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW) (8) 
q ARKANSAS-FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (9) 
q ARKANSAS-LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF (BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(10) 
q AVE MARIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (11) 
q BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF (12) 
q BARRY UNIVERSITY (ANDREAS SCHOOL OF LAW) (13) 
q BAYLOR UNIVERSITY (14) 
q BELMONT UNIVERSITY (15) 
q BOSTON COLLEGE (16) 
q BOSTON UNIVERSITY (17) 
q BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY (CLARK LAW SCHOOL) (18) 
q BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL (19) 
q CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW (20) 
q CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF (21) 
q CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF (22) 
q CALIFORNIA-HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF (23) 
q CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF (24) 
q CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF (25) 
q CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY (26) 
q CAPITAL UNIVERSITY (27) 
q CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY (28) 
q CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA (29) 
q CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY (FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW) (30) 
q CHARLESTON SCHOOL OF LAW (31) 
q CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW (32) 
q CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF (33) 
q CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF (34) 
q CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (35) 
q CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY (CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF 
LAW) (36) 
q COLORADO-BOULDER, UNIVERSITY OF (37) 
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q COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (38) 
q CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY (39) 
q CONNECTICUT, UNIVERSITY OF (40) 
q CORNELL UNIVERSITY (41) 
q CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY (42) 
q DAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF (43) 
q DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF (STURM COLLEGE OF LAW) (44) 
q DEPAUL UNIVERSITY (45) 
q DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF (CLARKE SCHOOL OF LAW) (46) 
q DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF (47) 
q DRAKE UNIVERSITY (48) 
q DREXEL UNIVERSITY (KLINE SCHOOL OF LAW) (49) 
q DUKE UNIVERSITY (50) 
q DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY (51) 
q ELON UNIVERSITY (52) 
q EMORY UNIVERSITY (53) 
q FAULKNER UNIVERSITY (JONES SCHOOL OF LAW) (54) 
q FLORIDA A&M SCHOOL OF LAW (55) 
q FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW (56) 
q FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LAW (57) 
q FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY (58) 
q FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF (LEVIN COLLEGE OF LAW) (59) 
q FORDHAM UNIVERSITY (60) 
q GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (61) 
q GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (62) 
q GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (63) 
q GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY (64) 
q GEORGIA, UNIVERSITY OF (65) 
q GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY (66) 
q GONZAGA UNIVERSITY (67) 
q HAMLINE UNIVERSITY (68) 
q HARVARD UNIVERSITY (69) 
q HAWAII-MANOA, UNIVERSITY OF (RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW) (70) 
q HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY (DEANE SCHOOL OF LAW) (71) 
q HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF (72) 
q HOWARD UNIVERSITY (73) 
q IDAHO, UNIVERSITY OF (74) 
q ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF 
LAW) (75) 
q ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF (76) 
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q INDIANA TECH LAW SCHOOL (77) 
q INDIANA UNIVERSITY - BLOOMINGTON (MAURER SCHOOL OF LAW) (78) 
q INDIANA UNIVERSITY - INDIANAPOLIS (MCKINNEY SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(79) 
q INTER AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO (80) 
q IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF (81) 
q JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - ATLANTA (82) 
q JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - CHICAGO (83) 
q KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF (84) 
q KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY OF (85) 
q LA VERNE, UNIVERSITY OF  (86) 
q LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE (NORTHWESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW) (87) 
q LIBERTY UNIVERSITY (88) 
q LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY (89) 
q LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY (HEBERT LAW CENTER) (90) 
q LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW) (91) 
q LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY - LOS ANGELES (92) 
q LOYOLA UNIVERSITY - CHICAGO (93) 
q LOYOLA UNIVERSITY - NEW ORLEANS (94) 
q MAINE, UNIVERSITY OF (95) 
q MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY (96) 
q MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF (CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW) (97) 
q MASSACHUSETTS-DARTMOUTH, UNIVERSITY OF (98) 
q MEMPHIS, UNIVERSITY OF (HUMPHREYS SCHOOL OF LAW) (99) 
q MERCER UNIVERSITY (GEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW) (100) 
q MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF (101) 
q MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY (102) 
q MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF (103) 
q MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (104) 
q MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE OF LAW (105) 
q MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF (106) 
q MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF (107) 
q MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, UNIVERSITY OF (108) 
q MITCHELL | HAMLINE SCHOOL OF LAW (109) 
q MONTANA, UNIVERSITY OF (110) 
q NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, UNIVERSITY OF (111) 
q NEVADA-LAS VEGAS, UNIVERSITY OF (BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW) (112) 
q NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW (113) 
q NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIVERSITY OF (FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER) 
(114) 
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q NEW MEXICO, UNIVERSITY OF (115) 
q NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL (116) 
q NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (117) 
q NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY (118) 
q NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF (119) 
q NORTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (120) 
q NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (121) 
q NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY (122) 
q NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY (CHASE COLLEGE OF LAW) (123) 
q NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (124) 
q NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF (125) 
q NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (BROAD LAW CENTER) (126) 
q OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY (PETTIT COLLEGE OF LAW) (127) 
q OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY (MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW) (128) 
q OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY (129) 
q OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF (130) 
q OREGON, UNIVERSITY OF (131) 
q PACE UNIVERSITY (132) 
q PACIFIC, UNIVERSITY OF THE (MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW) (133) 
q PENN STATE UNIVERSITY (DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW) (134) 
q PENN STATE UNIVERSITY (PENN STATE LAW) (135) 
q PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF (136) 
q PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY (137) 
q PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF (138) 
q PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF P.R. (139) 
q PUERTO RICO, UNIVERSITY OF (140) 
q QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE (141) 
q REGENT UNIVERSITY (142) 
q RICHMOND, UNIVERSITY OF (143) 
q ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY (144) 
q RUTGERS UNIVERSITY (145) 
q RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - CAMDEN (146) 
q RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - NEWARK (147) 
q SAMFORD UNIVERSITY (CUMBERLAND SCHOOL OF LAW) (148) 
q SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF (149) 
q SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF (150) 
q SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY (151) 
q SEATTLE UNIVERSITY (152) 
q SETON HALL UNIVERSITY (153) 
q SOUTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF (154) 
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q SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (155) 
q SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW (156) 
q SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF (GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(157) 
q SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY - CARBONDALE (158) 
q SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY (DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW) (159) 
q SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER (160) 
q SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL (161) 
q ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY (162) 
q ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY (163) 
q ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY (164) 
q ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY (165) 
q ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (166) 
q STANFORD UNIVERSITY (167) 
q STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO (168) 
q STETSON UNIVERSITY (169) 
q SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY (170) 
q SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY (171) 
q TEMPLE UNIVERSITY (BEASLEY SCHOOL OF LAW) (172) 
q TENNESSEE-KNOXVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (173) 
q TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY (TEXAS WESLEYAN SCHOOL OF LAW) (174) 
q TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY (MARSHALL SCHOOL OF LAW) (175) 
q TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY (176) 
q TEXAS-AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF (177) 
q THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW (178) 
q THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL (179) 
q TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF (180) 
q TOURO COLLEGE (FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER) (181) 
q TULANE UNIVERSITY (182) 
q TULSA, UNIVERSITY OF (183) 
q UTAH, UNIVERSITY OF (QUINNEY COLLEGE OF LAW) (184) 
q VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY (185) 
q VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (186) 
q VERMONT LAW SCHOOL (187) 
q VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY (188) 
q VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF (189) 
q WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY (190) 
q WASHBURN UNIVERSITY (191) 
q WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY (192) 
q WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (193) 
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q WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF (194) 
q WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY (195) 
q WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY (196) 
q WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY (197) 
q WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW (198) 
q WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL (199) 
q WIDENER UNIVERSITY - HARRISBURG (200) 
q WIDENER UNIVERSITY - WILMINGTON (201) 
q WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY (202) 
q WILLIAM & MARY, COLLEGE OF (203) 
q WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW (204) 
q WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF (205) 
q WYOMING, UNIVERSITY OF (206) 
q YALE UNIVERSITY (207) 
q YESHIVA UNIVERSITY (CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW) (208) 
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Q23 If you weren't attending law school at your current school, which one of the law 
schools that accepted you would likely have been your next choice? 
m AKRON, UNIVERSITY OF (1) 
m ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF (2) 
m ALBANY LAW SCHOOL OF UNION UNIVERSITY (3) 
m AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW) (4) 
m APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW (5) 
m ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY (O'CONNOR COLLEGE OF LAW) (6) 
m ARIZONA SUMMIT LAW SCHOOL (PHOENIX LAW SCHOOL) (7) 
m ARIZONA, UNIVERSITY OF (ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW) (8) 
m ARKANSAS-FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (9) 
m ARKANSAS-LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF (BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(10) 
m AVE MARIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (11) 
m BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF (12) 
m BARRY UNIVERSITY (ANDREAS SCHOOL OF LAW) (13) 
m BAYLOR UNIVERSITY (14) 
m BELMONT UNIVERSITY (15) 
m BOSTON COLLEGE (16) 
m BOSTON UNIVERSITY (17) 
m BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY (CLARK LAW SCHOOL) (18) 
m BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL (19) 
m CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW (20) 
m CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF (21) 
m CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF (22) 
m CALIFORNIA-HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF (23) 
m CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF (24) 
m CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF (25) 
m CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY (26) 
m CAPITAL UNIVERSITY (27) 
m CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY (28) 
m CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA (29) 
m CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY (FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW) (30) 
m CHARLESTON SCHOOL OF LAW (31) 
m CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW (32) 
m CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF (33) 
m CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF (34) 
m CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (35) 
m CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY (CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF 
LAW) (36) 
m COLORADO-BOULDER, UNIVERSITY OF (37) 
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m COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (38) 
m CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY (39) 
m CONNECTICUT, UNIVERSITY OF (40) 
m CORNELL UNIVERSITY (41) 
m CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY (42) 
m DAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF (43) 
m DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF (STURM COLLEGE OF LAW) (44) 
m DEPAUL UNIVERSITY (45) 
m DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF (CLARKE SCHOOL OF LAW) (46) 
m DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF (47) 
m DRAKE UNIVERSITY (48) 
m DREXEL UNIVERSITY (KLINE SCHOOL OF LAW) (49) 
m DUKE UNIVERSITY (50) 
m DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY (51) 
m ELON UNIVERSITY (52) 
m EMORY UNIVERSITY (53) 
m FAULKNER UNIVERSITY (JONES SCHOOL OF LAW) (54) 
m FLORIDA A&M SCHOOL OF LAW (55) 
m FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW (56) 
m FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LAW (57) 
m FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY (58) 
m FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF (LEVIN COLLEGE OF LAW) (59) 
m FORDHAM UNIVERSITY (60) 
m GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (61) 
m GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (62) 
m GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (63) 
m GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY (64) 
m GEORGIA, UNIVERSITY OF (65) 
m GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY (66) 
m GONZAGA UNIVERSITY (67) 
m HAMLINE UNIVERSITY (68) 
m HARVARD UNIVERSITY (69) 
m HAWAII-MANOA, UNIVERSITY OF (RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW) (70) 
m HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY (DEANE SCHOOL OF LAW) (71) 
m HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF (72) 
m HOWARD UNIVERSITY (73) 
m IDAHO, UNIVERSITY OF (74) 
m ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF 
LAW) (75) 
m ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF (76) 
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m INDIANA TECH LAW SCHOOL (77) 
m INDIANA UNIVERSITY - BLOOMINGTON (MAURER SCHOOL OF LAW) (78) 
m INDIANA UNIVERSITY - INDIANAPOLIS (MCKINNEY SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(79) 
m INTER AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO (80) 
m IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF (81) 
m JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - ATLANTA (82) 
m JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - CHICAGO (83) 
m KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF (84) 
m KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY OF (85) 
m LA VERNE, UNIVERSITY OF  (86) 
m LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE (NORTHWESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW) (87) 
m LIBERTY UNIVERSITY (88) 
m LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY (89) 
m LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY (HEBERT LAW CENTER) (90) 
m LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW) (91) 
m LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY - LOS ANGELES (92) 
m LOYOLA UNIVERSITY - CHICAGO (93) 
m LOYOLA UNIVERSITY - NEW ORLEANS (94) 
m MAINE, UNIVERSITY OF (95) 
m MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY (96) 
m MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF (CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW) (97) 
m MASSACHUSETTS-DARTMOUTH, UNIVERSITY OF (98) 
m MEMPHIS, UNIVERSITY OF (HUMPHREYS SCHOOL OF LAW) (99) 
m MERCER UNIVERSITY (GEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW) (100) 
m MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF (101) 
m MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY (102) 
m MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF (103) 
m MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (104) 
m MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE OF LAW (105) 
m MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF (106) 
m MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF (107) 
m MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, UNIVERSITY OF (108) 
m MITCHELL | HAMLINE SCHOOL OF LAW (109) 
m MONTANA, UNIVERSITY OF (110) 
m NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, UNIVERSITY OF (111) 
m NEVADA-LAS VEGAS, UNIVERSITY OF (BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW) (112) 
m NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW (113) 
m NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIVERSITY OF (FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER) 
(114) 
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m NEW MEXICO, UNIVERSITY OF (115) 
m NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL (116) 
m NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (117) 
m NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY (118) 
m NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF (119) 
m NORTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (120) 
m NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (121) 
m NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY (122) 
m NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY (CHASE COLLEGE OF LAW) (123) 
m NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (124) 
m NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF (125) 
m NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (BROAD LAW CENTER) (126) 
m OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY (PETTIT COLLEGE OF LAW) (127) 
m OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY (MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW) (128) 
m OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY (129) 
m OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF (130) 
m OREGON, UNIVERSITY OF (131) 
m PACE UNIVERSITY (132) 
m PACIFIC, UNIVERSITY OF THE (MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW) (133) 
m PENN STATE UNIVERSITY (DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW) (134) 
m PENN STATE UNIVERSITY (PENN STATE LAW) (135) 
m PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF (136) 
m PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY (137) 
m PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF (138) 
m PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF P.R. (139) 
m PUERTO RICO, UNIVERSITY OF (140) 
m QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE (141) 
m REGENT UNIVERSITY (142) 
m RICHMOND, UNIVERSITY OF (143) 
m ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY (144) 
m RUTGERS UNIVERSITY (145) 
m RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - CAMDEN (146) 
m RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - NEWARK (147) 
m SAMFORD UNIVERSITY (CUMBERLAND SCHOOL OF LAW) (148) 
m SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF (149) 
m SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF (150) 
m SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY (151) 
m SEATTLE UNIVERSITY (152) 
m SETON HALL UNIVERSITY (153) 
m SOUTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF (154) 
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m SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF (155) 
m SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW (156) 
m SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF (GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW) 
(157) 
m SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY - CARBONDALE (158) 
m SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY (DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW) (159) 
m SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER (160) 
m SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL (161) 
m ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY (162) 
m ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY (163) 
m ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY (164) 
m ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY (165) 
m ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (166) 
m STANFORD UNIVERSITY (167) 
m STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO (168) 
m STETSON UNIVERSITY (169) 
m SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY (170) 
m SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY (171) 
m TEMPLE UNIVERSITY (BEASLEY SCHOOL OF LAW) (172) 
m TENNESSEE-KNOXVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF (173) 
m TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY (TEXAS WESLEYAN SCHOOL OF LAW) (174) 
m TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY (MARSHALL SCHOOL OF LAW) (175) 
m TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY (176) 
m TEXAS-AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF (177) 
m THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW (178) 
m THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL (179) 
m TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF (180) 
m TOURO COLLEGE (FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER) (181) 
m TULANE UNIVERSITY (182) 
m TULSA, UNIVERSITY OF (183) 
m UTAH, UNIVERSITY OF (QUINNEY COLLEGE OF LAW) (184) 
m VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY (185) 
m VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (186) 
m VERMONT LAW SCHOOL (187) 
m VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY (188) 
m VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF (189) 
m WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY (190) 
m WASHBURN UNIVERSITY (191) 
m WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY (192) 
m WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (193) 
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m WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF (194) 
m WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY (195) 
m WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY (196) 
m WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY (197) 
m WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW (198) 
m WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL (199) 
m WIDENER UNIVERSITY - HARRISBURG (200) 
m WIDENER UNIVERSITY - WILMINGTON (201) 
m WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY (202) 
m WILLIAM & MARY, COLLEGE OF (203) 
m WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW (204) 
m WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF (205) 
m WYOMING, UNIVERSITY OF (206) 
m YALE UNIVERSITY (207) 
m YESHIVA UNIVERSITY (CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW) (208) 
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Q24 Please sort the following items into factors of greatest, average, and least 
consideration, and then rank those factors you considered when deciding to attend in the 
law school at which you currently enrolled. 
Factors of greatest 
consideration 
Factors of average 
consideration 
Factors of least consideration 
______ Academic reputation 
(1) 
______ Academic reputation 
(1) 
______ Academic reputation 
(1) 
______ Alumni network (2) ______ Alumni network (2) ______ Alumni network (2) 
______ Bar passage rate (3) ______ Bar passage rate (3) ______ Bar passage rate (3) 
______ Campus / law 
building's aesthetic appeal (4) 
______ Campus / law 
building's aesthetic appeal (4) 
______ Campus / law 
building's aesthetic appeal (4) 
______ City / town amenities 
(5) 
______ City / town amenities 
(5) 
______ City / town amenities 
(5) 
______ Co-curriculuar 
opportunities (6) 
______ Co-curriculuar 
opportunities (6) 
______ Co-curriculuar 
opportunities (6) 
______ Diversity of faculty 
(7) 
______ Diversity of faculty 
(7) 
______ Diversity of faculty 
(7) 
______ Diversity of students 
(8) 
______ Diversity of students 
(8) 
______ Diversity of students 
(8) 
______ Extra-curricular 
opportunities (9) 
______ Extra-curricular 
opportunities (9) 
______ Extra-curricular 
opportunities (9) 
______ Faculty interaction 
(10) 
______ Faculty interaction 
(10) 
______ Faculty interaction 
(10) 
______ Financial aid package 
(11) 
______ Financial aid package 
(11) 
______ Financial aid package 
(11) 
______ Job placement rate 
(12) 
______ Job placement rate 
(12) 
______ Job placement rate 
(12) 
______ Law career 
opportunities in the city / state 
region (13) 
______ Law career 
opportunities in the city / state 
region (13) 
______ Law career 
opportunities in the city / state 
region (13) 
______ Law career 
opportunities in the state / 
national region (14) 
______ Law career 
opportunities in the state / 
national region (14) 
______ Law career 
opportunities in the state / 
national region (14) 
______ Location in my 
preferred bar jurisdiction (15) 
______ Location in my 
preferred bar jurisdiction (15) 
______ Location in my 
preferred bar jurisdiction (15) 
______ Proximity to my home 
/ family (16) 
______ Proximity to my home 
/ family (16) 
______ Proximity to my home 
/ family (16) 
______ Religious affiliation 
(17) 
______ Religious affiliation 
(17) 
______ Religious affiliation 
(17) 
______ Size of the classes / 
law school (18) 
______ Size of the classes / 
law school (18) 
______ Size of the classes / 
law school (18) 
______ Social opportunities 
(19) 
______ Social opportunities 
(19) 
______ Social opportunities 
(19) 
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______ Sports teams (20) ______ Sports teams (20) ______ Sports teams (20) 
______ US News ranking (21) ______ US News ranking (21) ______ US News ranking (21) 
______ Other (please 
explain): (22) 
______ Other (please 
explain): (22) 
______ Other (please 
explain): (22) 
 
 
Q25 Please sort and then rank the following items into sources of information you 
considered when deciding to attend the law school at which you are currently enrolled. 
Sources of Information in Deciding to Attend Law School 
______ ABA 509 Disclosure Reports (1) 
______ Above the Law Rankings (2) 
______ Law School Admission Council (LSAC) Data (3) 
______ Law school's acceptance letter and materials (4) 
______ Law school's website (5) 
______ National Association for Law Placement (NALP) Data (6) 
______ Newspaper or periodical (please name): (7) 
______ State Bar website (8) 
______ Vault Rankings (9) 
______ US News Rankings (10) 
______ Word of mouth reputation of your law school (11) 
______ Other (please explain): (12) 
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Q26 What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? 
m To work as an attorney in private practice. (1) 
m To work as an attorney or law clerk for federal, state, or local government. (2) 
m To work as an attorney in the public interest, with an advocacy organization or with a 
non-profit agency. (3) 
m To work in business, not as an attorney (e.g. banking or consulting). (4) 
m To work as an academic or in university administration, not as an attorney. (5) 
m To work in another professional position, not as an attorney (e.g., accountant, teacher, 
business manager, nurse). (6) 
m To work in a non-professional position, not as an attorney (i.e. in a position that does 
not require any special professional skills or training). (7) 
m Other (please explain): (8) ____________________ 
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Display This Question: 
If What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work as an attorney in private practice. Is Selected 
Or What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work as an attorney or law clerk for federal, state, or local government. Is Selected 
Or What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work as an attorney in the public interest, with an advocacy organization or with a non-profit 
agency. Is Selected 
Q27a Which field of law will likely be your primary practice area immediately following 
graduation from law school? 
q Administrative Law (1) 
q Antitrust (2) 
q Appellate Litigation (3) 
q Bankruptcy (4) 
q Children's Law/Juvenile Justice (5) 
q Civil Rights/Civil Liberties (6) 
q Contracts (7) 
q Communications Law (8) 
q Corporate Law (9) 
q Criminal Law (10) 
q Education Law (11) 
q Employment/Labor Law (12) 
q Environmental Law (13) 
q Family Law (14) 
q General Legal Services (15) 
q Government Law (16) 
q Health Law (17) 
q Housing Law/Community Economic Development (18) 
q Immigration Law (19) 
q Insurance Law (20) 
q Intellectual Property Law (21) 
q International Trade Law (22) 
q Land Use (23) 
q Mergers and Acquisitions (24) 
q National Security Law (25) 
q Privacy Law (26) 
q Public Interest Law (27) 
q Real Estate Law (28) 
q Securities (29) 
q Sports/Entertainment Law (30) 
q Tax Law (31) 
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q Trusts and Estates (32) 
q White Collar Crime (33) 
 
Display This Question: 
If What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work as an attorney in private practice. Is Selected 
Or What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work as an attorney or law clerk for federal, state, or local government. Is Selected 
Or What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work as an attorney in the public interest, with an advocacy organization or with a non-profit 
agency. Is Selected 
Q27b How long do you plan to work as an attorney following your graduation from law 
school? 
______ Number of years (1) 
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Display This Question: 
If What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work in business, not as an attorney (e.g. banking or consulting). Is Selected 
Or What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work in another professional position, not as an attorney (e.g., accountant, teacher, business 
manager, nurse). Is Selected 
Or What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? To 
work in a non-professional position, not as an attorney (i.e. in a position that does not require any 
special professional skills or training). Is Selected 
Or What are your career interests immediately following graduation from law school? Other 
(please explain): Is Selected 
Q27c If you do not plan to work as an attorney following your graduation, what sector 
best describes the area you plan to work in? 
m Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry, or Hunting (1) 
m Construction (2) 
m Educational Services (K-12 or Higher Education) (3) 
m Financial Activities (4) 
m Government or Public Administration (Federal) (5) 
m Government or Public Administration (State or Local) (6) 
m Information Services (7) 
m Leisure and Hospitality (8) 
m Manufacturing (9) 
m Medical or Health Services (10) 
m Mining or Natural Resources (11) 
m Professional and Business Services (12) 
m Retail Trade (13) 
m Social Assistance (14) 
m Technology or Communications (15) 
m Transportation and Warehousing (16) 
m Utilities (17) 
m Wholesale Trade (18) 
m Other (please explain): (19) 
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Q28 Approximately how much loan debt will you accrue:a. this year (2017-2018 school 
year)?b. over the course of your law school education? 
______ a. this year. (1) 
______ b. over the course of your law school education. (2) 
 
Q29 Did you plan to or are you enrolled in the Public Service Loan Forgiveness plan? 
m Yes (1) 
m No (2) 
 
Q30 What percentage of your law school expenses (tuition, fees, room, and board) is met 
by the following sources? 
______ Law school scholarship (1) 
______ Other scholarship (e.g. 3rd party scholarship) (2) 
______ Government aid (e.g. military benefits) (3) 
______ Federal loans (e.g. Stafford and Perkins loans) (4) 
______ Non-government loans (e.g. 3rd party loans) (5) 
______ Savings (personal) (6) 
______ Spousal support (or combined savings) (7) 
______ Parents or other relatives (not including spouse) (8) 
______ Other (please explain): (9) 
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Q31 Please select one of the following options relating to your cost preference. How 
much more or less would you be willing to pay to attend: 
 Much 
less than 
I do now. 
(1) 
Less than 
I do now. 
(2) 
Slightly 
less than I 
do now. 
(3) 
About 
the same 
as I do 
now. (4) 
Slightly 
more than 
I do now. 
(5) 
More 
than I do 
now. (6) 
Much 
more 
than I do 
now. (7) 
A bottom-
tier law 
school 
nationally. 
(1) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
A bottom-
tier law 
school 
regionally. 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
A mid-tier 
law school 
nationally. 
(3) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
A mid-tier 
law school 
regionally. 
(4) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
A top-tier 
law school 
nationally. 
(5) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
A top-tier 
law school 
regionally. 
(6) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
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Q32 Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with the following 
statements about paying for your legal education. 
 Totally 
Agree 
(1) 
Mostly 
Agree 
(2) 
Slightly 
Agree (3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
Disagree 
(5) 
Mostly 
Disagree 
(6) 
Totally 
Disagree 
(7) 
My legal 
education 
is an 
important 
investment 
in my 
future. (1) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Paying for 
my legal 
education 
is 
expensive. 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
My legal 
education 
so far has 
been 
worth the 
money. (3) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I have 
concerns 
about my 
ability to 
pay for my 
legal 
education. 
(4) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
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Q33 Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with the following 
statements about your skills training. 
 Totally 
Agree 
(1) 
Mostly 
Agree 
(2) 
Slightly 
Agree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
Disagree 
(5) 
Mostly 
Disagree 
(6) 
Totally 
Disagree 
(7) 
My legal 
education has 
trained me in 
the skills 
necessary to 
perform 
successfully 
in my 
preferred job 
for the first 
few years of 
my career. 
(1) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I have 
concerns 
about my 
training for 
the bar exam. 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
My legal 
education has 
trained me in 
the skills 
necessary to 
perform 
successfully 
in my 
preferred job 
for my whole 
career. (3) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I have 
concerns 
about my 
training for a 
career in my 
preferred job. 
(4) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
My legal 
education has 
trained me in 
skills that are 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
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applicable to 
a variety of 
fields. (5) 
I have 
concerns 
about the 
transferability 
of the skills I 
have gained 
in law school. 
(6) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
Q34 Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with the following 
statements about your job prospects. 
 Totally 
Agree 
(1) 
Mostly 
Agree 
(2) 
Slightly 
Agree (3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
Disagree 
(5) 
Mostly 
Disagree 
(6) 
Totally 
Disagree 
(7) 
My legal 
education 
makes me 
a better job 
candidate 
than I was 
before I 
attended 
law 
school. (1) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I have 
concerns 
about my 
ability to 
find a job 
in my 
preferred 
field upon 
my 
graduation. 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
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Q35 Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 Totally 
Agree 
(1) 
Mostly 
Agree 
(2) 
Slightly 
Agree (3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
Disagree 
(5) 
Mostly 
Disagree 
(6) 
Totally 
Disagree 
(7) 
I follow 
the motto, 
"Nothing 
ventured, 
nothing 
gained." 
(1) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I don't like 
to put 
something 
at stake; I 
would 
rather be 
on the 
safe side. 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
Q36       Some activities, such as those listed below, involve a financial risk or risk of 
gaining or losing money or other assets. On a scale from 1 to 10, rate your propensity for 
accepting financial risk in the corresponding activity. 
______ Investing (e.g. buying shares of stock) (1) 
______ Gambling (e.g. in casinos) (2) 
______ Betting (e.g. on horses) (3) 
______ Entrepreneurial speculation (e.g. starting or funding a business) (4) 
 
Q37                                     Imagine that you frequently go rock climbing in the 
mountains, over steep rocks and on mountain sides with the help of ropes and hooks, 
etc. Think of a situation in which your friends and you have climbed up half the 
mountain. You have come to a particularly difficult rock face which requires 
considerable skill. Successfully climbing up such a rock face would give satisfaction, the 
feeling that one has some mastery over the environment. However, accidents may also 
occur if the situation turns out to be too difficult and mistakes are made. So the critical 
question is whether or not to take a risk. In such a situation, how likely is it that you 
would decide to tackle the upcoming rock face? 
______   (1) 
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Q38 Please enter your law school email address below (only .edu or .law email domains, 
please) to be considered for the Amazon gift card drawing at your law school. Only 
complete survey responses will be eligible for entry. 
Email address: (1) 
 
End The question above, is the final question. Only click the next arrow, below, if you 
are ready to submit your completed survey. Thank you for your participation in this 
study. 
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